A. Lincoln_ A Biography Part 21

The next day, Lincoln took charge of a plan to capture Norfolk. Soldiers and sailors watched in amazement as Lincoln commandeered a boat to select the best landing site to launch his attack. He ordered gunboats to attack the Confederate sh.o.r.e batteries at Sewall's Point.

On May 9, 1862, the Confederates abandoned Norfolk, blowing up the Virginia Virginia so that it could not be captured. A soldier aboard one of the navy transports watched Lincoln directing reinforcements to the front. "Abe was rushing about, hollering to someone on the wharf-dressed in a black suit with a very seedy crepe on his hat, and hanging over the railing, he looked like some hoosier just starting for home from California, with store clothes and a biled shirt on." An officer aboard the so that it could not be captured. A soldier aboard one of the navy transports watched Lincoln directing reinforcements to the front. "Abe was rushing about, hollering to someone on the wharf-dressed in a black suit with a very seedy crepe on his hat, and hanging over the railing, he looked like some hoosier just starting for home from California, with store clothes and a biled shirt on." An officer aboard the Monitor Monitor wrote, "It is extremely fortunate that the President came down as he did-he seems to have infused new life into everything." The president's action began "stirring up dry bones." Salmon Chase wrote to his daughter, "So has ended a brilliant week's campaign of the President; for I think it quite certain that if he had not come down, Norfolk would still have been in possession of the enemy, and the 'Merrimac' as grim and defiant and as much a terror as ever. The whole coast is now virtually ours." wrote, "It is extremely fortunate that the President came down as he did-he seems to have infused new life into everything." The president's action began "stirring up dry bones." Salmon Chase wrote to his daughter, "So has ended a brilliant week's campaign of the President; for I think it quite certain that if he had not come down, Norfolk would still have been in possession of the enemy, and the 'Merrimac' as grim and defiant and as much a terror as ever. The whole coast is now virtually ours."

While at Fortress Monroe, Lincoln met Union general Ambrose Burnside, who had come up from North Carolina. On May 11, 1862, Lincoln invited Burnside to sail back with him on the USS Baltimore. Baltimore. Once in Washington, Burnside found himself responding to a whole battery of questions from the president. When the general returned to the Willard Hotel, he offered his initial a.s.sessment of the president to members of his staff. "If there is an honest man on the face of the earth, Lincoln is one." Once in Washington, Burnside found himself responding to a whole battery of questions from the president. When the general returned to the Willard Hotel, he offered his initial a.s.sessment of the president to members of his staff. "If there is an honest man on the face of the earth, Lincoln is one."

Also on May 11, 1862, Lincoln removed McClellan as general in chief, relieving him of his overall command. Lincoln's rationale was that Little Mac could not do it all. He placed Henry Halleck in charge of the armies in the West, and John C. Fremont in charge of a new Mountain Division, consisting of western Virginia and eastern Tennessee. McClellan retained his command of the Army of the Potomac. Inside the War Department, there was debate about whether Lincoln had gracefully let McClellan down, or challenged him that if he succeeded in taking Richmond his command would be restored.

Even so, Lincoln's orders further strengthened his own role as commander in chief. Henceforth, Halleck, Fremont, and McClellan would be equals reporting through Stanton to the president. Lincoln had come to trust Stanton and could work with him in ways he never could with Cameron. The hospitable Lincoln and his demanding secretary of war became a formidable team.

BY THE MIDDLE OF MAY, under the command of the freshly demoted George McClellan, the Army of the Potomac's 105,000 men could see the church spires of Richmond as they approached the city's gates. Sixty thousand Confederate troops defended Richmond, yet McClellan called for reinforcements, complaining he was fighting twice that number. For a while there was a standoff, but on May 31, 1862, Joseph Johnston unleashed an attack on McClellan south of the Chickahominy River. The ensuing battle of Seven Pines, or Fair Oaks, devolved into chaotic skirmishes in confusing terrain. Johnston was severely wounded and replaced by Robert E. Lee. Two days of blooding fighting resulted in a tactical draw.

McClellan was delighted when Lee, Jefferson Davis's military adviser, replaced the veteran Johnston. McClellan wrote Lincoln, "I prefer Lee to Johnston-the former is too too cautious & weak under grave responsibility-personally brave & energetic to a fault, he yet is wanting in moral firmness when pressed by heavy responsibility & is likely to be timid and irresolute in action." Lincoln likely wondered whether McClellan had misjudged an opponent once again. cautious & weak under grave responsibility-personally brave & energetic to a fault, he yet is wanting in moral firmness when pressed by heavy responsibility & is likely to be timid and irresolute in action." Lincoln likely wondered whether McClellan had misjudged an opponent once again.

The answer came soon. General Robert E. Lee, whom Lincoln had asked to a.s.sume command of the entire Union army at the beginning of the war, was now in charge of the Confederate forces defending Richmond. He quickly proved to be a formidable commander. He directed General Stonewall Jackson into the Shenandoah Valley. Jackson was a risk taker who could move his often-outnumbered troops to take advantage of an opponent's weakness.

Lincoln, sensing the danger of Jackson, implored McClellan to instruct his senior generals to trap the wily Jackson in the valley. At the same time, he sent out his own orders to the division commanders from the telegraph office. But while the Union forces slowly came into position in a pincer move, Jackson's men stayed steps ahead by marching hard to escape the potential trap. Jackson won small battles at Front Royal, Winchester, Cross Keys, and Port Republic, frustrating the Union forces. He then joined Lee in the defense of Richmond.

In June, Lee led a counteroffensive, the Seven Days Battles, in which McClellan was forced to retreat from his position four miles east of Richmond. If McClellan thought he knew Lee, the Virginia general clearly remembered McClellan from Mexico. Convinced that McClellan would be tied to his guns, Lee risked leaving only twenty-five thousand troops to defend Richmond, and prepared to attack McClellan north of the Chickahominy. Not successful the first day, he attacked again and again. In a series of six battles in seven days, McClellan's peninsular campaign came to an end. By July 4, 1862, one year after Lincoln's special message to Congress, it had become clear to the president and the nation that McClellan's grand opportunity had been lost. Richmond had survived, and Lee and Jackson and their armies were on the rise.

