A Letter to Grover Cleveland Part 12

2. On the power of congress to coin money.

3. On the power of congress to borrow money.

Out of these simple, and apparently harmless provisions, the court manufactures an authority to grant, to a few persons, a monopoly that is practically omnipotent over all the industry and traffic of the country; that is fatal to all other men's natural right to lend and hire capital for any or all their legitimate industries; and fatal absolutely to all their natural right to buy, sell, and exchange any, or all, the products of their labor at their true, just, and natural prices.

Let us look at these const.i.tutional provisions, and see how much authority congress can really draw from them.

1. The const.i.tution says:

The congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises, _to pay the debts, and provide for the common defence and general welfare of the United States_.

This provision plainly authorizes no taxation whatever, except for the raising of revenue to pay the debts and legitimate expenses of the government. It no more authorizes taxation for the purpose of establishing monopolies of any kind whatever, than it does for taking openly and boldly all the property of the many, and giving it outright to a few. And none but a congress of usurpers, robbers, and swindlers would ever think of using it for that purpose.

The court says, _in effect_, that this provision gives congress power to establish the present monopoly of money; that the power to tax all other money, is a power to prohibit all other money; and a power to prohibit all other money is a power to give the present money a monopoly.

How much is such an argument worth? Let us show by a parallel case, as follows.

Congress has the same power to tax all other property, that it has to tax money. And if the power to tax money is a power to prohibit money, then it follows that the power of congress to tax all other property than money, is a power to prohibit all other property than money; and a power to prohibit all other property than money, is a power to give monopolies to all such other property as congress may not choose to prohibit; or may choose to specially license.

On such reasoning as this, it would follow that the power of congress to tax money, and all other property, is a power to prohibit all money, and all other property; and thus to establish monopolies in favor of all such money, and all such other property, as it chooses not to prohibit; or chooses to specially license.

Thus, this reasoning would give congress power to establish all the monopolies, it may choose to establish, not only in money, but in agriculture, manufactures, and commerce; and protect these monopolies against infringement, by imposing prohibitory taxes upon all money and other property, except such as it should choose not to prohibit; or should choose to specially license.

Because the const.i.tution says that "congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes," etc., to raise the revenue necessary for paying the current expenses of the government, the court say that congress have power to levy prohibitory taxes--taxes that shall yield no revenue at all--but shall operate only as a penalty upon all industries and traffic, and upon the use of all the means of industry and traffic, that shall compete with such monopolies as congress shall choose to grant.

This is no more than an unvarnished statement of the argument, by which the court attempts to justify a prohibitory "tax" upon money; for the same reasoning would justify the levying of a prohibitory tax--that is, penalty--upon the use of any and all other means of industry and traffic, by which any other monopolies, granted by congress, might be infringed.

There is plainly no more connection between the "power to lay and collect taxes," etc., for the necessary expenses of the government, and the power to establish this monopoly of money, than there is between such a power of taxation, and a power to punish, as a crime, any or all industry and traffic whatsoever, except such as the government may specially license.

This whole cheat lies in the use of the word "tax," to describe what is really a penalty, upon the exercise of any or all men's natural rights of providing for their subsistence and well-being. And none but corrupt and rotten congresses and courts would ever think of practising such a cheat.

2. The second provision of the const.i.tution, relied on by the court to justify the monopoly of money, is this:

The congress shall have power to coin money, regulate the value thereof, and of foreign coins.

The only important part of this provision is that which says that "the congress shall have power to coin money, [and] regulate the value thereof."

That part about regulating the value of foreign coins--if any one can tell how congress can regulate it--is of no appreciable importance to anybody; for the coins will circulate, or not, as men may, or may not, choose to buy and sell them as money, and at such value as they will bear in free and open market,--that is, in compet.i.tion with all other coins, and all other money. This is their only true and natural market value; and there is no occasion for congress to do anything in regard to them.

The only thing, therefore, that we need to look at, is simply the power of congress "to coin money."

So far as congress itself is authorized to coin money, this is simply a power to weigh and a.s.say metals,--gold, silver, or any other,--stamp upon them marks indicating their weight and fineness, and then sell them to whomsoever may choose to buy them; and let them go in the market for whatever they may chance to bring, in compet.i.tion with all other money that may chance to be offered there.

