A. Lincoln_ A Biography Part 23

CHAPTER 22.

What Will the Country Say? January 1863May 1863 ALL PERSONS HELD AS SLAVES ... SHALL BE THEN, THENCEFORWARD, AND FOREVER FREE.

ABRAHAM LINCOLNEmanc.i.p.ation Proclamation, January 1, 1863 -BRAHAM LINCOLN DID NOT GO TO BED ON NEW YEAR'S EVE. AS revelers celebrated in streets nearby, he paced back and forth on the White House second floor. For weeks he had been absorbed with finalizing the wording of his Emanc.i.p.ation Proclamation. revelers celebrated in streets nearby, he paced back and forth on the White House second floor. For weeks he had been absorbed with finalizing the wording of his Emanc.i.p.ation Proclamation.

In the early hours of January 1, 1863, Lincoln walked from his bedroom in the west end of the White House to his office in the east end. He sat at the long oak table cluttered with rolled-up maps, newspapers, letters, and military orders, and reached for the proclamation that had become the subject of so much debate and controversy in recent months.

More than anyone, Lincoln understood the implications of the signing to take place that afternoon. The war had now convulsed the nation for more than two and a half years; some had started calling it "Mr. Lincoln's war." In the spring of 1861, most people in the North had predicted a quick victory, but the question on everyone's mind now was: How long would this war go on?

As the first rays of sun came through his office's east window, Lincoln reviewed three long pieces of paper, determined to revise the proclamation one more time before signing it. He studied again the central paragraph.

And by virtue of the power, and for the purpose aforesaid, I do order and declare that all persons held as slaves within said designated States, and parts of States, are, and henceforward shall be free, and that the Executive government of the United States, including the military and naval authorities thereof, will recognize and maintain the freedom of said persons.

How long he had brooded over the decision about slavery announced in these words.

IN THE LAST WEEKS OF DECEMBER, critics had besieged Lincoln from all sides. He barely mentioned the proclamation in his annual message to Congress on December 1, 1862, and many wondered whether Lincoln still intended to hold fast to it. Abolitionists were acclaiming Lincoln's initiative but grumbling that it did not go far enough. African-American leader Frederick Dougla.s.s wondered aloud, "What if the President fails in this trial hour, what if he now listens to the demon slavery-and rejects the entreaties of the Angel of Liberty?" Old-line Republican supporters were concerned about how the proclamation would affect the morale of troops, who, they repeated, had signed on to save the Union, not to free slaves. Emboldened by Democratic gains in the 1862 elections, Democratic newspapers, such as the Chicago Times, Chicago Times, predicted that Lincoln would withdraw the final proclamation. predicted that Lincoln would withdraw the final proclamation.

Republican senators Charles Sumner and Orville Browning offered opposite recommendations to Lincoln. On December 27, 1862, Sumner called on the president at the White House. He brought with him a memorial signed by ministers calling for him to "stand by" his proclamation. The Ma.s.sachusetts senator talked with Lincoln about how many persons were "impatient" that the act be signed. Lincoln responded, he "could not stop the Proclamation if he would, & would not if he could."

Browning, who always had personal access to the president, called at the White House to convey his belief that the proclamation "was fraught with evil ... and would do much injury." A conservative Republican, Browning had previously told the president that he believed the announcement of the proclamation in September was the main reason behind the disappointing biennial election results. Resigned to the fact that the president intended to sign it, Browning concluded his diary for 1862 with the words, "There is no hope. The proclamation will come-G.o.d grant it may not be productive of the mischief I fear." Lincoln and Browning had enjoyed a close relationship in recent years, but their friendship would begin to cool once Lincoln signed the proclamation.

Early Monday morning, December 29, 1862, Lincoln a.s.sembled his notes and wrote a draft of the proclamation. He gave it to John Nicolay and asked his secretary to make printed copies for members of the cabinet. Lincoln convened his regular cabinet meeting at 10 a.m. He read aloud the final draft, asking the cabinet to make suggestions to him in writing. Secretary of State Seward expressed concern that the proclamation, which he supported in principle, would lead to a total collapse of order in the South. He recommended language urging the freed slaves "to abstain from all violence unless in necessary self-defense." Treasury Secretary Chase presented a new preamble that was lengthier than Lincoln's whole proclamation. Lincoln's original ma.n.u.script copy has not survived, but the copies handed out to Seward, Chase, Edward Bates, and Montgomery Blair do, along with their comments.

On Wednesday, December 31, 1862, Lincoln, having read the cabinet members' written responses, convened a special cabinet meeting to consider the proclamation a final time. Chase proposed adding a "felicitous" concluding sentence. He believed it important for Lincoln to offer justifications for this bold act beyond military necessity. He wanted Lincoln to invoke both the Const.i.tution and G.o.d. Lincoln thanked them for their suggestions and told the cabinet "he would complete the doc.u.ment."

After the meeting concluded, Lincoln greeted a committee of New York abolitionist ministers headed by George Cheever, pastor of the Church of the Puritans, who had auth.o.r.ed G.o.d Against Slavery G.o.d Against Slavery in 1857, and William Goodell, who had helped organize both the American Anti-Slavery Society and the Liberty Party. The ministers wanted some confirmation that Lincoln was actually going to sign the proclamation. Lincoln would only say, "Tomorrow at noon, you shall know-and the country shall know-my decision." in 1857, and William Goodell, who had helped organize both the American Anti-Slavery Society and the Liberty Party. The ministers wanted some confirmation that Lincoln was actually going to sign the proclamation. Lincoln would only say, "Tomorrow at noon, you shall know-and the country shall know-my decision."