Lincoln determined to find out firsthand what went wrong. He arrived by steamer at Fort Harrison, at the eastern tip of the Virginia peninsula, on July 8, 1862. McClellan came on board the steamer Ariel Ariel at Harrison's Landing and handed Lincoln a long letter, resuming a conversation he had started with the president before the Seven Days Battles. Admitting that he was going beyond his duties as an army commander but believing that the war had reached a crucial stage, McClellan wrote, "The Government must determine upon a civil and military policy, covering the whole ground of our national trouble." at Harrison's Landing and handed Lincoln a long letter, resuming a conversation he had started with the president before the Seven Days Battles. Admitting that he was going beyond his duties as an army commander but believing that the war had reached a crucial stage, McClellan wrote, "The Government must determine upon a civil and military policy, covering the whole ground of our national trouble."

McClellan's letter was partly a response to whispers in Washington debating the need for a second Confiscation Act. The first, signed by Lincoln on August 6, 1861, permitted the seizure of any property, including slaves, being used by Confederates to support their insurrection. Lincoln, after negotiating with Congress, had signed it because it did not explicitly free all the slaves. The rumored second act would go further. "It should not be a war looking to the subjugation of the [Southern] people," McClellan lectured. "Neither confiscation of property ... or the forcible abolition of slavery should be contemplated."

Lincoln, who had not met with McClellan in three months, received the letter, thanked him, and said nothing. The next day, discouraged, McClellan wrote his wife, Ellen, of the visit to "His Excellency." He said he doubted Lincoln "profited" from the call. The president "really seems quite incapable of rising to the height of the merits of the question & the magnitude of the crisis," he wrote.

But Lincoln did understand the enormity of the crisis. Whereas he might have agreed with McClellan six months earlier, he had changed his point of view. Three weeks later, Lincoln wrote as much in a letter to Cuthbert Bullitt, a Southern Unionist in New Orleans. He asked a series of rhetorical questions. "What would you do in my position? Would you drop the war where it is? Or, would you prosecute it in the future, with elder-stalk squirts, charged with rose water?" Lincoln strongly implied his answer in asking, "Would you deal lighter blows than heavier ones?" Three days later, in the same spirit, Lincoln wrote August Belmont, a prominent Northern Democrat. "This government cannot much longer play a game in which it stakes all, and its enemies stake nothing." Lincoln had reached a crucial decision in July 1862, about the nature of the war and new means to win the peace.

IN EARLY JUNE, Abraham and Mary Lincoln made an unannounced trip from the White House to a residence known as the Soldiers' Home. Located on shaded hills three miles north of the White House along the road to Silver Spring, Maryland, the Soldiers' Home was only a half-hour carriage ride from the White House. The seclusion of its three hundred acres was a welcome relief from the frenetic pace, humidity, and stench that constantly enveloped the Executive Mansion in Washington. Abraham and Mary would stay until early November, and would return the following two summers, living there a total of thirteen months, or more than one-quarter of Lincoln's presidency.

What came to be called the Soldiers' Home was built in 1842 by Washington banker George W. Riggs. In 1851, it became an asylum for disabled veterans of previous wars who could not provide for themselves. James Buchanan became the first president to stay at the Soldiers' Home. He probably suggested it to the Lincolns as a retreat. Both Mary and Abraham visited the Soldiers' Home separately in the days immediately following the inauguration on March 4, 1861, but the events leading up to Bull Run postponed a move in 1861 to the summer of 1862. In their summers there, the Lincolns may have stayed in more than one of the cottages, including the Riggs family home, a country house with a large porch built in the English Gothic Revival style whose popularity had begun in England in the 1830s.

In 1862, the Soldiers' Home became a summer retreat for the Lincoln family. Here Lincoln found s.p.a.ce and time for mental refreshment as well as for entertaining close friends.

After Willie's death, Mary especially enjoyed getting away from busy Washington. Benjamin B. French, commissioner of public buildings, visited the White House on Monday, June 16, 1862, just as Mary was getting ready to depart for the Soldiers' Home. French wrote in his diary, "She seemed to be in excellent spirits, and delighted at getting out of the city." One reason she surely was delighted was that the retreat provided more of an opportunity to be alone with her husband and Tad. Robert joined them from Harvard at the end of June. Mary and Abraham read to each other, and, whenever she could, she encouraged him to accompany her on late-afternoon carriage rides. In July, in a letter to a friend, she wrote, "We are truly delighted, with this retreat, the drives & walks around here are delightful, & each day, brings its visitors. Then, too, our boy Robert, is with us."

As a daily commuter, Lincoln rose early in the summer months and was on his way into Washington well before 8 a.m. One of the soldiers who was responsible for escorting the president, Captain David Derickson, reported that he would arrive at the cottage many days about 6:30 a.m. to find Lincoln "reading the Bible or some work on the art of war." Although he would accomplish presidential work at the Soldiers' Home, Lincoln also welcomed private time for reading and reflection in this retreat setting. While on duty at the White House, Lincoln regaled visitors with stories and humor, but when off duty at the Soldiers' Home he much preferred, guests recalled, to read from Shakespeare and several of his other favorite poets. In the company of his secretary John Hay, a graduate of Brown College who had a literary flair, Lincoln would read for hours from Macbeth Macbeth or or Hamlet Hamlet or or Richard II. Richard II. In Springfield, Hay had heard Lincoln read the outburst of despair in the third act of In Springfield, Hay had heard Lincoln read the outburst of despair in the third act of Richard II; Richard II; he heard it again at the White House, and now at the Soldiers' Home. he heard it again at the White House, and now at the Soldiers' Home.

For G.o.d's sake, let us sit upon the ground And tell sad stories of the death of kings; How some have been deposed; some slain in war, Some haunted by the ghosts they have deposed; Some poison 'd by their wives: some sleeping kill'd; All murder'd: Lincoln seemed drawn to those plays of Shakespeare that spoke of an England split apart by civil war and of men driven by overwhelming ambition. The president's young a.s.sistant reported that Lincoln "read Shakespeare more than all other writers together."

