A Journey_ My Political Life Part 22

I decided we should table the five tests anyway. We did so in the early hours of Thursday 13 March. They were immediately rejected by France. Jacques Chirac gave a very strong statement saying he would not support military action whatever the circ.u.mstances. Dominique de Villepin, at that time Foreign Minister and someone I actually liked but who just disagreed with me on this, also then rejected the tests per se. This was before the Iraqis even responded. Ricardo then explained that, in this case, he couldn't really partic.i.p.ate in an obviously futile charade at the UNSC. The UN route was blocked.

Meanwhile, we had resolved our own legal issues.

On 7 March, Peter Goldsmith had submitted his final opinion. As I said earlier he had been over to Washington and had had detailed discussions with the administration lawyers. He set out the arguments for and against and on balance came out in favour. Later, much was made of the 'pressure' on Peter to do so. The truth is he was, and is, someone of genuine integrity. He really wanted to be sure. It was difficult. The world is full of lawyers, and on this, every lawyer was having his or her shout. He felt the responsibility keenly, as he should have. There was clearly a case against in law; but there was also a case for. He debated, discussed, reflected and decided. His opinion was balanced. The argument was balanced. He did his job.

He was also one of the few lawyers who, in charge of an administrative function, had real executive capability. The changes Peter made to the role of Director of Public Prosecutions, to the Crown Prosecution Service and to criminal justice made a huge difference to the quality of the system. He put up with my frequently expressed impatience (and not always expressed politely) with the courts over their immigration, terrorism and asylum rulings. He was a stickler for proper process. But within those bounds, he was a radical, with the ability to translate the radicalism into real change.

George and I were due to meet in the Azores on 16 March, partly to bind in Spain and Portugal who were both supportive and both of whose prime ministers were under enormous heat from hostile parliamentary and public opinion. It was clear now that action was inevitable, barring Saddam's voluntary departure. George had agreed to give him an ultimatum to quit. There was no expectation he would, however. Alastair, Jonathan and David were working hard with the Bush team, Condoleezza Rice in particular, to draw up the right statement with the right phrasing.

The mood in the UK continued to be highly volatile. On 11 March, Donald Rumsfeld inadvertently put the cat among the pigeons by suggesting at a press conference that owing to Britain's internal politics, it may be that we shouldn't be part of the initial military action. Some thought he was trying to put the wind up us. It was clear to me that it was just a c.o.c.k-up. He was actually trying to be helpful. It didn't help, however, and by then the military were absolutely determined, rightly, that they would be part of the action from the outset, and took amiss any sense that we might be in the second rank.

Robin Cook came and said now that it was clear that a second resolution was impossible, he would resign, and perfectly amicably we set about drawing up resignation statements. I understood the importance of the second resolution in terms of political survival and so forth. I confess I always thought it a bit odd in terms of the moral acceptability of the course of action or not. It bestowed more legitimacy, it was true, but whether we got a second resolution or not basically depended on the politics in France and Russia and their calculation of where their political interests lay. We had acted without UN authority in Kosovo. It would have been highly doubtful if we could ever have got UNSC agreement for either Bosnia or Rwanda. I never even thought about it for Sierra Leone. Yet it would be hard to argue that, morally, in each of those situations, we should not have intervened. What's more, if the going got tough, as we have found in Afghanistan, the mere fact of UN authority does not necessarily bind people in.

However, had we got it, of course the politics, at least for a time, would have been far easier. But we didn't and so the choice was clear, as it was for many nations' leaders at that moment: in or out? We could count on roughly thirty to be in the military coalition, but it was plain the US and UK would bear the brunt.

On the morning of 16 March, we got up early and flew to the Azores. It was a slightly surreal event. On the face of it we were still pushing for a political solution. There were some last-minute hopes of an Arab initiative to get Saddam out; or of a Saddam capitulation. George was content to adopt the line that we were going to hold out every last hope for peace. We sat and talked for a while in the strange little waiting room outside the main room where the meeting had taken place. It was at the Lajes airbase and the facilities were basic, as most military airbases are, the rooms functional, the decor pretty plain save for some azulejos azulejos (Portuguese tiles) on the walls. It was a beautiful island that much we could see from the flight in but we saw little of it. (Portuguese tiles) on the walls. It was a beautiful island that much we could see from the flight in but we saw little of it.

We rehea.r.s.ed again the main arguments. He was completely calm. He thought we had to send out a message of total clarity to the world: have anything to do with WMD and we were going to come after you. More even than me, he was focused on the possibility of terrorist groups getting hold of WMD material. 'I am just not going to be the president on whose watch it happens,' he said. 'I love my country and these people threaten it by their hatred for us.'

It's easy to mock the simplicity of the George Bush view of the world. Some of it does indeed appear Manichaean. On the other hand, the simplicity was born out of a very direct a.n.a.lysis which it was hard to dispute. For all its faults and the limitations natural in any ent.i.ty containing humanity, America is a great and free country. There's lots of things about the US which I find incompatible with the way we Europeans think about things: guns and capital punishment and the prison system and some of what seems indifference to inner-city poverty, for example. But plenty of Americans also disagree with those things.

None of that should diminish its strength, its appeal or its essential goodness as a nation. I know that 'goodness as a nation' sounds odd, but they and we have systems of government and basic rights and freedoms that are 'good'. Now some nations can't achieve those freedoms yet, but are on their way and will get there. I believe China is such a nation. It has unique problems. It has the world's largest population and more than fifty different ethnic varieties within it. It will take time to develop politically. We should be sensitive to the stresses and strains of that development.

But you look at other nations and you see no sign of benign evolution. You see, instead, power corruptly wielded, a nation held back, people oppressed and a future denied. There is no house on the hill which makes the present struggle worthwhile; just a horizon full of deeper despair as far as the eye can see.

For those people in that bleak wilderness, America does stand out; it does shine; it may not be a house in their land they can aspire to, but it is a house they can see in the distance, and in seeing, know that how they do live is not how they must live.

So when I look back and I reread all the doc.u.ments and the memories flood back to me of all those agonised and agonising meetings, calls and deliberations, I know that there was never any way Britain was not going to be with the US at that moment, once we went down the UN route and Saddam was in breach. Of course, such a statement is always subject to in extremis in extremis correction. A crazy act of aggression? No, we would not have supported that. But given the history, you couldn't call Saddam a crazy target. correction. A crazy act of aggression? No, we would not have supported that. But given the history, you couldn't call Saddam a crazy target.