Now, on the morning of January 1, 1863, as he sat alone at his table, he decided to ignore the bulk of his cabinet's recommendations. He did work with Chase's suggestion, which became a new final paragraph: "And upon this act, sincerely believed to be an act of justice, warranted by the Const.i.tution, upon military necessity, I invoke the considerate judgment of mankind, and the gracious favor of Almighty G.o.d."

While Lincoln was bent over the table revising, his wife and oldest son appeared in his office. Before retiring the previous evening, Mary had asked her husband, "What do you intend doing?" Now Lincoln looked up, his face worn with lines. Robert Lincoln would comment later that there was a "presence" in his father's manner that silenced both his mother and himself.

Lincoln completed his editing. A clerk was called and asked to carry the doc.u.ment to the State Department where a final copy would be prepared for Lincoln's signature.

At 10:45 a.m. William Seward and his son, Frederick, climbed the stairs to the president's office bearing the newly revised proclamation. While preparing to sign it, the president noticed an error in the transcription. He made the necessary change and asked Seward to have a new copy engrossed, completed in a fine handwriting. By now it was nearly eleven o'clock and Lincoln needed to prepare to meet his New Year's Day guests in the Blue Room.

Outside the White House, the streets of Washington had been thronged with persons eager to welcome in the New Year since early morning. The day had dawned bright and clear. People greeted one another with "warm salutations." Despite the tenseness in the capital in the wake of the demoralizing defeat at Fredericksburg in December, the festivities of New Year's Day seemed to hold out the prospect of a hopeful and better future.

The crowd, larger than usual, knew how special this reception would be. New Year's Day receptions at the White House were a long tradition, and on January 1, 1863, persons of all walks of life wanted to be present when Lincoln signed the Emanc.i.p.ation Proclamation. People lined up two and three abreast along Pennsylvania Avenue stretching back toward Seventeenth Street.

The official guests entered the White House at 11 a.m., beginning with the diplomatic corps arrayed in their best finery from the fashions of the various countries. The nine judges of the Supreme Court came next, led by the aged Roger Taney. Gideon Welles, secretary of the navy, attended, but most cabinet members hosted their own receptions at their residences. A group of army officers, who had a.s.sembled at the War Department, arrived together, led by General Henry Halleck.

At twelve noon, the large White House gates were opened and the crowd surged in. Delegations from Maine to California had been waiting in line for hours. The civil and the uncivil pressed and pushed their way the length of the grand portico toward the main entrance. A small detachment of police, backed up by members of a Pennsylvania regiment, tried to maintain some order, but there was little. Visitors were admitted in groups at intervals. As soon as one group had entered, another was pa.s.sed through. Once inside, the "scuffle" of the annual New Year's Day reception began. The plush carpets had been covered to protect them from the mud.

Abraham and Mary Lincoln stood in the Blue Room in the midst of the melee. This was Mary's first public reception since the death of Willie the previous February. Some of the surviving soldiers of the War of 1812, known as the "old defenders," stood out among the visitors. Lincoln was flanked on his left by his outsized Illinois friend Ward Hill Lamon, acting as marshal for the occasion. Lamon obtained the name of each guest and announced the person to the president. Each person was eager to shake the hand of the "pres," as he was familiarly called. Lincoln pumped each hand in return. After three hours of hand shaking, the president was exhausted and his right hand was swollen. Finally, at shortly after 2 p.m., the last of the crowd exited the White House.

The president returned upstairs to his office. Visibly drooping with fatigue, he prepared to sign the proclamation. As he took up his gold pen and dipped it in ink, "his hand trembled, so that he held the pen with difficulty," Senator Charles Sumner observed. Illinois congressman Isaac Arnold reported that Lincoln told him when he grasped the pen, "My hand and arm trembled so violently, that I could not write." Unusually, Lincoln signed his full name in a slow and careful hand. He looked up and allowed himself a little laugh, exclaiming, "That will do." When it was all over, Lincoln sighed, "I never, in my life, felt more certain that I was doing right, than I do in signing this paper."

EVEN ON THIS DAY OF CELEBRATION, Lincoln's continuing struggle to find competent military leadership intruded. After the Union army's de moralizing defeat at Fredericksburg, General Ambrose Burnside, commander of the Army of the Potomac, traveled to Washington and requested a meeting with the president. They met briefly on December 31, but Lincoln convened a larger meeting on the morning of January 1 that included General in Chief Halleck and Secretary of War Stanton.

Lincoln had developed a strong liking for Burnside, a man with large blue eyes and a winning smile. His regard was only strengthened when the general accepted responsibility for the defeat at Fredericksburg, an att.i.tude so unlike that of the previous commander. When Burnside arrived, he gave the president a letter he had written the night before at Willard's Hotel. "Burn," as his men called him, appeared outwardly strong, but inside self-doubt ate away at his ability to command. In his letter he told Lincoln, "It is of the utmost importance that you be surrounded and supported by men who have the confidence of the people and of the army." Because Burnside believed he no longer retained that confidence, he asked to be relieved so that he might "retire to private life." He went on to say that neither Stanton nor Halleck had the confidence of the army, and they should resign also. Lincoln read the letter, and, without saying a word, returned it to Burnside.

The four men talked about Burnside's plan to cross the Rappahannock again. Burnside, cordial but agitated, did not defend his plan but simply expanded on the reasons for it. Lincoln turned to Halleck and asked for his opinion. Halleck hesitated, hemming and hawing. The tension between Burnside and Halleck was evident. The president, irritated, continued to press Halleck for his recommendation; the general in chief replied that the decision was the prerogative of the field commander. Seeing that he was not getting anywhere, Lincoln concluded the meeting.