AT THE END OF JUNE 1862, at a time of great Northern discouragement, Lincoln asked his secretary of state to sound out confidentially the state governors about the need to call up more troops. Worried that such a call might produce a panic across the North, Lincoln nonetheless told Seward of his resolve. "I expect to maintain this contest until successful, or till I die, or am conquered, or my term expires or Congress or the country forsakes me." On July 1, a few days before the nation celebrated its eighty-sixth birthday, Lincoln issued a call for another three hundred thousand three-year volunteers.

Quaker abolitionist James Sloan Gibbons, a businessman who was one of the lead supporters of the National Anti-Slavery Standard, National Anti-Slavery Standard, wrote a poem that was published anonymously in the wrote a poem that was published anonymously in the New York Evening Post New York Evening Post on July 16, 1862. The poem struck a chord with the public. No less than eight composers quickly set it to music. By the early fall the poem was being sung by choruses at Union rallies and by the public in town squares. The song expressed the Union's heart in music. on July 16, 1862. The poem struck a chord with the public. No less than eight composers quickly set it to music. By the early fall the poem was being sung by choruses at Union rallies and by the public in town squares. The song expressed the Union's heart in music.

We are coming, Father Abraham, 300,000 more,From Mississippi's winding stream and from New England's sh.o.r.e.We leave our plows and workshops, our wives and children dear,With hearts too full for utterance, with but a silent tear.We dare not look behind us but steadfastly before.We are coming, Father Abraham, 300,000 more!CHORUS: We are coming, we are coming our Union to restore, We are coming, Father Abraham, 300,000 more!

The poem elicited such a popular response because it voiced what everyone was saying. The last stanza begins, "You have called us and we're coming." The growing esteem of the Union soldiers and sailors for their commander in chief was spreading to citizens around the country.

Through the years, people had affixed nicknames to Lincoln in admiration. The earliest moniker, "Honest Abe," stuck because it captured the essential character of Lincoln in his midtwenties. Lincoln had endured the constant harangue that he was the "Black Republican" in his debates with Stephen Douglas, and again in the presidential campaign of 1860. This latest name, "Father Abraham," was a signpost that by the middle of 1862, appreciation for Lincoln had moved beyond an admiration reserved for an American president to an unusual affection bestowed upon a loving father figure by his grateful citizens.

IN THE SUMMER quiet at the Soldiers' Home, Lincoln brooded about slavery. Though personally he had long been opposed to slavery, as president he felt that in his oath he was constrained by the Const.i.tution not to interfere with it where it already existed. He understood that taking this principled position had put him at odds with many leaders of his own party. quiet at the Soldiers' Home, Lincoln brooded about slavery. Though personally he had long been opposed to slavery, as president he felt that in his oath he was constrained by the Const.i.tution not to interfere with it where it already existed. He understood that taking this principled position had put him at odds with many leaders of his own party.

Lincoln's viewpoint on slavery was not so different from those of his critics, whose pa.s.sion against slavery he admired. As he had told Ma.s.sachusetts senator Charles Sumner at the end of 1861, timing was everything. Since signing the original Confiscation Act, he had tried to shift the burden of responsibility from the federal government to the states in a plan of compensated emanc.i.p.ation. He had high hopes for his trial plan in Delaware, but it was not going anywhere. Turning back to the ideas of his mentor, Henry Clay, he had advanced the idea of colonization as a solution to the problem of strife between whites and blacks. Colonization was a plan to settle African-Americans outside the United States. He floated this idea in his December 1861 annual message to Congress, with little response.

In early March 1862, Lincoln sent to Congress a bill providing for a federal-state emanc.i.p.ation plan similar to his Delaware plan. In order to soothe fears of white Northerners, he again coupled emanc.i.p.ation with colonization. Whereas in his annual message he had a.s.sured Congress that he would not resort to any "radical" or "revolutionary" measures, this time he warned them that if compensated emanc.i.p.ation did not work, he would be free to use means "such as seem indispensable, or may obviously promise great efficiency towards ending the struggle." This message created an uproar, but Sumner and Greeley praised it. Henry J. Raymond, editor of the New York Times, New York Times, wrote Lincoln to complain that the plan would cost too much. The president replied that the cost of fighting the war for seven to eight days would pay entirely the price of emanc.i.p.ating the slaves in the four border states. On March 10, he met with border state representatives at the White House who, to his discouragement, almost to a person opposed his plan. wrote Lincoln to complain that the plan would cost too much. The president replied that the cost of fighting the war for seven to eight days would pay entirely the price of emanc.i.p.ating the slaves in the four border states. On March 10, he met with border state representatives at the White House who, to his discouragement, almost to a person opposed his plan.

On April 16, 1862, Lincoln signed into law a bill abolishing slavery in Washington, D.C. The bill compensated owners and made plans to send slaves, if they so wished, to either Haiti or Liberia. On June 9, he signed a bill outlawing slavery in all the federal territories. This bill effectively reversed the ruling in the Dred Scott decision of 1857.

On July 12, 1862, two days after Lincoln returned from seeing McClellan at Harrison's Landing, Congress pa.s.sed a second confiscation bill. This bill dealt with a problem that plagued field commanders occupying Southern territory. As troops advanced, slaves sought refuge in Union camps, and federal commanders were confused over their obligations to the refugees. Some freed the slaves, others sent them back to their masters for lack of means to care for them. The Confiscation Act of 1862 declared that all slaves taking refuge behind Union lines were captives of war who were to be set free.

On the same day, Lincoln met, once again, with representatives of the border states. He told them that they must forget their retreat into earlier, quieter times, and face up to "the unprecedentedly stern facts of our case." If they rejected his plan for compensated emanc.i.p.ation, the war would kill off slavery "by mere friction and abrasion," and they would not get a dollar for their slaves. Did not they see that his plan was the best option for them?

They did not. The plan would cost too much. It would only further fan the flames of rebellion.