Personally, I have little doubt that at some point we would have to have dealt with him. But throughout I comforted myself, as I put it in the Glasgow speech, that if we were wrong, we would have removed a tyrant; and as a matter of general principle, I was in favour of doing that.

Nonetheless, I was also aware that the very split in international opinion meant that we were absolutely at the mercy of events, and in wars events are usually of the unforeseen and unpleasant kind. So as we left the Azores, I knew the die was cast. I was aware of my isolation, my precarious grip on power, and stomach-churning thought my total dependence on things going right, not wrong. What's more, this was the first time I would be committing ground troops to an action to topple a regime where we would be the junior partner, where we would not be in charge of all the arrangements. It is true that in Afghanistan British troops were engaged on the ground, but the initial action was an air campaign. This time we would be fighting Saddam's forces, who had been through two wars themselves, and would be fighting to protect their privileged place in the Iraqi hierarchy.

Above all, as I stared out of the window of the BA plane chartered for the day trip and looked at the coastline of the Azores fading into the distance, I knew lives would end or be altered as a result of this decision. I was calm too, but calm because now my fate was sealed along with the fate of countless others. I was doing what I thought was right. But by G.o.d, I wished I wasn't doing it.

We returned. We held an emergency Cabinet on the Monday. Robin had resigned and so didn't attend. I took everyone through the arguments again. I had finally got George to commit to the Road Map, which was of enormous importance to the Middle East peace process. Essentially it provided the framework, as it still does today, for the steps towards peace. It had been resisted by the Israelis (ironically in view of their later strong advocacy of it), and the US system was at best lukewarm, but it was holy writ for the Palestinians, the Arab world and the EU. After much wrangling and debate, we got the US signed up to it and we even got a specific commitment to it in the US ultimatum to Saddam.

Apart from Clare Short, the Cabinet were supportive. All my most loyal people weighed in. As ever on these occasions, John Prescott was a rock. Derry Irvine came in with a very helpful intervention saying that if France had not threatened to veto any resolution authorising action, we could probably have got a second resolution and the problem was that we tried so hard to get a second resolution that people a.s.sumed, wrongly, we needed one legally.

Then came 18 March and the debate in the House of Commons. The Bush ultimatum, with our changes all taken on board, was balanced, not bellicose, and strongly supportive of the Iraqi people. And, critically for me, it played up the Middle East peace process. I had worked on my speech the most important speech I had ever made late into that night and Tuesday morning. At times like this, I just put my head down to write.

The argument came easily. I went through the history of the perpetual flouting of international law and UN resolutions, the ejection of the inspectors, the military action in 1998. I explained why we couldn't allow this to go on; how after September 11 we had to send out the clearest possible signal that the security paradigm had changed and so should our toleration of rogue regimes that used or developed WMD.

In one pa.s.sage, which I regretted and almost took out, I made reference to the 1930s and to the almost universal refusal, for a long time, of people to believe Hitler was a threat. I was careful not to conflate Saddam and Hitler and specifically disowned many of the glib comparisons between 2003 and 1933. But I did mention how joyful people had been at Munich when they thought action had been averted.

Now I would put it differently. Actually there is is a parallel, but it is less about the lead-up to action and more about the general ideology of this extremism based on a perversion of Islam and our att.i.tude to it, and our att.i.tude to the rising threat of fascism. In both cases, there is enormous reluctance to believe we are necessarily in a war. In both cases, our longing for peace blinds us to our enemies' determination to have their way. In both cases, we excuse behaviour on the part of people and states that in other circ.u.mstances we would abhor. In both cases, it seems all a bit remote from us and therefore we ask: Why do we need to intervene? a parallel, but it is less about the lead-up to action and more about the general ideology of this extremism based on a perversion of Islam and our att.i.tude to it, and our att.i.tude to the rising threat of fascism. In both cases, there is enormous reluctance to believe we are necessarily in a war. In both cases, our longing for peace blinds us to our enemies' determination to have their way. In both cases, we excuse behaviour on the part of people and states that in other circ.u.mstances we would abhor. In both cases, it seems all a bit remote from us and therefore we ask: Why do we need to intervene?

I summarised the basic case in this way: Let me tell the House what I know. I know that there are some countries, or groups within countries, that are proliferating and trading in weapons of ma.s.s destruction especially nuclear weapons technology. I know that there are companies, individuals and some former scientists on nuclear weapons programmes who are selling their equipment or expertise. I know that there are several countries mostly dictatorships with highly repressive regimes that are desperately trying to acquire chemical weapons, biological weapons or, in particular, nuclear weapons capability. Some of those countries are now a short time away from having a serviceable nuclear weapon. This activity is not diminishing. It is increasing. We all know that there are terrorist groups now operating in most major countries. Just in the past two years, around twenty different nations have suffered serious terrorist outrages. Thousands of people quite apart from September 11 have died in them. The purpose of that terrorism is not just in the violent act; it is in producing terror. It sets out to inflame, to divide, and to produce consequences of a calamitous nature. Round the world, it now poisons the chances of political progress in the Middle East, in Kashmir, in Chechnya and in Africa. The removal of the Taliban yes dealt it a blow. But it has not gone away. We all know that there are terrorist groups now operating in most major countries. Just in the past two years, around twenty different nations have suffered serious terrorist outrages. Thousands of people quite apart from September 11 have died in them. The purpose of that terrorism is not just in the violent act; it is in producing terror. It sets out to inflame, to divide, and to produce consequences of a calamitous nature. Round the world, it now poisons the chances of political progress in the Middle East, in Kashmir, in Chechnya and in Africa. The removal of the Taliban yes dealt it a blow. But it has not gone away. Those two threats have, of course, different motives and different origins, but they share one basic common view: they detest the freedom, democracy and tolerance that are the hallmarks of our way of life. At the moment, I accept fully that the a.s.sociation between the two is loose but it is hardening. The possibility of the two coming together of terrorist groups in possession of weapons of ma.s.s destruction or even of a so-called dirty radiological bomb is now, in my judgement, a real and present danger to Britain and its national security . . . Those two threats have, of course, different motives and different origins, but they share one basic common view: they detest the freedom, democracy and tolerance that are the hallmarks of our way of life. At the moment, I accept fully that the a.s.sociation between the two is loose but it is hardening. The possibility of the two coming together of terrorist groups in possession of weapons of ma.s.s destruction or even of a so-called dirty radiological bomb is now, in my judgement, a real and present danger to Britain and its national security . . .Let me explain the dangers. Three kilograms of VX from a rocket launcher would contaminate 0.25 sq km of a city. Millions of lethal doses are contained in one litre of anthrax, and 10,000 litres are unaccounted for. What happened on September 11 has changed the psychology of America that is clear but it should have changed the psychology of the world. Of course, Iraq is not the only part of this threat. I have never said that it was. But it is the test of whether we treat the threat seriously. Faced with it, the world should unite. The UN should be the focus both of diplomacy and of action. That is what 1441 said. That was the deal. And I simply say to the House that to break it now, and to will the ends but not the means, would do more damage in the long term to the UN than any other single course that we could pursue. To fall back into the la.s.situde of the past twelve years; to talk, to discuss, to debate but never to act; to declare our will but not to enforce it; and to continue with strong language but with weak intentions that is the worst course imaginable. If we pursue that course, when the threat returns, from Iraq or elsewhere, who will then believe us? What price our credibility with the next tyrant? Of course, Iraq is not the only part of this threat. I have never said that it was. But it is the test of whether we treat the threat seriously. Faced with it, the world should unite. The UN should be the focus both of diplomacy and of action. That is what 1441 said. That was the deal. And I simply say to the House that to break it now, and to will the ends but not the means, would do more damage in the long term to the UN than any other single course that we could pursue. To fall back into the la.s.situde of the past twelve years; to talk, to discuss, to debate but never to act; to declare our will but not to enforce it; and to continue with strong language but with weak intentions that is the worst course imaginable. If we pursue that course, when the threat returns, from Iraq or elsewhere, who will then believe us? What price our credibility with the next tyrant?