After Burnside, Stanton, and Halleck left, Lincoln wrote a letter to Halleck instructing him to go with Burnside, a.s.sess the situation, consult with the other officers, and then either approve or disapprove the plan. "If in such a difficulty as this you do not help," Lincoln wrote, "you fail me precisely in the point for which I sought your a.s.sistance. Your military skill is useless to me, if you will not do this." Lincoln gave the letter to Stanton to deliver to Halleck.

When Halleck received the letter, he resigned. Lincoln, finding himself caught in an intolerable situation between a man who acted more like a clerk than a commander, but with no one else to take his place, withdrew his letter. He wrote on the bottom, "Withdrawn, because considered harsh by Gen. Halleck."

LINCOLN DID NOT ACCEPT Burnside's resignation. He wished to give him another opportunity to succeed. Burnside's resignation. He wished to give him another opportunity to succeed.

Relieved by Lincoln's support, Burnside's spirits were revived. He worked long hours with little sleep in an effort to redeem himself and took advantage of the unusual dry winter weather of the first weeks of January to prepare for battle.

Burnside did not intend to keep his troops cooped up in winter quarters. He was determined to win a victory in January that was denied him in December. On a cold, clear January day he mounted his walleyed gray horse, Major, for "a fine ride of 15 or 18 miles," bound for a personal reconnaissance of the upper fords of the Rappahannock, looking for the best place where his huge army might cross above Fredericks-burg.

On Monday morning, January 19, 1863, Burnside gave the orders for his 130,000-man army to begin the march up the Rappahannock. The river, which traversed 184 miles across northern Virginia, had become an unofficial boundary between North and South. The troops initially marched quickly on dry roads. Intelligence, which would later prove faulty, brought news that James Longstreet's corps had departed for Tennessee. Burnside hoped this might be the beginning of a great Union victory.

His hopes were quickly dashed. After three weeks of clear weather, it began to rain heavily, turning the roads into a quagmire. Wagons bogged down. Horses struggled to pull the heavy artillery. After two days, Burnside ordered the troops back to winter camp. What became dubbed derisively the "Mud March" resulted in yet another failure for the Army of the Potomac.

Burnside learned that Joseph Hooker and William B. Franklin, two key senior officers, had openly criticized his plans to their troops. He was determined that there should be accountability for the defeatist chatter. He headed for Washington, and, after considerable difficulty because of the continuing horrendous weather, made it shortly after 7 a.m. on January 24, 1863. He went directly to see Lincoln, carrying Order Number Eight, which outlined his determination to fire or transfer Hooker, William Franklin, and other complainers who he believed had sowed dissension in the ranks, or be himself relieved of command.

The next day, January 25, 1863, Lincoln welcomed Burnside into his office at 10 a.m. The president thanked Burnside for his service and told him he had decided to replace him. Burnside was rea.s.signed to the Department of the Ohio.

WHO WOULD BE BURNSIDE'S REPLACEMENT? At a time of low morale, both in the country and throughout the Army of the Potomac, Lincoln understood how much was riding on making the right appointment. Whoever he chose would be the fourth commander of the Army of the Potomac in less than two years. Lincoln determined not to consider George McClellan or any of McClellan's partisans, some of whom the president now transferred out of the Army of the Potomac. He may have thought of Western commanders, such as Ulysses S. Grant or William S. Rosecrans, but they were doing well where they were. Besides, Lincoln did not want to antagonize his Eastern soldiers with another imported Western commander, as had happened six months earlier with the appointment of John Pope. At a time of low morale, both in the country and throughout the Army of the Potomac, Lincoln understood how much was riding on making the right appointment. Whoever he chose would be the fourth commander of the Army of the Potomac in less than two years. Lincoln determined not to consider George McClellan or any of McClellan's partisans, some of whom the president now transferred out of the Army of the Potomac. He may have thought of Western commanders, such as Ulysses S. Grant or William S. Rosecrans, but they were doing well where they were. Besides, Lincoln did not want to antagonize his Eastern soldiers with another imported Western commander, as had happened six months earlier with the appointment of John Pope.

Lincoln offered a surprise when he decided to appoint Joseph Hooker, even after all of Hooker's sniping at Burnside behind his back. Lincoln did not consult Stanton, Halleck, or members of his cabinet. At a White House reception the evening of January 24, 1863, Henry J. Raymond, editor of the New York Times, New York Times, warned Lincoln about Hooker's loose talk. Lincoln put his hand on Raymond's shoulder and, speaking softly into his ear, not wanting to be overheard, said, "That is all true. Hooker does talk badly, but the trouble is, he is stronger with the country today than any other man." Lincoln's primary priority in early 1863 had become the public and the soldiers. warned Lincoln about Hooker's loose talk. Lincoln put his hand on Raymond's shoulder and, speaking softly into his ear, not wanting to be overheard, said, "That is all true. Hooker does talk badly, but the trouble is, he is stronger with the country today than any other man." Lincoln's primary priority in early 1863 had become the public and the soldiers.

Born in Hadley, Ma.s.sachusetts, and a graduate of West Point, "Fighting Joe" Hooker was handsome, with wavy brown hair and blue eyes. He had earned his nickname for his courage at Williamsburg in the battle on the Virginia peninsula in the spring of 1862. Hooker seemed to be everywhere, calmly directing his men from the vantage point of "Colonel," his large white horse. Hooker did not like his nickname because he believed it did him "incalculable injury," leading the public to think "I am a hot headed, furious young fellow" not given to calm and thoughtful military leadership. He earned a reputation for caring about his soldiers during the siege at Yorktown. He commanded a division in the second battle of Bull Run and was wounded in the foot at Antietam in September 1862.