Lincoln returned to the Soldiers' Home to continue work on a doc.u.ment he had been readying in recent days, perhaps weeks. He had tried his best to move people toward compensated emanc.i.p.ation with colonization. Now he was prepared for a much bolder move.

ON SUNDAY AFTERNOON, July 13, 1862, Lincoln invited Seward and Welles to ride with him to the funeral of Secretary of War Stanton's infant child, James, not quite nine months old. Both his guests were startled when Lincoln informed them that he was thinking of emanc.i.p.ating the slaves. Welles wrote in his diary, "He dwelt earnestly on the gravity, importance, and delicacy of the movement, and said he had given it much thought." Lincoln had come to the conclusion "that we must free the slaves or be ourselves subdued."

Lincoln, as usual, would say nothing more to anyone for more than a week as he continued to mull over his decision. He would later reflect, "Things had gone from bad to worse, until I felt that we had reached the end of our rope on the plan of operations we had been pursuing; that we had about played our last card, and must change our tactics, or lose the game!" Lincoln now decided to convene his cabinet to make his first public disclosure of his momentous decision.

CHAPTER 21.

We Must Think Anew July 1862December 1862 THE DOGMAS OF THE QUIET PAST, ARE INADEQUATE TO THE STORMY PRESENT.

ABRAHAM LINCOLNSecond annual message to Congress, December 1, 1862 -N JULY 22, 1862, LINCOLN EMERGED FROM HIS SOLITARY BROODING AND writing at the Soldiers' Home. "After much anxious thought," he had come to the conclusion that it was not possible to return to the past, or even stand in the shifting sands of the present. He determined to step forward into an unknown future. writing at the Soldiers' Home. "After much anxious thought," he had come to the conclusion that it was not possible to return to the past, or even stand in the shifting sands of the present. He determined to step forward into an unknown future.

For Lincoln, using his largely undefined war powers as commander in chief to propose emanc.i.p.ation was contrary to much in his personal makeup. His intellectual roots were planted more in the reasonableness of the Enlightenment than in the sentiments of Romanticism. As a lawyer, he had grounded his legal briefs in precedent. In his religious pilgrimage, he had chosen to attend rational, nonpolitical Old School Presbyterian congregations over experiential, antislavery New School congregations in both Springfield and Washington. Although his heart had long been tormented by the immorality of slavery, his Enlightenment, precedent-based, Old School head had heretofore tethered him to what he believed to be the Const.i.tution's prohibition against eliminating slavery where it already existed in the South.

Lincoln had not set his sights on emanc.i.p.ation at the beginning of the war. His single goal was to save the Union. The subject of slavery was virtually absent in both his inaugural address and his special message to Congress on July 4, 1861. But now, sixteen months later, his developing ideas, the press of events, the military defeats, and his own sense of timing coalesced into a determination to redefine the war's purpose.

On July 22, 1862, when Lincoln began to read to his cabinet a preliminary draft of a proclamation promising emanc.i.p.ation, he said he was not asking for their a.s.sent but informing them of his plan of action. None were prepared for his final sentence. Lincoln, "as a fit and necessary military measure," declared that on January 1, 1863, "all persons held as slaves within any state or states, wherein the const.i.tutional authority of the United States shall not then be practically recognized ... shall then, thenceforward, and forever, be free." The members of the cabinet sat stunned.

William Seward, who had known of Lincoln's plan in advance, expressed his strong concern about the timing of Lincoln's proclamation. To issue it at a time of continuing Union defeats might appear to many to be an act of desperation. Why not wait until a significant military victory would place the proclamation in a more positive light? Lincoln would say afterward, "The wisdom of the view of the Secretary of State struck me with very great force."

LINCOLN STARTED THE SECOND SUMMER of the war dealing with a retreating army and a restless public. He had hovered over the telegraph operators on the second floor of the War Department during the anxiety of the Seven Days Battles from June 25 to July 1, 1862. He followed events in Tennessee and Kentucky, where guerrilla attacks by Confederate generals Nathan Bedford Forrest and John Hunt Morgan behind Union lines dispelled any lingering notions that widespread Unionist sentiment remained in the South. The Confederate tactics heightened anger in the North. Lincoln heard that Union soldiers were writing home about "bushwhackers," insurgents hiding behind day jobs as farmers or shopkeepers, but hara.s.sing and killing Union bluecoats at night. Soldiers began to protest that what had begun as a "kid glove war" must now give way to a "hard war." of the war dealing with a retreating army and a restless public. He had hovered over the telegraph operators on the second floor of the War Department during the anxiety of the Seven Days Battles from June 25 to July 1, 1862. He followed events in Tennessee and Kentucky, where guerrilla attacks by Confederate generals Nathan Bedford Forrest and John Hunt Morgan behind Union lines dispelled any lingering notions that widespread Unionist sentiment remained in the South. The Confederate tactics heightened anger in the North. Lincoln heard that Union soldiers were writing home about "bushwhackers," insurgents hiding behind day jobs as farmers or shopkeepers, but hara.s.sing and killing Union bluecoats at night. Soldiers began to protest that what had begun as a "kid glove war" must now give way to a "hard war."

The president decided the time had come to make changes in the military command. Discouraged by the inability of the armies of Irvin McDowell, Nathaniel Banks, and John C. Fremont to trap the wily Stonewall Jackson in the Shenandoah Valley, Lincoln decided to consolidate these forces under a new army led by a new commander. He appointed General John Pope of Illinois to lead a newly designated Army of Virginia on June 26, 1862. Lincoln had practiced law under Pope's father, Judge Nathaniel Pope, a gruff man appointed by President James Monroe to be the first U.S. district judge for Illinois. John, an 1842 West Point graduate, was a large man with piercing eyes. He had served in the military escort accompanying Lincoln from Springfield to Washington in February 1861, when the two exchanged humorous stories. Pope had served under Henry Halleck in the West and had won fame for his capture of Island Number Ten, fifty miles downriver from Columbus, Kentucky, on April 7, 1862.

Lincoln was just getting started. On July 11, 1862, only two days after his visit with General McClellan at Harrison's Landing, Lincoln appointed Henry W. Halleck as general in chief. Lincoln's decision to change commanding generals was not only a rejection of McClellan as a leader, but a decision to change the political and military strategy of the war.