I also dealt with the divisions in the international community and in particular with how I wish Europe had negotiated with the US. In retrospect, I fear this only heightened the fact of my isolation, but it is interesting to speculate whether with different leadership, a different outcome along the lines I describe could have been achieved.

What we have witnessed is indeed the consequence of Europe and the United States dividing from each other. Not all of Europe Spain, Italy, Holland, Denmark and Portugal have strongly supported us and not a majority of Europe if we include, as we should, Europe's new members who will accede next year, all ten of whom have been in strong support of the position of this government. But the paralysis of the UN has been born out of the division that there is. I want to deal with that in this way. At the heart of that division is the concept of a world in which there are rival poles of power, with the US and its allies in one corner and France, Germany, Russia and their allies in the other. I do not believe that all those nations intend such an outcome, but that is what now faces us. I believe such a vision to be misguided and profoundly dangerous for our world. I know why it arises. There is resentment of US predominance. There is fear of US unilateralism. People ask, 'Do the US listen to us and our preoccupations?' And there is perhaps a lack of full understanding of US preoccupations after September 11. I know all this. But the way to deal with it is not rivalry, but partnership. Partners are not servants, but neither are they rivals. What Europe should have said last September to the United States is this: with one voice it should have said, 'We understand your strategic anxiety over terrorism and weapons of ma.s.s destruction and we will help you meet it. We will mean what we say in any UN resolution we pa.s.s and will back it with action if Saddam fails to disarm voluntarily. However, in return' Europe should have said 'we ask two things of you: that the US should indeed choose the UN path and you should recognise the fundamental overriding importance of restarting the Middle East peace process, which we will hold you to.' I want to deal with that in this way. At the heart of that division is the concept of a world in which there are rival poles of power, with the US and its allies in one corner and France, Germany, Russia and their allies in the other. I do not believe that all those nations intend such an outcome, but that is what now faces us. I believe such a vision to be misguided and profoundly dangerous for our world. I know why it arises. There is resentment of US predominance. There is fear of US unilateralism. People ask, 'Do the US listen to us and our preoccupations?' And there is perhaps a lack of full understanding of US preoccupations after September 11. I know all this. But the way to deal with it is not rivalry, but partnership. Partners are not servants, but neither are they rivals. What Europe should have said last September to the United States is this: with one voice it should have said, 'We understand your strategic anxiety over terrorism and weapons of ma.s.s destruction and we will help you meet it. We will mean what we say in any UN resolution we pa.s.s and will back it with action if Saddam fails to disarm voluntarily. However, in return' Europe should have said 'we ask two things of you: that the US should indeed choose the UN path and you should recognise the fundamental overriding importance of restarting the Middle East peace process, which we will hold you to.'

Finally I dealt with the issue of regime change.

I have never put the justification for action as regime change. We have to act within the terms set out in Resolution 1441 that is our legal base. But it is the reason why I say frankly that if we do act, we should do so with a clear conscience and a strong heart. I accept fully that those who are opposed to this course of action share my detestation of Saddam. Who could not? . . .The brutality of the repression the death and torture camps, the barbaric prisons for political opponents, the routine beatings for anyone or their families suspected of disloyalty is well doc.u.mented. Just last week, someone slandering Saddam was tied to a lamp post in a street in Baghdad, their tongue was cut out, and they were mutilated and left to bleed to death as a warning to others. I recall a few weeks ago talking to an Iraqi exile and saying to her that I understood how grim it must be under the lash of Saddam. 'But you don't,' she replied. 'You cannot. You do not know what it is like to live in perpetual fear.' And she is right. We take our freedom for granted. But imagine what it must be like not to be able to speak or discuss or debate or even question the society you live in. To see friends and family taken away and never daring to complain. To suffer the humility of failing courage in face of pitiless terror. That is how the Iraqi people live. Leave Saddam in place, and the blunt truth is that that is how they will continue to be forced to live.

So the moral case for action never absent from my psyche provided the final part of my speech and its peroration, echoing perhaps subconsciously the Chicago speech of 1999.

We won the vote handsomely in the end, by 412 to 149. My team both civil servants and special advisers had been utterly magnificent, giving me the most powerful, sustained and sustaining support.

I went back to Downing Street. Everyone a.s.sumed the US would begin its bombing campaign the next day. In fact, the action started with British forces, including special forces securing the oilfields to prevent an ecological disaster.

We were at war. How long, b.l.o.o.d.y and difficult was soon to become apparent.

FIFTEEN.

IRAQ: THE AFTERMATH.