If Lincoln may have earlier overlooked some of the flaws of McClellan, Pope, Halleck, and Burnside, he made the appointment of Hooker with his eyes wide open. Lincoln knew that Hooker came with both a.s.sets and liabilities. Hooker's chief a.s.sets were that he was an independent and outspoken soldier. Hooker's chief liabilities were the same two qualities. In the Mexican War, he had criticized General Winfield Scott, testifying against him in a court of inquiry. a.s.signed to command the Center Grand Division under Burnside at Fredericksburg, he was "incensed" from the start of Burn's much-too-slow strategy to cross the Rappahannock. He tried to persuade Burnside not to continue the suicidal attack on Marye's Heights.

Abraham Lincoln made a surprise appointment in choosing "Fighting Joe" Hooker to become the fourth commander of the Army of the Potomac in January 1863.

When Lincoln made his decision to appoint Hooker, he summoned him to the White House. The president told him, I think it best for you to know that there are some things in regard to which, I am not quite satisfied with you. ... I think that during Gen. Burnside's command of the Army, you have taken counsel of your ambition, and thwarted him as much as you could, in which you did a great wrong to the country, and to a most meritorious and honorable brother officer.

One can only imagine Hooker's expression when Lincoln then said, "Of course it was not for not for this, but in spite of it, that I have given you the command." Lincoln had heard that among Hooker's headstrong loose talk he had made the suggestion that what the country might need in this crisis was a dictator. Lincoln told Hooker, "Only those generals who gain successes, can set up dictators. What I now ask of you is military success, and I will risk the dictatorship." this, but in spite of it, that I have given you the command." Lincoln had heard that among Hooker's headstrong loose talk he had made the suggestion that what the country might need in this crisis was a dictator. Lincoln told Hooker, "Only those generals who gain successes, can set up dictators. What I now ask of you is military success, and I will risk the dictatorship."

Lincoln later wrote what he had said in Hooker's letter of appointment. He mingled affirmation with admonition in the remarkable letter, all in a tone of kindness, even humor. Several months later, Hooker told reporter Noah Brooks, "That is just such a letter as a father might write to a son. It is a beautiful letter, and although I think he was harder on me than I deserved, I will say I love the man who wrote it."

As a part of his appointment, Hooker requested that he report directly to the president, wanting to bypa.s.s Henry Halleck. Hooker and Halleck had studied together at West Point, but bad blood had developed in their days in California in the 1850s. Apparently Hooker owed Halleck money, and Halleck had publicly disapproved of Hooker's drinking and carousing. Lincoln, sometimes too willing to oblige, acquiesced to Hooker's request. His decision to bypa.s.s the chain of command would pose problems in the future.

With a new commander in place and no immediate advance planned, Lincoln could finally step back from his daily regimen as commander in chief. No president, before or after, ever spent nearly as much time in the day-to-day, hour-by-hour command of the armed forces of the nation. Lincoln's nonstop work was taking a tremendous toll on him.

WHO DID THE EMANc.i.p.aTION PROCLAMATION FREE? Critics quickly created an oft-repeated maxim that the only slaves emanc.i.p.ated were outside the reach of the Northern army. The proclamation exempted the border states, as well as Tennessee, plus areas of Virginia and Louisiana occupied by Union troops. The proclamation was not so much a fact accomplished as a promise to be realized. Critics quickly created an oft-repeated maxim that the only slaves emanc.i.p.ated were outside the reach of the Northern army. The proclamation exempted the border states, as well as Tennessee, plus areas of Virginia and Louisiana occupied by Union troops. The proclamation was not so much a fact accomplished as a promise to be realized.

If the Emanc.i.p.ation Proclamation could be achieved, it would be by the marching feet of a liberating army. But up until now this had been "a white man's war." By the middle of the nineteenth century, most Americans had forgotten that African-Americans fought in both the Revolutionary War and the War of 1812. Blacks had been barred from state militias since 1792. The regular army, including West Point, did not recruit or enroll black soldiers.

If critics pointed to the weaknesses of the proclamation, it contained one potentially large strength: "And I further declare and make known, that such persons of suitable condition, will be received into the armed service of the United States to garrison forts, positions, stations, and other places, and to man vessels of all sorts in said service." But the promise came with a question. Did Lincoln intend that freed slaves join the Union army and navy? If so, in what roles? Even Lincoln's closest colleagues were not sure what he intended at the beginning of 1863.

The second Confiscation Act of July 17, 1862, gave Lincoln the power to employ blacks in any way he chose, but he had been reluctant to use them as soldiers. Since early in the war, slaves had sought refuge in Union camps. Soldiers quickly learned that some slaves were willing bearers of information about Confederate troops and movements.

The overwhelming majority of Northern soldiers did not sign up to free black slaves or fight beside them in the Union army. The att.i.tudes of these soldiers combined a hatred of blacks with a greater hatred of the system of slavery they saw as a foundation of the Confederate states.

Recruitment of slaves for the Union military had taken place piecemeal in South Carolina, Louisiana, and Kansas in 1862, without either Lincoln's affirmation or authorization. In July 1862, days before sharing his plans for an Emanc.i.p.ation Proclamation with his cabinet, Lincoln had told Senator Orville Browning that the arming of black soldiers "would produce dangerous & fatal dissatisfaction in our army, and do more injury than good." After his public announcement of his plans for emanc.i.p.ation in September, the suggestion of arming black soldiers incited as much or more antagonism from Democrats and from Unionists in border states than the idea of emanc.i.p.ation itself.