Henry Halleck was born in 1815 on a farm in the Mohawk Valley of New York, and ranked third in the cla.s.s of 1839 at West Point. At the military academy, he studied the "art of war" through the writings of Baron Henri Jomini, a Swiss military historian. Taking a different tack from his contemporary Carl von Clausewitz, Jomini argued that Napoleon's success grew from rational principles that stressed movement rather than total destruction. The goal became to inflict damage to the enemy with the least risk to one's own troops.

After serving in California during the Mexican War, Halleck retired from the army in 1854. In 1855, he married Elizabeth Hamilton, granddaughter of Alexander Hamilton. When the Civil War erupted, he left California, where he had acc.u.mulated an estate worth $500,000 in quicksilver mines, for an appointment as a major general. Two years later Lincoln named him his top general.

In a war where the public wanted their generals to look like heroes, Halleck did not fit the part. He appeared much older than his forty-seven years. Standing five feet nine inches tall and one hundred ninety pounds, he was paunchy, with flabby cheeks and a double chin. He had an annoying habit of constantly scratching his elbows. Because of his dull, fishlike eyes, some said he was an opium addict. He acquired the nickname "Old Brains," not for his prowess as a military theorist, but for his high forehead and bulging eyes.

Lincoln looked forward to a partnership with a man he had admired from a distance. He had read Halleck's Elements of Military Art and Science Elements of Military Art and Science as part of his early tutorial in military strategy. In Lincoln's recent visit to West Point, retired general Scott, who had recommended Halleck over McClellan as his successor in the summer of 1861, commended him to Lincoln once again. Lincoln wrote to Halleck on July 14, 1862, "I am very anxious-almost impatient-to have you here. ... When can you reach here?" as part of his early tutorial in military strategy. In Lincoln's recent visit to West Point, retired general Scott, who had recommended Halleck over McClellan as his successor in the summer of 1861, commended him to Lincoln once again. Lincoln wrote to Halleck on July 14, 1862, "I am very anxious-almost impatient-to have you here. ... When can you reach here?"

Lincoln's decision to appoint Henry Halleck, "Old Brains" to replace George McClellan as general in chief was about both a new leader and a new strategy.

That Lincoln felt more than anxious had become apparent to those closest to him. Orville Browning saw Lincoln frequently in June and July 1862, often at the Soldiers' Home, where they enjoyed sitting together on the portico's stone steps on summer evenings. On July 15, Browning visited Lincoln at the White House. When he entered the library, he observed that Lincoln "looked weary, care-worn and troubled." They shook hands and Browning asked Lincoln how he was. "Tolerably well," he replied. Browning, concerned, told Lincoln he "feared his health was suffering." At that, Lincoln reached for Browning's hand, "pressed it, and said in a very tender and touching tone-'Browning I must die sometime.' He looked very sad, and there was a cadence of sadness in his voice." The two old friends parted, "both of us with tears in our eyes."

LINCOLN HAD HEARD the snide remarks about Halleck's looks and mannerisms, but he never put stock in outward appearances. When the general finally arrived on July 23, 1862, Halleck and Lincoln traveled to McClellan's headquarters, accompanied by Montgomery Meigs and Ambrose Burnside. Lincoln wanted Halleck's recommendation on whether to retain "Little Mac" as commander of the Army of the Potomac, and whether his battered forces should be withdrawn from the Virginia peninsula. the snide remarks about Halleck's looks and mannerisms, but he never put stock in outward appearances. When the general finally arrived on July 23, 1862, Halleck and Lincoln traveled to McClellan's headquarters, accompanied by Montgomery Meigs and Ambrose Burnside. Lincoln wanted Halleck's recommendation on whether to retain "Little Mac" as commander of the Army of the Potomac, and whether his battered forces should be withdrawn from the Virginia peninsula.

McClellan told Halleck that he needed more men, because he was certain that Lee's opposing army had 200,000 soldiers. Upon their return, Meigs, whom Lincoln trusted, told the president that by his calculations Lee had only 105,000 men. (The figure was closer to 75,000.) On Friday evening, July 25, 1862, Orville Browning visited Lincoln at the Soldiers' Home. The Illinois senator confided to his diary that Lincoln told him that McClellan would never fight. It was as "if by magic he could reinforce McClellan with 100,000 men to day he would be in an ecstasy over it, thank him for it, and tell him that he would go to Richmond tomorrow, but that when tomorrow came he would telegraph that he had certain information that the enemy had 400,000 men, and he could not advance without reinforcements."

Tired of McClellan's foot dragging, Lincoln decided to replace him with Ambrose E. Burnside, an Indiana native and a graduate of West Point in the cla.s.s of 1847, as commander of the Army of the Potomac. On February 7 and 8, 1862, Lincoln had been heartened by Burnside's leadership of an amphibious landing through the Hatteras inlet to attack Roanoke Island off the coast of North Carolina. Supported by gunboats, and fighting the fury of nature as much as the outnumbered Confederate defenders, Burnside secured a vital outpost in the Union's effort to tighten the blockade of the Atlantic Coast.

Everyone who met Burnside liked him at once. Six feet tall and handsome, with a st.u.r.dy build and his face partially enclosed by bushy muttonchop whiskers, he was a skilled horseman with long buckskin gloves and a pistol that swung loosely from a holster on his hip. Sometime between July 22 and 27, 1862, Lincoln asked Burnside to relieve McClellan and a.s.sume command of the Army of the Potomac. Burnside, surprised, told the president he was not eager to command a large army. He turned down the president's offer to replace his good friend McClellan who, he said, only needed more time to prove his leadership. Lincoln would not forget Burnside's self-effacing manner.

Lincoln asked Ambrose E. Burnside to become the new commander of the Army of the Potomac in July 1862.