The problem with a military campaign to which a large part of opinion public and most important media is opposed is that this part continues to have a point to prove. Unless they can be somehow co-opted at least to a neutral position, then they approach the conflict with a strong desire, conscious and subconscious, to see it fail. I don't say that in the sense that they wish for disasters to befall coalition troops or the local people; but they are unreconciled. They feel forcefully that the campaign is wrong. They want to say: we told you so. However much they try to resist it and in the case of Iraq, some didn't try hard they see each setback as a rebuke for those who advocated the action. This had crucial consequences for the later phases of Iraq.

Right from the outset, I was keen to put the operation back under a UN badge as swiftly as possible, and to reunify the fractured transatlantic alliance. If the going got tough, we would need that alliance.

That the planning for the aftermath was inadequate is well doc.u.mented. The lessons, set out in the compendious US Inspector General's Report in 2009 and in the Rand Report of the same year, have been pored over, examined and, to a great extent, learned.

The military campaign of conquest was a brilliant success. The civilian campaign of reconstruction wasn't. But disentangling what was avoidable error, what were the unpredicted and unpredictable challenges and what effect each had, is difficult even now. The US has admitted that its plans for reconstruction were poor. We in the British sector could have done better; but frankly for the area for which we were responsible, the plans were adequate and in any event were quickly ramped up and any inadequacy addressed.

The problem is that even if there had been the most intensive and fully adequate planning for the aftermath, all that would have meant was greater concentration of effort on things that ultimately weren't the cause of the bloodshed.

The pre-war preparations threw up three princ.i.p.al areas of concern. First and foremost we feared a humanitarian disaster, as a country dependent on food coupons lost the tightly controlled system of government distribution. This occupied most of our thinking and was the subject of numerous interactions inside government and between the US and its main allies.

When people say that there were warnings that the planning for the aftermath was not up to the mark, that is absolutely true. What is forgotten, however, is that those warnings were about eventualities that fortunately didn't materialise. Somehow, despite the inadequacy, there was no humanitarian disaster. The food was distributed. The system worked.

The second princ.i.p.al concern was over the possible use by Saddam of chemical or biological weapons. We spent much time and money trying to protect people against such a possibility. In the event, for obvious reasons, that never happened.

Finally, we were concerned that Saddam would set fire to the oilfields and spark a major ecological disaster. This was prevented by timely and targeted intervention early in the campaign by British troops.

Had we not done so and we discovered the oilfields were indeed mined and ready to be fired the effect would have been to pollute the entire area of the south of Iraq, its marshes, its biology and wildlife and the surrounding sea. Saddam had driven the Marsh Arabs over 100,000 of them from the marshlands that they had helped preserve, and so already there were signs that the marshes were deteriorating. But an oil slick would have been horrific in its consequences.

However, of course, what troubled us most was the military campaign itself. Above all, in terms of our armed forces, we worried whether the Saddam army whose Republican Guard, in particular, had had the run of the country, with highly privileged positions of power, would fight to the last. The casualties in such a scenario would be large.

So the operation began. In a statement to the House of Commons on 24 March, following the European Council of 2122 March, I set out our aims and initial action undertaken.