AFTER MONTHS OF FOREBODING, Frederick Dougla.s.s was elated when he heard that Lincoln had signed the Emanc.i.p.ation Proclamation. He had been encouraging the arming of black troops since the start of the war. From his editor's desk in Rochester, and on platforms across the North, Dougla.s.s had criticized the president in 1861 and 1862 for fighting a war with his white hand while his black hand was tied behind his back.

Now, at the beginning of 1863, Dougla.s.s made plans to act upon the military promise within the civil promise of emanc.i.p.ation. In February, he traveled two thousand miles to encourage black enlistment. In an address delivered at the Cooper Inst.i.tute in New York, Dougla.s.s declared, "The colored man only waits for honorable admission into the service of the country. They know that who would be free, themselves must strike the blow, and they long for the opportunity to strike that blow." On his tour, Dougla.s.s was struck by the clash of twin emotions-white Northern discouragement with the war effort and eagerness on the part of blacks to enlist and serve.

As black leaders, abolitionists, and radical Republicans promoted the deployment of black troops, Lincoln moved, quietly, behind the scenes. All the while he was being encouraged, if not pushed, by Secretary of War Stanton, with whom he had forged a strong working relationship.

When Stanton replaced Simon Cameron in Lincoln's cabinet in January 1862, he quickly learned that Treasury Secretary Salmon Chase stood alone in the cabinet in arguing that it made no sense to fight a war while refusing to deal with the underlying cause of the rebellion. Stanton had made himself acceptable to the Buchanan-Breckinridge cabinet by muting his own views, and he did the same thing in his first months in the Lincoln cabinet.

In his early work with Lincoln, Stanton recognized in the president a cautious if not apprehensive att.i.tude about the arming of black troops. In Stanton's dealings with Congress, however, he found himself gravitating toward the ideas of the Benjamin WadeZachariah Chandler Thaddeus Stevens troika, who were far ahead of Lincoln in seeing the absolute necessity of using black troops to win the war.

After January 1, 1863, Lincoln followed Stanton's lead in the arming of black troops. But moving African-Americans from their role as contraband laborers in the rear to trained soldiers at the front would require navigating a tricky obstacle course. The initial obstacle was the white mind-set that blacks, after years of plantation life, did not have the courage to step forward and fight, but would melt away at the first sign of struggle. A second obstacle was the deep prejudice of most white officers from the North who were unwilling to see black soldiers fight alongside white ones. The Confederates were the third obstacle as, alert to the problem of runaway slaves, they moved their slaves away from the seacoast, far from Union lines.

On March 25, 1863, Stanton ordered General Lorenzo Thomas, a career officer, to go to the Mississippi Valley to head up recruitment of African-Americans. Thomas, who for most of his career had been a desk general, surprised his colleagues by becoming a military entrepreneur who, with tireless energy, regularized the recruitment of black soldiers. On the day he began his a.s.signment, only five black regiments had been organized. By the end of 1863, twenty regiments would be organized. The day Thomas headed west, Lincoln wrote to Andrew Johnson, the Democratic military governor of Tennessee, "The bare sight of fifty thousand armed, and drilled black soldiers on the banks of the Mississippi, would end the rebellion at once. And who doubts that we can present that sight, if we but take hold in earnest?"

Artist James Fuller Queen painted these twelve ill.u.s.trated cards in 1863 depicting the journey of a slave from plantation life to freedom. The culmination of the journey is service in the Union army, where he willingly gives his life for the cause of the Union and liberty.

In these months, Lincoln moved from hesitant consent to eager advocacy of black soldiers. He wrote to Stanton, "I desire that a renewed and vigorous effort be made to raise colored forces along the sh.o.r.es of the Mississippi." Stanton had kept Lincoln informed of Thomas's success. The president was impressed. "I think the evidence is nearly conclusive that Gen. Thomas is one of the best, if not the very best, instruments for this service."

LINCOLN WATCHED IMPATIENTLY as Joseph Hooker took charge of the Army of the Potomac. Skeptics abounded. Charles Francis Adams, Jr., great-grandson and grandson of presidents, wrote his father, the U.S. minister to England, that the "Army of the Potomac is at present fearfully demoralized." He added, "The Government" took away McClellan and relieved Burnside-"all this that Hooker may be placed in command, a man who has not the confidence of the army and who in private character is well known to be-I need not say what." as Joseph Hooker took charge of the Army of the Potomac. Skeptics abounded. Charles Francis Adams, Jr., great-grandson and grandson of presidents, wrote his father, the U.S. minister to England, that the "Army of the Potomac is at present fearfully demoralized." He added, "The Government" took away McClellan and relieved Burnside-"all this that Hooker may be placed in command, a man who has not the confidence of the army and who in private character is well known to be-I need not say what."

Much of the resentment in the initial days of Hooker's command was due to the disheartening condition of the soldiers. Thousands were in poor health, and hundreds were dying from lack of adequate medical care in their winter quarters. The majority opposed Lincoln's Emanc.i.p.ation Proclamation. Desertions numbered two hundred per day.

Ill will turned to goodwill, however, as Hooker initiated changes. New hospitals were built and older ones revamped. Improved rations, especially vegetables, suddenly appeared. Hooker stated, "My men shall be fed before I am fed, and before any of my officers are fed." In March, he inst.i.tuted insignia badges of different colors, two inches square, which were worn with pride on the caps of the men of each corps. He implemented Lincoln's order of November 15, 1862, wherein the president, as commander in chief, directed "the orderly observance of the Sabbath," as "a becoming deference to the best sentiment of a Christian people, and a due regard for the Divine will."

