A Letter to Grover Cleveland Part 15

This definition is an utterly false, absurd, and atrocious one.

It would give congress power arbitrarily to control, obstruct, impede, derange, prohibit, and destroy commerce.

The verb "to regulate" does not, as Marshall a.s.serts, imply the exercise of any arbitrary control whatever over the thing regulated; nor any power "to prescribe [arbitrarily] the rule, by which" the thing regulated "is to be governed." On the contrary, it comes from the Latin word, _regula_, a rule; _and implies the pre-existence of a rule, to which the thing regulated is made to conform_.

To regulate one's diet, for example, is not, on the one hand, to starve one's self to emaciation, nor, on the other, to gorge one's self with all sorts of indigestible and hurtful substances, in disregard of the natural laws of health. But it supposes the pre-existence of the _natural laws of health_, to which the diet is made to conform.

A clock is not "regulated," when it is made to go, to stop, to go forwards, to go backwards, to go fast, to go slow, at the mere will or caprice of the person who may have it in hand. It is "regulated" only when it is made to conform to, to mark truly, the diurnal revolutions of the earth. These revolutions of the earth const.i.tute the pre-existing rule, by which alone a clock can be regulated.

A mariner's compa.s.s is not "regulated," when the needle is made to move this way and that, at the will of an operator, without reference to the north pole. But it is regulated when it is freed from all disturbing influences, and suffered to point constantly to the north, as it is its nature to do.

A locomotive is not "regulated," when it is made to go, to stop, to go forwards, to go backwards, to go fast, to go slow, at the mere will and caprice of the engineer, and without regard to economy, utility, or safety. But it is regulated, when its motions are made to conform to a pre-existing rule, that is made up of economy, utility, and safety combined. What this rule is, in the case of a locomotive, may not be known with such scientific precision, as is the rule in the case of a clock, or a mariner's compa.s.s; but it may be approximated with sufficient accuracy for practical purposes.

The pre-existing rule, by which alone commerce can be "regulated," is a matter of science; and is already known, so far as the natural principle of justice, in relation to contracts, is known. The natural right of all men to make all contracts whatsoever, that are naturally and intrinsically just and lawful, furnishes the pre-existing rule, by which _alone_ commerce can be regulated. And it is the only rule, to which congress have any const.i.tutional power to make commerce conform.

When all commerce, that is intrinsically just and lawful, is secured and protected, and all commerce that is intrinsically unjust and unlawful, is prohibited, then commerce is regulated, and not before.[5]

[5] The above extracts are from a pamphlet published by me in 1864, ent.i.tled "_Considerations for Bankers_,"

etc., pp. 55, 56, 57.

This false definition of the verb "_to regulate_" has been used, time out of mind, by knavish lawmakers and their courts, to hide their violations of men's natural right to do their own businesses in all such ways--that are naturally and intrinsically just and lawful--as they may choose to do them in. These lawmakers and courts dare not always deny, utterly and plainly, men's right to do their own businesses in their own ways; but they will a.s.sume "_to regulate_" them; and in pretending simply "to regulate" them, they contrive "to regulate" men out of all their natural rights to do their own businesses in their own ways.

How much have we all heard (we who are old enough), within the last fifty years, of the power of congress, or of the States, "_to regulate the currency_." And "to regulate the currency" has always meant to fix the kind, _and limit the amount_, of currency, that men may be permitted to buy and sell, lend and borrow, give and receive, in their dealings with each other. It has also meant to say _who shall have the control of the licensed money_; instead of making it mean the suppression only of false and dishonest money, and then leaving all men free to exercise their natural right of buying and selling, borrowing and lending, giving and receiving, all such, and so much, honest and true money, or currency, as the parties to any or all contracts may mutually agree upon.

Marshall's false _a.s.sumptions_ are numerous and tyrannical. They all have the same end in view as his false definitions; that is, to establish the principle that governments have all power, and the people no rights. They are so numerous that it would be tedious, if not impossible, to describe them all separately. Many, or most, of them are embraced in the following, _viz._:

1. The a.s.sumption that, by a certain paper, called the const.i.tution of the United States--a paper (I repeat and reiterate) which n.o.body ever signed, which but few persons ever read, and which the great body of the people never saw--and also by some forty subsidiary papers, called State const.i.tutions, which also n.o.body ever signed, which but few persons ever read, and which the great body of the people never saw--all making a perfect system of the merest nothingness--the a.s.sumption, I say, that, by these papers, the people have all consented to the abolition of justice itself, the highest moral law of the Universe; and that all their own natural, inherent, inalienable rights to the benefits of that law, shall be annulled; and that they themselves, and everything that is theirs, shall be given over into the irresponsible custody of some forty little cabals of blockheads and villains called lawmakers--blockheads, who imagine themselves wiser than justice itself, and villains, who care nothing for either wisdom or justice, but only for the gratification of their own avarice and ambitions; and that these cabals shall be invested with the right to dispose of the property, liberty, and lives of all the rest of the people, at their pleasure or discretion; or, as Marshall says, "their wisdom and discretion!"