We are now just four days into this conflict. It is worth restating our central objectives. They are to remove Saddam Hussein from power, and to ensure that Iraq is disarmed of all chemical, biological and nuclear weapons programmes, but in achieving these objectives we have also embraced other considerations. We want to carry out this campaign in a way that minimises the suffering of ordinary Iraqi people, brutalised by Saddam; to safeguard the wealth of the country for the future prosperity of the people; and to make this a war not of conquest, but of liberation. For this reason, we did not, as some expected, mount a heavy bombing campaign first, followed by a land campaign. Instead, land forces were immediately in action, securing oil installations and gaining strategic a.s.sets and retaining them, not destroying them. The air campaign has been precisely targeted. Of course, there will have been civilian casualties, but we have done all that we humanly can to keep them to a minimum. Water and electricity supplies are being spared. The targets are the infrastructure, command and control of Saddam's regime, not of the civilian population. We are making ma.s.sive efforts to clear lines of supply for humanitarian aid, although the presence of mines is hindering us. We are now just four days into this conflict. It is worth restating our central objectives. They are to remove Saddam Hussein from power, and to ensure that Iraq is disarmed of all chemical, biological and nuclear weapons programmes, but in achieving these objectives we have also embraced other considerations. We want to carry out this campaign in a way that minimises the suffering of ordinary Iraqi people, brutalised by Saddam; to safeguard the wealth of the country for the future prosperity of the people; and to make this a war not of conquest, but of liberation. For this reason, we did not, as some expected, mount a heavy bombing campaign first, followed by a land campaign. Instead, land forces were immediately in action, securing oil installations and gaining strategic a.s.sets and retaining them, not destroying them. The air campaign has been precisely targeted. Of course, there will have been civilian casualties, but we have done all that we humanly can to keep them to a minimum. Water and electricity supplies are being spared. The targets are the infrastructure, command and control of Saddam's regime, not of the civilian population. We are making ma.s.sive efforts to clear lines of supply for humanitarian aid, although the presence of mines is hindering us. By contrast, the nature of Saddam's regime is all too plainly expressed in its actions. The oil wealth was mined, and deep-mined at that. Had we not struck quickly, Iraq's future wealth would even now be burning away. Prisoners are being paraded in defiance of all international conventions. Those who dare speak criticism of the regime are being executed. By contrast, the nature of Saddam's regime is all too plainly expressed in its actions. The oil wealth was mined, and deep-mined at that. Had we not struck quickly, Iraq's future wealth would even now be burning away. Prisoners are being paraded in defiance of all international conventions. Those who dare speak criticism of the regime are being executed. Now let me give the House some detail, if I may, of the military campaign. In the south, our aim was to secure the key oil installations on the Al Faw peninsula; to take the port of Umm Qasr, the only Iraqi port to the outside world; and to render Basra, the second largest city in Iraq, ineffective as a basis for military operations by Saddam against coalition troops. In the west, in the desert, our aim is to prevent Saddam from using it as a base for hostile external aggression. In the north, our objective is to protect people in the Kurdish autonomous zone, to secure the northern oilfields, and to ensure that the north cannot provide a base for Saddam's resistance. Then, of course, the vital goal is to reach Baghdad as swiftly as possible, thus bringing the end of the regime closer. Now let me give the House some detail, if I may, of the military campaign. In the south, our aim was to secure the key oil installations on the Al Faw peninsula; to take the port of Umm Qasr, the only Iraqi port to the outside world; and to render Basra, the second largest city in Iraq, ineffective as a basis for military operations by Saddam against coalition troops. In the west, in the desert, our aim is to prevent Saddam from using it as a base for hostile external aggression. In the north, our objective is to protect people in the Kurdish autonomous zone, to secure the northern oilfields, and to ensure that the north cannot provide a base for Saddam's resistance. Then, of course, the vital goal is to reach Baghdad as swiftly as possible, thus bringing the end of the regime closer. I hope that the House will understand that there is a limit to how much I can say about the detail of our operations, especially those involving special forces, but with that caveat, at present British and US troops have taken the Al Faw peninsula; that is now secure. The southern oil installations are under coalition control. The port of Umm Qasr, despite continuing pockets of resistance, is under allied control, but the waterway essential for humanitarian aid may be blocked by mines and will take some days to sweep. Basra is surrounded and cannot be used as an Iraqi base, but in Basra there are pockets of Saddam's most fiercely loyal security services, who are holding out. They are contained but still able to inflict casualties on our troops, so we are proceeding with caution. Basra international airport has been made secure. The western desert is largely secure. In the north, there have been air attacks on regime targets in Mosul, Kirkuk and Tikrit. We have been in constant contact with the Turkish government and the Kurdish authorities to urge calm. I hope that the House will understand that there is a limit to how much I can say about the detail of our operations, especially those involving special forces, but with that caveat, at present British and US troops have taken the Al Faw peninsula; that is now secure. The southern oil installations are under coalition control. The port of Umm Qasr, despite continuing pockets of resistance, is under allied control, but the waterway essential for humanitarian aid may be blocked by mines and will take some days to sweep. Basra is surrounded and cannot be used as an Iraqi base, but in Basra there are pockets of Saddam's most fiercely loyal security services, who are holding out. They are contained but still able to inflict casualties on our troops, so we are proceeding with caution. Basra international airport has been made secure. The western desert is largely secure. In the north, there have been air attacks on regime targets in Mosul, Kirkuk and Tikrit. We have been in constant contact with the Turkish government and the Kurdish authorities to urge calm. Meanwhile, coalition forces led by the American 5th Corps are on the way to Baghdad. As we speak, they are about sixty miles south of Baghdad, near Karbala. A little way from there they will encounter the Medina division of the Republican Guard, which is defending the route to Baghdad. That will plainly be a crucial moment. Coalition forces are also advancing on al-Kut, in the east of Iraq. The two main bridges over the Euphrates south of Baghdad have been taken intact. That is of critical significance. Meanwhile, coalition forces led by the American 5th Corps are on the way to Baghdad. As we speak, they are about sixty miles south of Baghdad, near Karbala. A little way from there they will encounter the Medina division of the Republican Guard, which is defending the route to Baghdad. That will plainly be a crucial moment. Coalition forces are also advancing on al-Kut, in the east of Iraq. The two main bridges over the Euphrates south of Baghdad have been taken intact. That is of critical significance. The air campaign has attacked Iraqi military installations, the centres of Saddam's regime and command and control centres. More than 5,000 sorties have taken place, thousands of Iraqi soldiers have surrendered and still more have simply left the field, their units disintegrating. But there are those, closest to Saddam, who are resisting and will resist strongly. They are the elite who are hated by the local population and have little to lose. There are bound, therefore, to be difficult days ahead, but the strategy and its timing are proceeding according to plan. The air campaign has attacked Iraqi military installations, the centres of Saddam's regime and command and control centres. More than 5,000 sorties have taken place, thousands of Iraqi soldiers have surrendered and still more have simply left the field, their units disintegrating. But there are those, closest to Saddam, who are resisting and will resist strongly. They are the elite who are hated by the local population and have little to lose. There are bound, therefore, to be difficult days ahead, but the strategy and its timing are proceeding according to plan.

The European Council began with tragedy. I got in to Brussels late on Thursday night. We were staying overnight on 20 March in the UK Representative's home, a lovely old house on a nineteenth-century Brussels terrace. There are very beautiful parts of Brussels (unfortunately not including any of the EU buildings) and this was one of them. It is that very particular mid-century architecture, large rooms with very high ceilings and those plain, long, thin double doors.

I was woken early on Friday morning to hear that eight British marines and four US soldiers had been killed in a helicopter collision in Kuwait. It was an ominous sign. Up to then, in the combined operations in Kosovo, Sierra Leone and Afghanistan, we had lost only a handful. The horrible feeling that this was going to be very, very tough returned to me. As ever, I imagined the families, the knock on the door, the grieving widow, the fatherless children, the sheer tragedy of it all.

Both Jacques Chirac and Gerhard Schroeder came over to me at the beginning of the Council and gave their condolences in a sincere and touching manner. I was very grateful for it. It also allowed us to discuss how we might now reunite the international community.

My aim was to persuade the US that as soon as the fighting stopped, the whole political process should be put under the UN. They could then supervise the elections. They would have the formal power of decision-making, even if obviously the de facto power rested with the US. We could then say: OK, we all disagreed over removing Saddam. But now he's gone, let us agree we all have an interest in a stable, friendly and well-governed Iraq.

In this regard, the Council went better than expected. It agreed on the need for oil revenues to be held in trust by the UN and for the Iraqi people. It agreed that the UN should have a strong post-conflict mandate, and that the new provisional government should, for the first time in decades, be generally representative of all sections of Iraqi opinion. Since the 1960s, the Shia (60 per cent of the population) and the Kurds (20 per cent) had been effectively excluded from power. Now was the chance for them to partic.i.p.ate in the running of their country.

The US was harder to persuade. Colin Powell was very much in favour, pretty much for the same reasons as me. d.i.c.k Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld and much of the administration thought the UN bureaucracy would just snarl things up. The task, as ever, was to persuade George. We were due to meet on 27 March. I wrote him a detailed note explaining why the UN had to be involved. I stressed once again the seminal importance of the Middle East peace process. When we met at Camp David, we went through the note pretty much line by line. Once he had studied the note carefully it was clear that he would end up coming down on the UN side. That was good, but the fact that it was a struggle indicated the nature of the problem.