Hooker was still not without his detractors. Women and whiskey have always followed soldiers, but Hooker's headquarters became a gathering place for female camp followers who acquired a name that stuck long after the Civil War-"hookers." Stanton warned Hooker to prohibit women and liquor from his camps. Young Adams described Hooker's headquarters as "a combination of bar-room and brothel."

Although Hooker was proving to be a good administrator, Lincoln wondered if he was up to the challenge of leading a large army into battle. In February and March, Hooker sent out detachments up and down the Rappahannock, but Robert E. Lee and his troops, in their winter camps south of the river, derided these moves as intended merely to frighten. Southern pickets greeted Union soldiers with derisive cheers. The winter weather was dark, with plenty of snow and sleet, but Hal-leck and Stanton wondered whether Hooker, despite his earlier criticisms of McClellan, was afflicted with the same disease of inaction. Lincoln decided to see for himself.

On April 4, 1863, Lincoln left the Navy Yard on the steamer Carrie Martin Carrie Martin at 5 p.m. leading a party that included Mary, Tad, Attorney General Bates, and Noah Brooks, correspondent for the at 5 p.m. leading a party that included Mary, Tad, Attorney General Bates, and Noah Brooks, correspondent for the Sacramento Daily Union, Sacramento Daily Union, bound for Hooker's camp at Falmouth, in northern Virginia. On April 6, a bl.u.s.tery day, Lincoln reviewed the cavalry. The president, an excellent horseman, rode using a saddle recently received by Hooker from San Francisco, while little Tad clung to the saddle of his pony, as drums rolled, trumpets blared, and the various regiments dipped their colors. As the president and General Hooker prepared to receive the troops in review, they witnessed a sight never seen before. In the first two years of the war, the Union cavalry were attached to infantry units and generally misused as escort or messenger services. Now, under the leadership of Major General George Stoneman, who had roomed with Stonewall Jackson at West Point, the cavalry had been brought together under a single command. On this day, seventeen thousand cavalry, with horses prancing, the largest cavalry parade ever a.s.sembled, with the six-foot-four-inch Stoneman in the lead, marched before the president. bound for Hooker's camp at Falmouth, in northern Virginia. On April 6, a bl.u.s.tery day, Lincoln reviewed the cavalry. The president, an excellent horseman, rode using a saddle recently received by Hooker from San Francisco, while little Tad clung to the saddle of his pony, as drums rolled, trumpets blared, and the various regiments dipped their colors. As the president and General Hooker prepared to receive the troops in review, they witnessed a sight never seen before. In the first two years of the war, the Union cavalry were attached to infantry units and generally misused as escort or messenger services. Now, under the leadership of Major General George Stoneman, who had roomed with Stonewall Jackson at West Point, the cavalry had been brought together under a single command. On this day, seventeen thousand cavalry, with horses prancing, the largest cavalry parade ever a.s.sembled, with the six-foot-four-inch Stoneman in the lead, marched before the president.

The next day, Lincoln insisted on going through all the hospital tents and talking with countless soldiers. He listened with endless patience to the stories of soldiers and offered kindness and comfort in return. When he left the hospital tents he was greeted by a thunderous cheer.

On April 8, 1863, Lincoln reviewed sixty thousand men in the infantry and artillery. He touched his stovepipe hat in a return salute to the officers, but uncovered his head to the soldiers in the ranks. The review went on, uninterrupted, for five and a half hours.

But Lincoln mainly came to talk with Hooker. From the outset their conversation took the form of an odd call-and-response. Hooker would begin his conversations with, "When I get to Richmond," to which Lincoln would respond, "If you get to Richmond, General," Hooker would then interrupt, "Excuse me, Mr. President, but there is no if in the case. I am going straight to Richmond if I live."

Lincoln, in a final conference, haunted by the misuse of resources by George McClellan at Antietam and Ambrose Burnside at Fredericks-burg, spoke with both Hooker and Darius N. Couch, the senior corps commander. "Gentlemen, in your next battle, put in all your men." put in all your men."

Lincoln returned to Washington impressed with the changes inst.i.tuted by Hooker, which had resulted in an obvious upturn of morale, but disturbed by the easy, almost nonchalant att.i.tude he witnessed when he sought to engage Hooker in conversation about the difficult days ahead. Lincoln confided to Brooks, "That is the most depressing thing about Hooker. It seems to me that he is over-confident."

THREE AND A HALF MONTHS after signing the Emanc.i.p.ation Proclamation, Lincoln continued to consider its implications, not just for the United States, but for the family of nations. In another of his reflections, this time on the back of Executive Mansion stationery, Lincoln wrote out a resolution on slavery. First, Lincoln stated the problem: "Whereas, while heretofore, States, and Nations, have tolerated slavery, Recently, for the first time in the world, an attempt has been made to construct a new Nation, upon the basis of, and with the primary, and fundamental object to maintain, enlarge, and perpetuate human slavery, therefore, ..." after signing the Emanc.i.p.ation Proclamation, Lincoln continued to consider its implications, not just for the United States, but for the family of nations. In another of his reflections, this time on the back of Executive Mansion stationery, Lincoln wrote out a resolution on slavery. First, Lincoln stated the problem: "Whereas, while heretofore, States, and Nations, have tolerated slavery, Recently, for the first time in the world, an attempt has been made to construct a new Nation, upon the basis of, and with the primary, and fundamental object to maintain, enlarge, and perpetuate human slavery, therefore, ..."

Then he stated the resolution: "Resolved, That no such embryo State should ever be recognized by, or Admitted into, the family of christian and civilized nations; and that all ch[r]istian and civilized men everywhere should, by all lawful means, resist to the utmost, such recognition or admission."