In Henry Halleck, Lincoln believed he had finally found someone who could relieve him of the burden of his responsibility for the supervision of the army. McClellan and Pope, who did not hide their dislike of each other, would now both report to Halleck. Lincoln quickly came to depend on "Old Brains" for technical military advice. A month later, McClellan was surely surprised when Lincoln answered a query by replying, "I wish not to control. That I now leave to Gen. Halleck." With many tough decisions to be made, Lincoln would sometimes feign ignorance of military strategy and let Halleck be the public face of the Union forces. In responding to the mult.i.tude of questions coming his way, he began to offer a standard reply, "You must call on General Halleck, who commands."

LONG BEFORE THE ADVENT of televised presidential press conferences, Lincoln mastered a new means of communication developing in the nineteenth century. As he struggled to find his footing in the second year of his presidency, this mastery would become a key to his emerging political leadership. of televised presidential press conferences, Lincoln mastered a new means of communication developing in the nineteenth century. As he struggled to find his footing in the second year of his presidency, this mastery would become a key to his emerging political leadership.

In his first debate with Stephen Douglas in Ottawa, Illinois, in 1858, Lincoln offered his insight into the role of public opinion in a democratic society. "Public sentiment is everything. With public sentiment, nothing can fail; without it nothing can succeed. Consequently he who moulds sentiment, goes deeper than he who enacts statutes or p.r.o.nounces decisions."

But Lincoln offered this comment in an Illinois he knew well. How would he be able to keep his finger on the pulse of public opinion while he lived in Washington, often confined to the White House and consumed by his duties as commander in chief? In 1862, he worked hard to listen to the public and to find more ways to communicate his vision for the Union. He found the answer in newsprint.

Newspapers conveyed the immediacy of daily events to Americans as never before. At the time of Lincoln's birth, there were approximately 250 American newspapers. By the beginning of the Civil War, there were more than 2,500 newspapers, both daily and weekly. In New York, Boston, Philadelphia, and other larger cities, newspapers published multiple editions each day in order to keep up with people's appet.i.te for news. Many more people read newspapers than paid subscribers. At countless general stores and post offices, neighbors gathered to listen to someone read from "Uncle Horace's Weekly Try-bune," or the like.

Lincoln was a newspaper junkie. Francis B. Carpenter, an artist in residence in the White House in 1864, reported that he regularly saw in the secretary's quarters the New York Tribune, Herald, Evening Post, World, Times, New York Tribune, Herald, Evening Post, World, Times, and and Independent; Independent; the the Boston Advertiser, Journal, Boston Advertiser, Journal, and and Transcript; Transcript; the the Philadelphia Press Philadelphia Press and and North American; North American; the the Baltimore American Baltimore American and and Sun; Sun; the the Cincinnati Gazette Cincinnati Gazette and and Commercial; Commercial; the the St. Louis Republican St. Louis Republican and and Democrat; Democrat; the the Albany Evening Journal; Albany Evening Journal; and the and the Chicago Tribune Chicago Tribune and and Journal. Journal.

Instead of letters to the editor, editors wrote letters to Lincoln. They offered their counsel on every political issue, but especially the war. More than three hundred letters from newspaper editors were received at the White House during Lincoln's presidency. Editors not only wrote to Lincoln, they also traveled to Washington to speak to him in person.

And Lincoln also wrote letters. After his special message to Congress on March 6, 1862, in which he again advocated compensation to Southern states if they would put an end to slavery, he sent a letter to Henry Raymond to object that the New York Times New York Times got it wrong about how much the compensation would cost. He told the editor he was "grateful to the New-York Journals, and not less to the Times than to the others, for their kind notices of the late special Message to Congress." Lincoln was not just playing up to Raymond, for he had cut out and saved editorials from six New York newspapers-the got it wrong about how much the compensation would cost. He told the editor he was "grateful to the New-York Journals, and not less to the Times than to the others, for their kind notices of the late special Message to Congress." Lincoln was not just playing up to Raymond, for he had cut out and saved editorials from six New York newspapers-the New York Times, Tribune, Evening Bulletin, Herald, World, New York Times, Tribune, Evening Bulletin, Herald, World, and and Evening Post, Evening Post, all written on March 7, all supporting compensated emanc.i.p.ation. all written on March 7, all supporting compensated emanc.i.p.ation.

In the first months of the war, Lincoln had appreciated Horace Gree-ley's central role among the newspaper generals. "Having him firmly behind me will be as helpful to me as an army of one hundred thousand men." But the New York Tribune New York Tribune editor's support for Lincoln began to vacillate in 1862 as he became more and more distressed by Lincoln's silence about slavery. Greeley decided to speak straight to the president through the most public communication he knew-his newspaper. editor's support for Lincoln began to vacillate in 1862 as he became more and more distressed by Lincoln's silence about slavery. Greeley decided to speak straight to the president through the most public communication he knew-his newspaper.

On August 19, 1862, Greeley wrote a letter to Lincoln that he published the following day in the Tribune Tribune under the heading "The Prayer of Twenty Millions." Greeley complained that the president was "strangely and disastrously remiss" in not proclaiming emanc.i.p.ation now. under the heading "The Prayer of Twenty Millions." Greeley complained that the president was "strangely and disastrously remiss" in not proclaiming emanc.i.p.ation now.

On the face of this wide earth, Mr. President, there is not one disinterested, determined, intelligent, champion of the Union cause who does not feel that all attempts to put down the Rebellion, and at the same time uphold its inciting cause, are preposterous and futile-that the Rebellion, if crushed out to-morrow, would be renewed within a year if slavery were left in full vigor. ... I close as I began, with the statement that what an immense majority of the loyal millions of your countrymen require of you is a frank, declared unqualified, ungrudging execution of the laws of the land.

Appearing toward the end of a long summer of Union dissatisfaction, Greeley's letter created a commotion. Newspapers across the North reprinted his protest.