The Americans' belief was that the UN got in the way. My belief was that you had to construct a coalition to win and the UN was the easiest conduit to such a coalition. This isn't simply a matter of waging a war that is a guerrilla campaign rather than a conventional war. There have been guerrilla wars fought before. It is that, with modern technology and modern news and communication, the reality of war is played out in real time in people's living rooms across the world. It is a spectacle. What the spectators see and, above all, the lens through which they see it is a vital component of winning or losing. Of course, public opinion has always played its part in warfare. But now, there are embedded media with the front-line troops. Everyone gives a running commentary. The collective news footage is not just vastly greater; it is of a quite different nature from what has gone before. I sometimes wonder whether some of the wars of old, including the Second World War, could have been fought in the way they were if the media of today had been there with the technology they now have. Think of Dresden or Hiroshima.

The point is that the visual impact of real war completely eclipses a.n.a.lysis, context or explanation. It becomes its own story because the images are so shocking. In those circ.u.mstances, it is of the essence that the narrative about why we are doing it, the purpose, the objectives, the moral as well as geopolitical rationale, is clear and sufficiently agreed and accepted so that it can overwhelm the visual force of the images of war.

This is so for virtually any modern military engagement. It is abundantly so for any engagement that will take time. That is why building a coalition to topple Saddam mattered; it is why, above all, reuniting the international community post-Saddam was going to be vital. If the post-Saddam Iraq could be made a task for all of us, then, yes, it is true there would be irritating amounts of UN bureaucracy, but there would be the immense bonus of international buy-in. Or, at the least, a greater prospect of it.

It was a hard sell with George and even harder with d.i.c.k. But in the end we got agreement 'in principle' that the UN should come in.

I tried to mend fences by going from Camp David straight to New York to see Kofi Annan. I had and have a great respect and liking for Kofi. His position throughout Iraq was quite impossible. He did his level best to steer a sensible course. He was, personally, I am sure, opposed to the action, but he saw entirely the sense of the UN coming back into it and was grateful I had made the effort to see and consult him.

In the light of what came to be a familiar criticism of UN exclusion, and because it provided Clare Short with the ostensible reason for her resignation a few weeks later, it is worth pointing out that from the outset Kofi made it clear he did not seek the 'lead' role for the UN. He wanted the UN to be at the centre of things but thought (rightly) there was no way the UN could take the lead until the country stabilised. What he wanted a 'central' or 'vital' role, as it came to be called was what he got.

In the days and weeks that followed, there was a continual round of meetings, updates, conference calls and the steady progress of the forces on the ground.

I used to meet the core group the Chief of Defence Staff, the heads of intelligence, Jack Straw and Geoff Hoon early in the morning; and then have the War Cabinet at nine. The War Cabinet meetings were marked by Clare's continued agonising over whether she should stay in the government or resign; and usually very detailed debates about individual items. I tried to keep it focused but it was difficult, frankly. However, it kept everyone bound in. There is a charge bolstered by some of the Civil Service grandees (though not others) that there were mistakes in Iraq because not enough was discussed in the bigger Cabinet. It really is nonsense. I wasn't there during the Second World War or the Falklands, but if Winston Churchill or Margaret Thatcher used to do everything through formal Cabinet meetings, I would eat my proverbial hat. It's like any other walk of life. You can't take decisions by vast committees of people. You can debate, discuss and absorb views that way, but you can't run a war, organisation or company that way. It just doesn't work; at least, not in my experience. But then again, that might be my fault ...

The American and British forces performed brilliantly. Indeed, from 19 March to the effective end of Saddam's government was less than two months. In fact, on 14 April in a statement to the House of Commons, I said that though the conflict was not over, in essence the regime had already collapsed. It had been an extraordinarily well-executed and brisk military campaign. I outlined what had been achieved so far: The south of Iraq is now largely under British control. The west is secure, and in the major town of Al Qaim fighting is diminishing. In the north, Kurdish forces have retired from Kirkuk and Mosul, leaving US forces in control. US forces are in and around Tikrit. They are meeting some resistance. But in essence, all over Iraq, Saddam's forces have collapsed. Much of the remaining fighting, particularly in Baghdad, is being carried out by foreign irregular forces. In Baghdad itself, the Americans are in control of most of the city but not yet all of it. As is obvious, the problem now is the disorder following the regime's collapse. Some disorder, frankly, is inevitable. It will happen in any situation where a brutal police state that for thirty years has terrorised a population is suddenly destroyed. Some looting, too, is directed at specific regime targets, including hospitals that were dedicated for the use of the regime. But it is a serious situation and we need to work urgently to bring it under control. As is obvious, the problem now is the disorder following the regime's collapse. Some disorder, frankly, is inevitable. It will happen in any situation where a brutal police state that for thirty years has terrorised a population is suddenly destroyed. Some looting, too, is directed at specific regime targets, including hospitals that were dedicated for the use of the regime. But it is a serious situation and we need to work urgently to bring it under control. Basra shows that initial problems can be overcome. I am particularly proud of the role that British forces, ably led by Major General Robin Brims, have played in Basra. Basra shows that initial problems can be overcome. I am particularly proud of the role that British forces, ably led by Major General Robin Brims, have played in Basra. Iraqi technicians and managers are now making themselves known to British forces. Together we are restoring many key services. Most public health clinics are operational. UK forces have supplied oxygen to Al Basra general hospital and are providing other medical support where they can. About two hundred policemen have reported for work. Joint patrols started on 13 April. In surrounding towns, looting has either ceased or is declining, local patrols are being re-established and cooperation with city councils is going well. Iraqi technicians and managers are now making themselves known to British forces. Together we are restoring many key services. Most public health clinics are operational. UK forces have supplied oxygen to Al Basra general hospital and are providing other medical support where they can. About two hundred policemen have reported for work. Joint patrols started on 13 April. In surrounding towns, looting has either ceased or is declining, local patrols are being re-established and cooperation with city councils is going well.

The casualties on the British side for such a military operation were mercifully slight fewer than thirty deaths, each one a personal tragedy, but an extraordinary low count on such a major undertaking.

As the army moved through the south, taking out Iraqi resistance, mopping up any renegade elements, they were, through the excellence of the engineering unit, also repairing bridges, electricity, water and power infrastructure. Detailed plans were developed for rehabilitation and repair work. Though it is true that Clare's att.i.tude did hamper the civilian efforts, the army commitment more than made up for it, and in any event, frankly, any failings of Clare could have been easily remedied, had the security situation remained benign.