On April 17, 1863, Lincoln showed this resolution to Senator Charles Sumner. They talked about its use, including publishing it in the English press, to further bolster the cause of the Union there. The resolution was never published, perhaps made unnecessary by events on the battlefield in the next three months. On November 30, Sumner would write to Lincoln encouraging the president to include the resolution in his upcoming annual message to Congress. Lincoln did not do so. Although never to see the public light of day, this private memo is further evidence that Lincoln's Emanc.i.p.ation Proclamation was not simply a military emergency strategy, but in his mind the conception of the model of a new nation.

ULYSSES S. GRANT was one of the few senior generals Lincoln had never met. The president liked what he first heard of the Illinoisan's una.s.suming manner. What a contrast after dealing earlier with McClellan and now with Hooker. Lincoln appreciated Grant's spare but concise communications, his lack of concern about rank, and, most of all, that he never asked for reinforcements and was ready every day to fight. was one of the few senior generals Lincoln had never met. The president liked what he first heard of the Illinoisan's una.s.suming manner. What a contrast after dealing earlier with McClellan and now with Hooker. Lincoln appreciated Grant's spare but concise communications, his lack of concern about rank, and, most of all, that he never asked for reinforcements and was ready every day to fight.

The president had heard all the gossip about Grant-that the general was surprised at Shiloh; that Grant had reverted to old habits and was tippling again. He discovered that whenever a politician or another general wished to undercut Grant in the field, they resorted to recycling old stories about Grant and liquor. The president quickly learned of the jealousies within the army. He could believe the resentments against Grant were increasing in direct proportion to his rapid rise in rank.

In April 1863, Lincoln, in a private reflection, continued to think about the wider implications of emanc.i.p.ation for the family of nations.

Only once had Lincoln questioned Grant's judgment. In the fall of 1862, frustrated by the illicit cotton trading along the Mississippi that he believed was channeling supplies and money into the Confederacy, Grant took steps to try to stop it. In November, he gave orders to conductors that some of the traders, Jews, could no longer travel south on the railroad into his military department. On December 17, 1862, when Grant believed his order was being evaded, he issued General Order Number Eleven: "The Jews, as a cla.s.s, violating every regulation of trade established by the Treasury Department, and also Department orders, are hereby expelled from the Department." Some at the time tried to say that Grant's order was issued by his staff, or that the word "Jew" was shorthand for shrewd merchants, but Grant alone was responsible for this sweeping anti-Jewish order.

When it became public, the order produced widespread denunciations of Grant. Cesar J. Kaskel, of Paducah, Kentucky, led a delegation of Jewish leaders who called on Lincoln at the White House. The president, who seven years earlier had expressed his strong disagreement with a nativism that targeted immigrants, especially Catholics, listened respectfully. Kaskel reported that Lincoln defused the tension in the room with a "heartwarming, semi-humorous, Biblical" exchange.

"And so the children of Israel were driven from the happy land of Canaan?"

Kaskel replied, "Yes, and that is why we have come unto Father Abraham's bosom, asking protection."

Lincoln responded, "And this protection they shall have at once." Lincoln told Grant that he was revoking the order immediately.

IN 1863, Lincoln understood that control of the Mississippi River, which he had navigated twice to New Orleans as a youth and young man, could cut the Confederacy in two. Control depended on the strategic Mississippi fortress town of Vicksburg.

With Lincoln unable to bring Grant to Washington or visit him in the field, and with rumors circulating in the steamy political air of Washington, Stanton, with Lincoln's approval, decided to send a personal emissary to be their eyes and ears in Grant's headquarters. Stanton tapped Charles A. Dana, who since 1847 had been the managing editor of the New York Tribune, New York Tribune, to become his a.s.sistant secretary of war. He a.s.signed Dana to travel to Grant's headquarters supposedly to investigate the paymaster service in the Western armies, but really to spy for Stanton. to become his a.s.sistant secretary of war. He a.s.signed Dana to travel to Grant's headquarters supposedly to investigate the paymaster service in the Western armies, but really to spy for Stanton.

Lincoln, although he had never met Ulysses S. Grant, took a long-distance liking to this modest, hard-fighting general. Their growing appreciation of each other would become one of the fascinating stories of the Civil War.

Dana took the measure of Grant and pa.s.sed on his findings in almost daily secret ciphers to Stanton and Lincoln. Writing later, he described Grant to be "an uncommon fellow-the most modest, the most disinterested, and the most honest man." Dana found him "not an original or brilliant man, but sincere, thoughtful, deep, and gifted with courage that never faltered." Lincoln was strongly inclined to believe in Grant before Dana's visit, but the newspaperman's reports only confirmed his own intuition.

Even so, Lincoln continued to receive charges against the major general. On April 1, 1863, Murat Halstead, editor of the influential Cincinnati Commercial, Cincinnati Commercial, contacted John Nicolay in an effort "to reach the ear of the President through you." Halstead wrote, "Grant's Mississippi opening enterprise is a failure-a total, complete failure." Three days later, Chase wrote to Lincoln, pa.s.sing on a letter he had received from Halstead. "Genl. Grant, entrusted with our greatest army, is a jacka.s.s in the original package. He is a poor drunken imbecile." Halstead asked, "Now are our Western heroes to be sacrificed by the ten thousand by this poor devil? Grant will fail miserably, hopelessly, eternally." Chase added, in an accompanying note, that although he didn't like the tone of Halstead's letter, these comments "are too common to be safely or even prudently disregarded." contacted John Nicolay in an effort "to reach the ear of the President through you." Halstead wrote, "Grant's Mississippi opening enterprise is a failure-a total, complete failure." Three days later, Chase wrote to Lincoln, pa.s.sing on a letter he had received from Halstead. "Genl. Grant, entrusted with our greatest army, is a jacka.s.s in the original package. He is a poor drunken imbecile." Halstead asked, "Now are our Western heroes to be sacrificed by the ten thousand by this poor devil? Grant will fail miserably, hopelessly, eternally." Chase added, in an accompanying note, that although he didn't like the tone of Halstead's letter, these comments "are too common to be safely or even prudently disregarded."