Lincoln notified the Washington National Intelligencer National Intelligencer that he intended to write a response to Greeley, asking the paper to send one of its editors, James C. Welling, to the White House to a.s.sist him. Welling reviewed Lincoln's reply word by word. He proposed one sentence be "erased," in the third paragraph: "Broken eggs can never be mended, and the longer the breaking proceeds the more will be broken." The young literary editor recalled that Lincoln acquiesced "with some reluctance." Welling doesn't expand upon Lincoln's answer but did offer his own reason for removing it. This sentence "seemed somewhat exceptional, on rhetorical grounds, in a paper of such dignity." that he intended to write a response to Greeley, asking the paper to send one of its editors, James C. Welling, to the White House to a.s.sist him. Welling reviewed Lincoln's reply word by word. He proposed one sentence be "erased," in the third paragraph: "Broken eggs can never be mended, and the longer the breaking proceeds the more will be broken." The young literary editor recalled that Lincoln acquiesced "with some reluctance." Welling doesn't expand upon Lincoln's answer but did offer his own reason for removing it. This sentence "seemed somewhat exceptional, on rhetorical grounds, in a paper of such dignity."

Horace Greeley, reforming editor of the New York Tribune, wrote a letter to Lincoln ent.i.tled "The Prayer of Twenty Millions," challenging the president to move faster on emanc.i.p.ation.

Welling's response sounded like printer John D. Defrees's response to "sugar-coated" in Lincoln's annual message to Congress in 1861. The editor and the printer wished to correct Lincoln about proper speech. They were telling the president of the United States that his humble American expressions did not fit the rhetorical etiquette of the occasion.

Lincoln's response to Greeley was published in the National Intelligencer National Intelligencer on August 22, 1862. The president's "public letter," addressed to an individual but understood to be meant for a larger public consumption, was also quickly republished in numerous newspapers. The meaning of the letter has been debated from the moment Lincoln penned it. Although he must have been disconcerted by Greeley's imperious tone, he started his letter with a generosity of spirit. on August 22, 1862. The president's "public letter," addressed to an individual but understood to be meant for a larger public consumption, was also quickly republished in numerous newspapers. The meaning of the letter has been debated from the moment Lincoln penned it. Although he must have been disconcerted by Greeley's imperious tone, he started his letter with a generosity of spirit.

I have just read yours of the 19th, addressed to myself. ... If there be in it any statements, or a.s.sumptions of fact, which I may know to be erroneous, I do not now and here, controvert them. If there be in it any inferences which I may believe to be falsely drawn, I do not now and here, argue against them. If there be perceptible in it an impatient and dictatorial tone, I waive it in deference to an old friend, whose heart I have always supposed to be right.

That beginning, which is often omitted in reprinting Lincoln's reply, sets the tone for all that follows.

I would save the Union. I would save it the shortest way under the Const.i.tution. The sooner the national authority can be restored, the nearer the Union will be "the Union as it was." If there be those who would not save the Union, unless they could at the same time save slavery, I do not agree with them. If there be those who would not save the Union unless they could at the same time destroy slavery, I do not agree with them. My paramount object in this struggle is to save the Union, and is not either to save or to destroy slavery. If I could save the Union without freeing any slave I would do it, and if I could save it by freeing all the slaves I would do it; and if I could save it by freeing some and leaving others alone I would also do that. What I do about slavery, and the colored race, I do because it helps to save the Union; and what I forbear, I forbear because I do not believe it would help save the Union. I shall do less whenever I shall believe what I am doing hurts the cause, and I shall do more whenever I shall believe doing more will help the cause. I shall try to correct errors when shown to be errors; I shall adopt new views so fast as they appear to be true views.

At the center of the letter Lincoln offers a thesis sentence that spells out his meaning: "My paramount object in this struggle is to save the Union, and is not either to save or destroy slavery." He then expanded on what he would save and what he would not save. The verb "save" pulsates twelve times through this central paragraph of the letter.

Lincoln wished to speak to three groups. First, most people in the South wanted to save slavery, and Lincoln knew that many Northern Democrats were also opposed to emanc.i.p.ation. In response to this position, Lincoln offered a resonant: "I do not agree with them."

The second group were political abolitionists, represented by Charles Sumner in Congress and Horace Greeley in the press. Greeley presented himself as representing twenty million, which to Lincoln's mind was clearly an overstatement.

Lincoln had become especially sensitive to a third group. Unnamed in his letter, he was thinking of the common soldier. He understood that the majority of soldiers had enlisted to save the Union, not to free the slaves. Even those soldiers who believed that blacks might be able to work at jobs behind the lines did not believe they were capable of fighting on the front lines. An astute Lincoln used his public letter to speak to all these groups at once.

He concluded with a disclaimer: "I have here stated my purpose according to my view of official duty, and I intend no modification of my oft-expressed personal wish that all men everywhere could be free." Understanding this final paragraph is imperative to appreciating the full meaning of Lincoln's reply to Greeley. His final sentiment enunciated the continuing creative tension felt between the obligation of his office to abide by the Const.i.tution and his personal wishes.

What did Lincoln accomplish with his public letter? An impatient Greeley was calling out a patient Lincoln. Lincoln's reply did not really answer Greeley's appeal, but that was not his purpose. The president made his own appeal-to save the Union. He had shrewdly outflanked the leading New York general of opinion, and on his own territory, the newspaper.

The reply to Greeley is misconstrued if interpreted as a simple declaration of support for the Union. As Lincoln crafted his reply, he held in his coat pocket his preliminary Emanc.i.p.ation Proclamation. Lincoln had become adroit at keeping his own counsel and moving forward on his own schedule.

A FEW DAYS AFTER Lincoln's reply to Greeley, Union and Confederate forces fought a second furious battle around Mana.s.sas Junction. Thirteen months earlier, the Union army had suffered a devastating defeat at Bull Run. In the summer of 1862, the newly designated Union Army of Virginia, under General John Pope, vowed things would be different. Lincoln's reply to Greeley, Union and Confederate forces fought a second furious battle around Mana.s.sas Junction. Thirteen months earlier, the Union army had suffered a devastating defeat at Bull Run. In the summer of 1862, the newly designated Union Army of Virginia, under General John Pope, vowed things would be different.

Pope told everyone who would listen that his headquarters would be in his saddle. His tough talk about leading an offensive war had a positive effect on the many politicians who were tired of McClellan's delays.