If such an a.s.sumption as that does not embrace nearly, or quite, all the other false a.s.sumptions that usurpers and tyrants can ever need, to justify themselves in robbing, enslaving, and murdering all the rest of mankind, it is less comprehensive than it appears to me to be.

2. In the following paragraph may be found another batch of Marshall's false a.s.sumptions.

The right to contract is the attribute of a free agent, and he may rightfully coerce performance from another free agent, who violates his faith. Contracts have consequently an intrinsic obligation. _[But] When men come into society, they can no longer exercise this original natural right of coercion. It would be incompatible with general peace, and is therefore surrendered._ Society prohibits the use of private individual coercion, _and gives in its place a more safe and more certain remedy_. But the right to contract is not surrendered with the right to coerce performance.--_Ogden vs. Saunders, 12 Wheaton 350._

In this extract, taken in connection with the rest of his opinion in the same case, Marshall convicts himself of the grossest falsehood. He acknowledges that men have a natural right to make their own contracts; that their contracts have an "intrinsic obligation"; and that they have an "original and natural right" to coerce performance of them. And yet he a.s.sumes, and virtually a.s.serts, that men _voluntarily "come into society_," and "_surrender_" to "society" their natural right to coerce the fulfilment of their contracts. He a.s.sumes, and virtually a.s.serts, that they do this, _upon the ground, and for the reason, that "society gives in its place a more safe and more certain remedy_"; that is, "a more safe and more certain" enforcement of all men's contracts that have "an intrinsic obligation."

In thus saying that "men come into society," and "surrender" to society, their "original and natural right" of coercing the fulfilment of contracts, and that "_society gives in its place a more safe and certain remedy_," he virtually says, and means to say, that, _in consideration of such "surrender" of their "original and natural right of coercion,"

"society" pledges itself to them that it will give them this "more safe and more certain remedy_"; that is, that it will more safely and more certainly enforce their contracts than they can do it themselves.

And yet, in the same opinion--only two and three pages preceding this extract--he declares emphatically that "the right" of government--or of what he calls "society"--"_to prohibit such contracts as may be deemed mischievous_, is _unquestionable_."--_p. 347._

And as an ill.u.s.tration of the exercise of this right of "society" to prohibit such contracts "as may be deemed mischievous," he cites the usury laws, thus:

The acts against usury declare the contract to be void in the beginning. They deny that the instrument ever became a contract. They deny it all original obligation; and cannot impair that which never came into existence.--_p. 348._

All this is as much as to say that, when a man has voluntarily "come into society," and has "surrendered" to society "his original and natural right of coercing" the fulfilment of his contracts, and when he has done this in the confidence that society will fulfil its pledge to "give him a more safe and more certain coercion" than he was capable of himself, "society" may then turn around to him, and say:

We acknowledge that you have a natural right to make your own contracts. We acknowledge that your contracts have "an intrinsic obligation." We acknowledge that you had "an original and natural right" to coerce the fulfilment of them. We acknowledge that it was solely in consideration of our pledge to you, that we would give you a more safe and more certain coercion than you were capable of yourself, that you "surrendered" to us your right to coerce a fulfilment of them.

And we acknowledge that, _according to our pledge_, you have now a right to require of us that we coerce a fulfilment of them. But after you had "surrendered" to us your own right of coercion, we took a different view of the pledge we had given you; and concluded that it would be "mischievous" to allow you to make such contracts. We therefore "prohibited" your making them. And having prohibited the making of them, we cannot now admit that they have any "obligation." We must therefore decline to enforce the fulfilment of them. And we warn you that, if you attempt to enforce them, by virtue of your own "original and natural right of coercion," we shall be obliged to consider your act a breach of "the general peace," and punish you accordingly. We are sorry that you have lost your property, but "society" must judge as to what contracts are, and what are not, "mischievous." We can therefore give you no redress. Nor can we suffer you to enforce your own rights, or redress your own wrongs.

Such is Marshall's theory of the way in which "society" got possession of all men's "original and natural right" to make their own contracts, and enforce the fulfilment of them; and of the way in which "society"

now justifies itself in prohibiting all contracts, though "intrinsically obligatory," which it may choose to consider "mischievous." And he a.s.serts that, in this way, "society" has acquired "_an unquestionable right_" to cheat men out of all their "original and natural right" to make their own contracts, and enforce the fulfilment of them.

A man's "original and natural right" to make all contracts that are "intrinsically obligatory," and to coerce the fulfilment of them, is one of the most valuable and indispensable of all human possessions. But Marshall a.s.sumes that a man may "surrender" this right to "society,"

under a pledge from "society," that it will secure to him "a more safe and certain" fulfilment of his contracts, than he is capable of himself; and that "society," having thus obtained from him this "surrender," may then turn around to him, and not only refuse to fulfil its pledge to him, but may also prohibit his own exercise of his own "original and natural right," which he has "surrendered" to "society!"