The US effort, through the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian a.s.sistance (ORHA), was a mess. On the other hand, the truth is that until American forces got into Baghdad and obtained a real sense of what the real-life situation was, there was a limit to what could be done. I will come to how that effort progressed. But right at the outset, let's be very clear: it would be so easy to say that the reason for the subsequent difficulty lay in planning failures, in terms of the civilian capacity to rebuild Iraq. It isn't true. The plain fact is that with the money and effort committed, any defects would have been overcome, had the problem been administrative or bureaucratic. What went wrong was on the security side. Some of the civilian decisions may not have helped and I will come to those also. But the notion that they were the root of the problem is just false, a delusion I'm afraid, and one that matters, because in future conflicts we have to be aware of the limitations of this approach. Reconstruction is essential. It can't happen in a violent environment. I saw that in Iraq and Afghanistan. I've also seen it since in Gaza and the West Bank.

The only issue is whether with better preparation, the security situation itself would have been better. If that preparation had yielded in and around Baghdad different or more troops, it is possible it would have. Down south, where the British were and where soon enough we were joined by 20,000 troops from other nations, it is less clear. For much of 2003 the south was relatively calm.

But I doubt any change would have prevented the al-Qaeda and Iran factors emerging; and it was those that from 2005 to 2007 almost tipped the country into the abyss.

In those initial weeks, all seemed according to plan. The regime had no support among the people at large. Many towns declared themselves open to coalition forces. Pockets of fighting continued but, without a local base of support, they were quickly eliminated and the south Shia and heavily anti-Saddam was swiftly subdued. Indeed, by 12 April, local police patrols resumed in Basra.

Baath Party officials were being captured or were surrendering to US forces. When the notorious Abu Ghraib prison complex was taken notorious then and to become even more notorious later it was found empty. Saddam had released all the prisoners, at least the criminal elements. It should have warned us along with the intelligence that Saddam had allowed al-Qaeda to establish a base inside Iraq in early 2003 that his tactics were not to fight our superior force but to let the country be overrun and then attempt to plunge it into chaos. But at this point, the reception accorded to the forces, if not that of garlands of flowers, was certainly more like that extended to a liberating force than to an occupying one. Towards the end of April, a million Shia pilgrims attended the main Shia festival in Karbala, something Saddam had forbidden to them.

On 2728 April, things were sufficiently quiet even in Baghdad for General Garner, head of ORHA, to be able to host a political and reconstruction meeting with over two hundred Iraqi delegates and representatives of the coalition force nations. At the end of June, the first new Basra political council was established.

Before then, I had myself visited Basra on 29 May. The British troops had been brilliant. I saw the forces at the Presidential Palace and then at the port of Umm Qasr. The port was being de-mined and they were preparing to reopen it. The potential of it was enormous, all of it lost during the Saddam years. But it could have been and in the heyday of ancient Iraq it was one of the great ports in the world. When, just before leaving office in 2007, I made a speech in the Emirates and said that Basra in time could become like Dubai or Abu Dhabi, I was much mocked. But the truth is it could, and today is expected to double its capacity in the next three years, having already increased it dramatically since the days of Saddam.

I visited a school newly refurbished by the British troops. Basra was quiet and relatively peaceful. Up in Baghdad, the statue of Saddam was wrenched from its pedestal and broken into pieces to cheers. It was a great moment. Stupidly I gave an interview to the Sun Sun and allowed myself to be drawn into a vainglorious remark about how I had almost lost my job over the war. (Rather less important than the soldiers losing or risking their lives, you might think.) But all in all, at that point the campaign had been hard and b.l.o.o.d.y but successful and short. By the end of May, roughly five hundred coalition troops had been lost, over four hundred of those American, and according to the Iraq Body Count around 8,000 Iraqis had died, obviously significant numbers of them combatants. and allowed myself to be drawn into a vainglorious remark about how I had almost lost my job over the war. (Rather less important than the soldiers losing or risking their lives, you might think.) But all in all, at that point the campaign had been hard and b.l.o.o.d.y but successful and short. By the end of May, roughly five hundred coalition troops had been lost, over four hundred of those American, and according to the Iraq Body Count around 8,000 Iraqis had died, obviously significant numbers of them combatants.

The humanitarian disaster had not happened. The oilfields had been protected. The resistance of Saddam elements had crumbled. The warnings of doom had been wrong.

We thought we were at the end of the main military campaign. Actually, we were at the beginning of what then became a quite different phase of operations; but this one hard, b.l.o.o.d.y, protracted, and at times during those years, the result was most definitely in doubt; even today it is fragile.

In this phase, the absence of international unity in the original decision, and the vested interests of many to prove that it was a mistake, counted heavily against us. I got a taste of this during a visit to Russia at the end of April. Vladimir Putin launched into a vitriolic attack at the press conference, really using the British as surrogates for the US, and then afterwards at dinner we had a tense, and at times heated, discussion. He was convinced the US was set on a unilateralist course, not for a good practical purpose but as a matter of principle. Time and again, he would say, 'Suppose we act against Georgia, which is a base for terrorism against Russia what would you say if we took Georgia out? Yet the Americans think they can do whatever they like to whomever they like.' Chechnya was another example, though as I pointed out I had actually supported suppression of terrorism there.

I realised then how deep was his feeling that Russia had just been ignored by the US and his determination that they should see it eventually as a mistake. The difficulty was that I half agreed with him about the unilateralism. There was an arrogance to it that was not so much wrong as counterproductive to our cause. But it didn't mean that the action per se shouldn't have been taken or that the a.n.a.logies he was drawing were accurate. The truth is that the IndiaPakistan dispute over Kashmir did erupt into sporadic violence and there was terrorism coming out of Pakistan. But, though elements of state organisations might be involved, that was a long way from saying the Pakistan government was a terrorist government, or Pakistan was a rogue state. China's issue with Taiwan was of internal Chinese unity. It was not really an external threat to anyone. Chechnya did indeed exhibit some of the same characteristics, but frankly if the US or Britain had gone into Iraq as hard as Russia had in Chechnya, there would have been bedlam.