It is no power to impose any restrictions whatever upon any or all other honest money, that may be offered in the market, and bought and sold in compet.i.tion with the coins weighed and a.s.sayed by the government.

The power itself is a frivolous one, of little or no utility; for the weighing and a.s.saying of metals is a thing so easily done, and can be done by so many different persons, that there is certainly no _necessity_ for its being done at all by a government. And it would undoubtedly have been far better if all coins--whether coined by governments or individuals--had all been made into pieces bearing simply the names of pounds, ounces, pennyweights, etc., and containing just the amounts of pure metal described by those weights. The coins would then have been regarded as only so much metal; and as having only the same value as the same amount of metal in any other form. Men would then have known exactly how much of certain metals they were buying, selling, and promising to pay. And all the jugglery, cheating, and robbery that governments have practised, and licensed individuals to practise--by coining pieces bearing the same names, but having different amounts of metal--would have been avoided.

And all excuses for establishing monopolies of money, by prohibiting all other money than the coins, would also have been avoided.

As it is, the const.i.tution imposes no prohibition upon the coining of money by individuals, but only by State governments. Individuals are left perfectly free to coin it, except that they must not "_counterfeit_ the securities and current coin of the United States."

For quite a number of years after the discovery of gold in California--that is, until the establishment of a government mint there--a large part of the gold that was taken out of the earth, was coined by private persons and companies; and this coinage was perfectly legal. And I do not remember to have ever heard any complaint, or accusation, that it was not honest and reliable.

The true and only value, which the coins have as money, is that value which they have as metals, for uses in the arts,--that is, for plate, watches, jewelry, and the like. This value they will retain, whether they circulate as money, or not. At this value, they are so utterly inadequate to serve as _bona fide_ equivalents for such other property as is to be bought and sold for money; and, after being minted, are so quickly taken out of circulation, and worked up into articles of use--plate, watches, jewelry, etc.--that they are practically of almost no importance at all as money.

But they can be so easily and cheaply carried from one part of the world to another, that they have substantially the same market value all over the world. They are also, in but a small degree, liable to great or sudden changes in value. For these reasons, they serve well as standards--are perhaps the best standards we can have--by which to measure the value of all other money, as well as other property. But to give them any monopoly as money, is to deny the natural right of all men to make their own contracts, and buy and sell, borrow and lend, give and receive, all such money as the parties to bargains may mutually agree upon; and also to license the few holders of the coins to rob all other men in the prices of the latter's labor and property.

3. The third provision of the const.i.tution, on which the court relies to justify the monopoly of money, is this:

The congress shall have power to borrow money.

Can any one see any connection between the power of congress "to borrow money," and its power to establish a monopoly of money?

Certainly no such connection is visible to the legal eye. But it is distinctly visible to the political and financial eye; that is, to that cla.s.s of men, for whom governments exist, and who own congresses and courts, and set in motion armies and navies, whenever they can promote their own interests by doing so.

To a government, whose usurpations and crimes have brought it to the verge of destruction, these men say:

Make bonds bearing six per cent. interest; sell them to us at half their face value; then give us a monopoly of money based upon these bonds--such a monopoly as will subject the great body of the people to a dependence upon us for the necessaries of life, and compel them to sell their labor and property to us at our own prices; then, under pretence of raising revenue to pay the interest and princ.i.p.al of the bonds, impose such a tariff upon imported commodities as will enable us to get fifty per cent. more for our own goods than they are worth; in short, pledge to us all the power of the government to extort for us, in the future, everything that can be extorted from the producers of wealth, and we will lend you all the money you need to maintain your power.

And the government has no alternative but to comply with this infamous proposal, or give up its infamous life.

This is the only real connection there is between the power of congress "to borrow money," and its power to establish a monopoly of money. It was only by an outright sale of the rights of the whole people, for a long series of years, that the government could raise the money necessary to continue its villainous existence.

Congress had just as much const.i.tutional power "to borrow money," by the sale of any and all the other natural rights of the people at large, as it had "to borrow money" by the sale of the people's natural rights to lend and hire money.