This is as much as to say that, if A can but induce B to intrust his (B's) property with him (A), for safekeeping, under a pledge that he (A) will keep it more safely and certainly than B can do it himself, _A thereby acquires an "unquestionable right" to keep the property forever, and let B whistle for it!_

This is the kind of a.s.sumption on which Marshall based all his ideas of the const.i.tutional law of this country; that _const.i.tutional_ law, which he was so famous for expounding. It is the kind of a.s.sumption, by which he expounded the people out of all their "original and natural rights."

He had just as much right to a.s.sume, and practically did a.s.sume, that the people had voluntarily "come into society," and had voluntarily "surrendered" to their governments _all their other natural rights_, as well as their "original and natural right" to make and enforce their own contracts.

He virtually said to all the people of this country:

You have voluntarily "come into society," and have voluntarily "surrendered" to your governments all your natural rights, of every name and nature whatsoever, _for safe keeping;_ and now that these governments have, _by your own consent_, got possession of all your natural rights, they have an "_unquestionable right_" to withhold them from you forever.

If it were not melancholy to see mankind thus cheated, robbed, enslaved, and murdered, on the authority of such naked impostures as these, it would be, to the last degree, ludicrous, to see a man like Marshall--reputed to be one of the first intellects the country has ever had--solemnly expounding the "const.i.tutional powers," as he called them, by which the general and State governments were authorized to rob the people of all their natural rights as human beings.

And yet this same Marshall has done more than any other one man--certainly more than any other man within the last eighty-five years--to make our governments, State and national, what they are. He has, for more than sixty years, been esteemed an oracle, not only by his a.s.sociates and successors on the bench of the Supreme Court of the United States, but by all the other judges, State and national, by all the ignorant, as well as knavish, lawmakers in the country, and by all the sixty to a hundred thousand lawyers, upon whom the people have been, and are, obliged to depend for the security of their rights.

This system of false definitions, false a.s.sumptions, and fraud and usurpation generally, runs through all the operations of our governments, State and national. There is nothing genuine, nothing real, nothing true, nothing honest, to be found in any of them. They all proceed upon the principle, that governments have all power, and the people no rights.

SECTION XXV.

But perhaps the most absolute proof that our national lawmakers and judges are as regardless of all const.i.tutional, as they are of all natural, law, and that their statutes and decisions are as dest.i.tute of all const.i.tutional, as they are of all natural, authority, is to be found in the fact that these lawmakers and judges have trampled upon, and utterly ignored, certain amendments to the const.i.tution, which had been adopted, and (const.i.tutionally speaking) become authoritative, as early as 1791; only two years after the government went into operation.

If these amendments had been obeyed, they would have compelled all congresses and courts to understand that, if the government had any const.i.tutional powers at all, they were simply powers to protect men's natural rights, and not to destroy any of them.

These amendments have actually forbidden any lawmaking whatever in violation of men's natural rights. And this is equivalent to a prohibition of any lawmaking at all. And if lawmakers and courts had been as desirous of preserving men's natural rights, as they have been of violating them, they would long ago have found out that, since these amendments, the const.i.tution authorized no lawmaking at all.

These amendments were ten in number. They were recommended by the first congress, at its first session, in 1789; two-thirds of both houses concurring. And in 1791, they had been ratified by all the States: and from that time they imposed the restrictions mentioned upon all the powers of congress.

These amendments were proposed, by the first congress, for the reason that, although the const.i.tution, as originally framed, had been adopted, its adoption had been procured only with great difficulty, and in spite of great objections. _These objections were that, as originally framed and adopted, the const.i.tution contained no adequate security for the private rights of the people._

These objections were admitted, by very many, if not all, the friends of the const.i.tution themselves, to be very weighty; and such as ought to be immediately removed by amendments. And it was only because these friends of the const.i.tution pledged themselves to use their influence to secure these amendments, that the adoption of the const.i.tution itself was secured. And it was in fulfilment of these pledges, and to remove these objections, that the amendments were proposed and adopted.

The first eight amendments specified particularly various prohibitions upon the power of congress; such, for example, as those securing to the people the free exercise of religion, the freedom of speech and the press, the right to keep and bear arms, etc., etc. Then followed the ninth amendment, in these words:

The enumeration in the const.i.tution, of certain rights, [retained by the people] shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.

Here is an authoritative declaration, that "the people" have "_other rights_" than those specially "enumerated in the const.i.tution"; and that these "_other rights_" were "_retained by the people_"; that is, _that congress should have no power to infringe them_.

What, then, were these "other rights," that had not been "enumerated"; but which were nevertheless "retained by the people"?

Plainly they were men's natural "rights"; for these are the only "rights" that "the people" ever had, or, consequently, that they could "retain."

And as no attempt is made to enumerate _all_ these "other rights," or any considerable number of them, and as it would be obviously impossible to enumerate all, or any considerable number, of them; and as no exceptions are made of any of them, the necessary, the legal, the inevitable inference is, that they were _all_ "retained"; and that congress should have no power to violate any of them.