I respected Vladimir for being as direct as he was. Though we disagreed, we kept lines open. But the chance to forge a really strong US/Russian partnership had been lost. If I were the US I wouldn't allow the same thing to happen with China. Bind them in and treat them as an equal, not in form alone but in substance.

There was also another more pressing and more embarra.s.sing issue for us. We were actively searching for the WMD. We were sure we would find them. This was the moment I was waiting for. It would draw a line under one major issue.

As our troops went further into Iraq, so we would get daily reports. Sometimes we would try to inspect plants or sites and get thwarted. Other times we would think we had made a find and be disappointed. As the weeks wore on, I became more and more agitated. By the time of my visit to Basra at the end of May, Donald Rumsfeld had somewhat unhelpfully suggested that we may never find WMD, a prediction that turned out to be true but needed to be handled with some care. It was, after all, the casus casus belli belli.

When in Basra, I met Jerry Bremer, who had just taken over the running of ORHA, soon to be the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). I told him that he should not hesitate in asking for anything he needed from us, and advised him to use the same tactic with his own administration. 'Don't hold back,' I said. 'If you need it, demand it. I will back you up and I'm sure your president will too.' Unsurprisingly, he seemed a trifle overwhelmed, but very capable and committed.

Following that conversation, however, I redoubled our efforts on helping, not just in respect of our field of operations down in Basra, but in what we could do to support the US in the rest of the country. It was set to be my princ.i.p.al preoccupation over the coming months.

The visit was a real wake-up call. Though I could see that much was being done, I could also see we were in danger of having won the war, then losing the peace. The expectations of the people were enormous. The complexities of tribal and religious life manifest. This was a huge challenge and there was no cause whatever for complacency.

On my return I called the key ministers together and gave a series of instructions to get our help to the US on a better footing. We had thought they would handle the centre of the country and we the south. I realised after that visit that unless they succeeded, we would fail. I had sent John Sawers, my former key foreign policy adviser, to Baghdad. He came to the same conclusion: the American operation needed a drastic boost. I also sent a strong note to George and we then spoke by phone.

Fortunately, on 22 May, the UN had pa.s.sed unanimously UN Resolution 1483 which gave the UN a key role in all aspects of Iraq's development. It put us back on a multilateral path. I argued strongly for the appointment of a really top UN operative to go into Baghdad. After some deliberation, Kofi agreed. At my urging he chose Sergio Vieira de Mello, the High Commissioner for Human Rights, and a man with a first-rate record and experience.

However, my attention soon got diverted elsewhere. On 29 May, the BBC's Today Today programme contained as its top story revelations from its defence correspondent Andrew Gilligan. In it, he focused on the forty-five-minutes claim in the September 2002 dossier. As I've said, this claim was in the dossier, it was highlighted by some papers the next day in a form we should, in retrospect, have corrected. But it then disappeared off the radar. programme contained as its top story revelations from its defence correspondent Andrew Gilligan. In it, he focused on the forty-five-minutes claim in the September 2002 dossier. As I've said, this claim was in the dossier, it was highlighted by some papers the next day in a form we should, in retrospect, have corrected. But it then disappeared off the radar.

The claim turned out to be wrong. Also, unknown to me, or to the Secretary of State, or indeed to the JIC, there had been internal Ministry of Defence debate about it. One of those taking part in the debate, though not directly responsible for the dossier, was a Dr David Kelly, a Ministry of Defence intelligence expert of about twenty years' experience.

The BBC broadcast did not claim, simply, that the intelligence was wrong on the forty-five minutes. What Gilligan said was: What we've been told by one of the senior officials in charge of drawing up that dossier was that actually the government probably knew that that forty-five-minute figure was wrong even before it decided to put it in ... Downing Street, our source says, a week before publication ordered it to be s.e.xed up to be made more exciting and ordered more facts to be discovered.

There could hardly have been a more inflammatory or severe charge. Mistaken intelligence is one thing. Intelligence known to be mistaken but nonetheless still published as accurate is a wholly different matter. That is not a mistake but misconduct. What's more, directly attributed to Number 10.

In view of five separate inquiries into this and the vast quant.i.ties of ink, time and energy expended on it, it would be tedious to go back over every fact, every argument, sub-argument and all the very painful personal grief that it caused. Dr Kelly, a decent and honourable man, took his own life. The two top people at the BBC, Greg d.y.k.e and Gavyn Davies, resigned. Alastair and numerous officials went through several months of absolute h.e.l.l over an allegation that was untrue. Probably my own integrity never recovered from it. Quite a consequence, really. As a result of it, something else happened: the division over the war became not a disagreement but a rather vicious dispute about the honesty of those involved. A difficult situation became and remains an ugly one.

Of course, as I have said, the blunt and inescapable truth is that though Saddam definitely had WMD, since he used them, we never found them. The intelligence turned out to be wrong. But here is where the relationship between politics and the modern media plays such a crucial role.

The intelligence was wrong. We admitted it. We apologised for it. We explained it, even. But it was never enough, in today's media, for there to have been a mistake. The mistake is serious; but it is an error. Humans make errors. And, given Saddam's history, it was an understandable error. But it leads to a headline that doesn't satisfy today's craving for scandal. A mistake doesn't hit the register high enough. So the search goes on for a lie, a deception, an act not of error but of malfeasance. And the problem is, if one can't be found, one is contrived or even invented.

I'm not saying we handled the allegation well. But it was a global firecracker that set blazing a whole series of conspiracy theories that in turn, at the very moment when we needed to unify people, divided them in the sharpest way possible. Before it, we were in error; after, we were 'liars'.

The basic facts are, actually, straightforward. As each inquiry in turn found and on the evidence there was no other finding possible each of the points in the original broadcast was wrong. The forty-five-minutes claim was not put in the dossier by anyone in Downing Street or anyone in government, but by the JIC. We didn't 'probably know it was wrong' and neither did anyone else. We never ordered the dossier to be 's.e.xed up'. Dr Kelly was not one of the officials involved in drawing it up.

Worse, Gilligan then went on in an article in the Mail on Sunday Mail on Sunday to allege that Alastair was the author of the whole claim, i.e. invented it, a charge that brought Alastair into the forefront of all the anti-war protest and was just an unbelievable thing to write, unless you were really sure it was true; which, of course, manifestly it wasn't, and by then both ourselves and the JIC had denied it. to allege that Alastair was the author of the whole claim, i.e. invented it, a charge that brought Alastair into the f