Pope's initial letter to the officers and soldiers of the Army of Virginia had the opposite effect. McClellan remained popular with many of the soldiers, but Pope minced no words. "I have come from the West, where we have always seen the backs of our enemies." He told his men "to dismiss from your minds certain phrases, which I am sorry to find so much in vogue amongst you. I hear constantly of 'taking strong positions and holding them,' of 'lines of retreat,' and of 'bases of supplies.' Let us discard such ideas." No one could mistake Pope's words as anything but criticism of McClellan. The new commander's men began calling him "boastful Pope" behind his back.

In the last week of August, Stonewall Jackson, commanding the leading edge of Robert E. Lee's army, marched his "foot cavalry" fifty-six miles in two days on a wide swing around Pope's right flank to attack the Union supplies at Mana.s.sas. Jackson could hardly believe what his men found in one hundred freight cars and countless warehouses. His hungry men feasted on the Union's lobster salad and Rhine wine. Men strutted about in new shoes, wore women's hats with elaborate ribbons, and carried off pickled oysters, molds of cheese, and candy. Jackson ordered all the whiskey poured on the ground (an order not completely obeyed). What the soldiers could not eat or carry with them they burned. Lincoln watched from the south lawn of the White House as black smoke rose in the sky above northern Virginia. Then Jackson's troops disappeared.

The next day, August 28, 1862, Jackson's troops drew Pope's army into battle at Brawner Farm near Bull Run. On the following morning, Pope carried out disjointed attacks against Jackson along an uncompleted railroad grade. Although neither side gained an advantage, Pope reported he had Jackson on the run. He failed to recognize that reinforcements led by General James Longstreet's troops had broken through Thoroughfare Gap and were fast arriving to support Jackson. A wary George Templeton Strong in New York wrote in his diary, "I am not prepared to crow quite yet. Pope is an imaginative chieftain and ranks with Cooper as a writer of fiction. Good news from Bull Run is suspicious."

Lincoln, standing beside his new general in chief Henry Halleck, listened to updates helplessly in the telegraph office. McClellan, now at Alexandria, was responsible for reinforcing Pope. Halleck, unsure of himself, called again and again for McClellan to begin sending reinforcements. Over and over, McClellan responded that for one reason or another, the officers in his command could not move. "We are not yet in a condition to move." "It would be a sacrifice to send them now." "I still think that a premature movement in small force will accomplish nothing but the destruction of the troops."

At 2:45 in the afternoon, McClellan telegraphed Lincoln. "I am clear that one of two courses should be adopted-1st To concentrate all our available forces to open communication with Pope-2nd To leave Pope to get out of this sc.r.a.pe & at once use all our means to make the Capital perfectly safe." Lincoln was astonished by McClellan's response. He was also disappointed in Halleck, who, standing beside him as if in shock, seemed unable to exercise command over McClellan.

On August 30, 1862, Pope, believing that Lee's repositioning of forces was actually the beginning of a retreat, attacked, failing to wait until he had fully ma.s.sed his own forces. Pope's divisions, especially his all-Western "Iron Brigade" from Wisconsin and Indiana, fought bravely. But Longstreet, with twenty-eight thousand men, counterattacked and Pope's troops began to fall back.

That same morning, Lincoln and John Hay had ridden in together from the Soldiers' Home. As they talked about all that had happened in the previous several days, Lincoln "was very outspoken in regard to McClellan's present conduct." He said "it really seemed to him that McC wanted Pope defeated."

At eight o'clock on August 30, 1862, Lincoln came into Hay's room in the White House to say, "Well John we are whipped again." Indeed, Pope's Union troops gave ground in a retreat to Centreville. In the days that followed, beaten Union units fell all the way back to their defenses on the outskirts of Washington. In five days of fighting, the Union forces of 65,000 men suffered 13,830 casualties while Lee and Jackson's 55,000 troops lost 8,350.

AT 7:30 ON TUESDAY MORNING, September 2, 1862, Lincoln and Henry Halleck walked to McClellan's house on H Street. Lincoln knocked on the door, unannounced, and found the general at breakfast. Lincoln told McClellan "that the troubles now impending could be overcome better" by him "than anyone else." Lincoln had decided to keep McClellan. In touch with the sentiment of the soldiers, Lincoln understood that whatever the newspaper generals or the senators might think, Little Mac remained immensely popular with the rank-and-file soldiers. The soldiers believed they had never been outgeneraled, certainly not outfought, but had been defeated by superior numbers. McClellan told his wife that when Pope's troops fell back to Washington "everything is to come under my command again." McClellan said he was being given "a terrible & thankless task-yet I will do my best with G.o.d's blessing to perform it."

When Lincoln walked into the regular Tuesday cabinet meeting, he found the members buzzing with conversation. After Pope's predictions of a Union victory, the Northern press criticized the leadership of "boastful Pope;" of McClellan, for failing to come to Pope's aid; and of the president, who, as commander in chief, allowed this debacle to develop on his watch. The Southern press and people were ecstatic.

Secretary of the Navy Welles captured the mood of the meeting and of the president. "There was a more disturbed and desponding feeling than I have ever witnessed in council; the President was greatly distressed." Attorney General Bates recorded in his diary that the president was deeply discouraged after early predictions of victory had turned into reports of a disastrous defeat. Bates wrote that Lincoln "seemed wrung by the bitterest anguish-said he felt almost ready to hang himself."

Lincoln then stunned the members of his cabinet by informing them that he had decided to place McClellan in charge of an army that would fold in the Army of the Potomac and Pope's Army of Virginia. Secretary of War Stanton, who had prepared a pet.i.tion already signed by several members of the cabinet, became indignant. Chase argued that McClellan's "experience as a military commander had been little else than a series of failures." Particularly upset with McClellan's failure to come to Pope's aid, Chase believed this "rendered him unworthy of trust."

Later that day, Lincoln's decision to reappoint McClellan was validated, if not by the cabinet, then by the soldiers. On a cold and rainy afternoon, as discouraged soldiers straggled back into Washington, they were met by a lone officer on a black horse, dressed in full military uniform, wearing a general's yellow sash and dress sword. Brigadier General Jacob c.o.x saw McClellan first.