Lincoln had been down this road before-with Pope, McClellan, and Burnside. Criticisms would rise up from the public. Complaints would be registered from within the ranks of officers. Would the criticisms of Grant lead to the same unhappy ending? In May, Lincoln admitted, "I have had stronger influence brought against Grant, praying for his removal ... than for any other object, coming too from good men."

Grant would need all of his military wisdom and courage for a siege against Vicksburg. Sitting atop two-hundred-foot bluffs, the Confederate garrison was commanded by John Pemberton, a forty-eight-year-old native of Philadelphia who, married to a Virginian, was one of the few Northern officers to join the Confederacy. Grant and Pemberton fought alongside each other in Mexico. Now Pemberton's soldiers were positioned on the top and the sides of this Mississippi River fortress, ready to rain down fire upon approaching enemy troops.

Throughout the winter and spring of 1863, Grant pursued option after option. He had his engineers attempt to rechannel the Mississippi River by digging a ca.n.a.l opposite Vicksburg to divert the river, so that he could make an a.s.sault from land. Lincoln, with his long-standing fascination with engineering ventures, followed the progress of this proj ect closely. Halleck wrote Grant, "The President attaches much importance to this." After months of hard labor, however, Grant's engineers had to abandon the ca.n.a.l as nature took its course.

In another venture, Admiral David D. Porter sent his ironclad gunboats through Steele's Bayou, twenty-five miles north of Vicksburg, but the boats were almost trapped by Confederates who felled trees to try to block the boats from each end. Reports began to circulate of flagging morale and of spreading sickness among Grant's troops-dysentery, typhoid, and pneumonia. The failed attempts, and the rumors about troop morale, increased the criticism of Grant and the pressure on Lincoln.

Lincoln had his own ideas as to what Grant should do to achieve victory at Vicksburg. Early on, he believed Grant should join forces with General Nathaniel Banks, who became commander of the Department of the Gulf, based in New Orleans, in December 1862. Banks was one of the political generals, having served as Speaker of the House of Representatives and Republican governor of Ma.s.sachusetts. Lincoln suggested that either Grant move south to help Banks in his attempts to take Port Hudson, Louisiana, or Banks move north to cooperate with Grant in attacking Vicksburg. Grant, however, knew that two hundred treacherous river miles lay between Vicksburg and Port Hudson, and he did not trust Banks's competency. Great respect for Lincoln notwithstanding, Grant rejected the idea. On April 2, 1863, Henry Halleck tele graphed Grant that the president was becoming "impatient" and continually asking "questions" about Grant's progress.

Lincoln put another roadblock in Grant's path to Vicksburg when he allowed himself to be persuaded by another political general, John A. McClernand, who had served with Lincoln in the Illinois legislature. Lincoln appreciated that McClernand, a Democrat, had led the way in damping down secessionist views in southern Illinois. The former congressman commanded a division at Forts Henry and Donelson and also at Shiloh, all under Grant.

McClernand took advantage of his friendship with Lincoln to go outside normal military channels and communicate with him directly. Lincoln, always wishing to see the best qualities in people, was slow to perceive McClernand's shadowy side. Not so, General Grant. "Unconditional Surrender" Grant saw what Lincoln did not see: At Forts Henry and Donelson, McClernand acted without orders and not only claimed far more for himself and his troops than results warranted, but downplayed the actions of fellow officers.

McClernand came to Washington in late September 1862, to lobby the president and members of his cabinet for an independent command of a new force of Midwestern volunteers, many of them democrats, to open up the Mississippi River. He made a favorable impression on Chase, but when the treasury secretary asked the president his opinion of McClernand, Lincoln replied that "he thought him brave and capable, but too desirous to be independent of every body else." Lincoln's comment notwithstanding, the president's largess toward his independent-minded Illinois friend would become Grant's management headache on the Mississippi in the months ahead.

In early May, Grant made his own plans. Instead of marching back to Port Hudson, or moving directly on Vicksburg, he struck out northeast into the Mississippi countryside. After four dreary months of camping in the mud by the Mississippi River, the Army of the Tennessee, with thirty thousand men, left its supply line on the river behind and, determined to live off the land, simply disappeared. Lincoln, anxious for any news, read Grant's spare telegram to Halleck, "You may not hear from me for several days." Grant pressed ahead on an authority based in his own experience.

In the days ahead, Grant marched his men 130 miles, captured Jackson, the capital of Mississippi, and waged five battles against surprised opponents. The Confederate forces, in total, were actually as large as Grant's army, but he was determined to fight their different divisions separately and never let them combine.

Elihu Washburne, Lincoln's friend and the congressman for Grant's district in northwestern Illinois, was traveling with Grant and wrote the president. Washburne and Lincoln had enjoyed many laughs together back in Illinois. The congressman closed with comments sure to bring a smile to the president. "I am afraid Grant will have to be reproved for want to style. On this whole move of five days he had neither a horse nor an orderly or servant, a blanket or overcoat or clean shirt, or even a sword. His entire baggage consists of a tooth brush."