When the Supreme Court of the United States--a.s.suming to be an oracle, empowered to define authoritatively the legal rights of every human being in the country--declares that congress has a const.i.tutional power to prohibit the use of all that immense ma.s.s of money capital, in the shape of promissory notes, which the real property of the country is capable of supplying and sustaining, and which is sufficient to give to every laboring person, man or woman, the means of independence and wealth--when that court says that congress has power to prohibit the use of all this money capital, and grant to a few men a monopoly of money that shall condemn the great body of wealth-producers to hopeless poverty, dependence, and servitude--and when the court has the audacity to make these declarations on such nakedly false and senseless grounds as those that have now been stated, it is clearly time for the people of this country to inquire what const.i.tutions and governments are good for, and whether they (the people) have any natural right, as human beings, to live for themselves, or only for a few conspirators, swindlers, usurpers, robbers, and tyrants, who employ lawmakers, judges, etc., to do their villainous work upon their fellow-men.

The court gave their sanction to the monopoly of money in these three separate cases, _viz._: _Veazie Bank vs. Fenno_, 8 _Wallace_, 549 (1869). _National Bank vs. United States_, 101 _U. S. Reports_, 5 _and_ 6 (1879). _Juilliard vs. Greenman_, 110 _U. S. Reports_ 445-6 (1884).

Section XXIII.

If anything could add to the disgust and detestation which the monstrous falsifications of the const.i.tution, already described, should excite towards the court that resorts to them, it would be the fact that the court, not content with falsifying to the utmost the const.i.tution itself, _goes outside of the const.i.tution, to the tyrannical practices of what it_ calls the "_sovereign_" governments of "_other civilized nations_," to justify the same practices by our own.

It a.s.serts, over and over again, the idea that our government is a "_sovereign_" government; that it has the same rights of "_sovereignty_," as the governments of "other civilized nations"; especially those in Europe.

What, then, is a "sovereign" government? It is a government that is "sovereign" over all the natural rights of the people. This is the only "sovereignty" that any government can be said to have. Under it, the people have no _rights_. They are simply "subjects,"--that is, slaves.

They have but one law, and one duty, _viz._, obedience, submission. They are not recognized as having any _rights_. They can claim nothing as their own. They can only accept what the government chooses to give them. The government owns them and their property; and disposes of them and their property, at its pleasure, or discretion; without regard to any consent, or dissent, on their part.

Such was the "sovereignty" claimed and exercised by the governments of those, so-called, "civilized nations of Europe," that were in power in 1787, 1788, and 1789, when our const.i.tution was framed and adopted, and the government put in operation under it. And the court now says, virtually, that the const.i.tution intended to give to our government the same "sovereignty" over the natural rights of the people, that those governments had then.

But how did the "civilized governments of Europe" become possessed of such "sovereignty"? Had the people ever granted it to them? Not at all.

The governments spurned the idea that they were dependent on the will or consent of their people for their political power. On the contrary, they claimed to have derived it from the only source, from which such "sovereignty" could have been derived; that is, from G.o.d Himself.

In 1787, 1788, and 1789, all the great governments of Europe, except England, claimed to exist by what was called "Divine Right." That is, they claimed to have received authority from G.o.d Himself, to rule over their people. And they taught, and a servile and corrupt priesthood taught, that it was a religious duty of the people to obey them. And they kept great standing armies, and hordes of pimps, spies, and ruffians, to keep the people in subjection.

And when, soon afterwards, the revolutionists of France dethroned the king then existing--the Legitimist king, so-called--and a.s.serted the right of the people to choose their own government, these other governments carried on a twenty years' war against her, to reestablish the principle of "sovereignty" by "Divine Right." And in this war, the government of England, although not itself claiming to exist by Divine Right,--but really existing by brute force,--furnished men and money without limit, to reestablish that principle in France, and to maintain it wherever else, in Europe, it was endangered by the idea of popular rights.

The principle, then, of "Sovereignty by Divine Right"--sustained by brute force--was the principle on which the governments of Europe then rested; and most of them rest on that principle today. And now the Supreme Court of the United States virtually says that our const.i.tution intended to give to our government the same "sovereignty"--the same absolutism--the same supremacy over all the natural rights of the people--as was claimed and exercised by those "Divine Right" governments of Europe, a hundred years ago!