A History of the Japanese People Part 90

Strategists are agreed that, had Kuropatkin's plans found competent agents to execute them, the j.a.panese advance would have been at least checked at Liaoyang. In fact, the j.a.panese, in drafting their original programme, had always expected that Nogi's army would be in a position on the left flank in the field long before there was any question of fighting at Liaoyang. It was thus due to the splendid defence made by the garrison of the great fortress that Kuropatkin found himself in such a favourable position at the end of August. But unfortunately for the Russians, one of their generals, Orloff, who had thirteen battalions under his command, showed incompetence, and falling into an ambuscade in the course of the counter-flanking operation, suffered defeat with heavy losses. The j.a.panese took full advantage of this error, and Kuropatkin, with perhaps excessive caution, decided to abandon his counter-movement and withdraw from Liaoyang. He effected his retreat in a manner that bore testimony to the excellence of his generalship. The casualties in this great battle were very heavy. From August 25th, when the preliminary operations may be said to have commenced, to September 3rd, when the field remained in the possession of the j.a.panese, their losses were 17,539, namely, 4866 in the First Army, 4992 in the Fourth, and 7681 in the Second, while the Russian casualties were estimated at 25,000.

BATTLES OF SHAHO AND OF HEIKAUTAI

On the 2nd of October, General Kuropatkin issued from his headquarters in Mukden an order declaring that the "moment for the attack, ardently desired by the army, had at last arrived, and that the j.a.panese were now to be compelled to do Russia's will." Barely a month had elapsed since the great battle at Liaoyang, and it still remains uncertain what had happened in that interval to justify the issue of such an order. But the most probable explanation is that Kuropatkin had received re-enforcements, so that he could marshal 250,000 to 260,000 troops for the proposed offensive, and that his news from Port Arthur suggested the necessity of immediate and strenuous efforts to relieve the fortress. His plan was to throw forward his right so as to outflank the j.a.panese, recover possession of Liaoyang, and obtain command of the railway.

He set his troops in motion on the 9th of October, but he was driven back after more than a week's fighting. No less than 13,333 Russian dead were left on the field, and at the lowest calculation, Kuropatkin's casualties must have exceeded 60,000 men exclusive of prisoners. There can be no doubt whatever that the Russian army had suffered one of the most overwhelming defeats in its history, and that after a fortnight's hard marching and nine days' hard fighting, with little food or sleep, it had been reduced by terrible losses and depressing fatigues to a condition bordering on extermination. Such was the result of Kuropatkin's first attempt to a.s.sume the offensive.

Thereafter, fully three months of complete inaction ensued, and the onlooking world occupied itself with conjectures as to the explanation of this apparent loss of time.

Yet the chief reason was very simple. The weather in central Manchuria at the close of the year is such as to render military manoeuvres almost impossible on a large scale, and this difficulty is greatly accentuated by the almost complete absence of roads. In fact, the reasons which induced Kuropatkin to defy these obstacles, and renew his outflanking attempts after the beginning of the cold weather, have never been fully explained. The most probable theory is that held by j.a.panese strategists, namely, that he desired to find some opening for the vigorous campaign which he intended to pursue in the spring, and that his attention was naturally directed to the region between the Hun and the Liao rivers, a region unoccupied by either army and yet within striking distance of the bases of both.

Moreover, he had received nearly three whole divisions from Europe, and he looked to these fresh troops with much confidence. He set his forces in motion on the 25th of January, 1905. Seven Russian divisions were engaged, and the brunt of the fighting was borne by two j.a.panese divisions and a brigade of cavalry. Two other divisions were engaged, but the part they acted in the fight was so subordinate that it need scarcely be taken into account. The Russians were finally driven back with a loss of some twenty thousand killed, wounded, or prisoners. This battle of Heikautai was the last engagement that took place before the final encounter.

PORT ARTHUR

The relief of Port Arthur had ceased to be an important objective of Kuropatkin before he planned his Heikautai attack. The great fortress fell on the last day of 1904. It was not until the middle of May that the Kinchou isthmus and Dalny came into j.a.panese hands, nor was the siege army under General Nogi marshalled until the close of June.

During that interval, General Stossel, who commanded, on the Russian side, availed himself of all possible means of defence, and the investing force had to fight for every inch of ground. The attack on the outlying positions occupied fully a month, and not till the end of July had the j.a.panese advanced close enough to attempt a coup de main. There can be no doubt that they had contemplated success by that method of procedure, but they met with such a severe repulse, during August, that they recognized the necessity of recourse to the comparatively slow arts of the engineer. Thereafter, the story of the siege followed stereotyped lines except that the colossal nature of the fortifications entailed unprecedented sacrifice of life on the besiegers' part. The crucial point of the siege-operations was the capture of a position called 203-Metre Hill. This took place on November 30th after several days of the most terrible fighting ever witnessed, fighting which cost the j.a.panese ten thousand casualties.

The importance of the hill was that it furnished a post of observation whence indications could be given to guide the heavy j.a.panese artillery in its cannonade of the remaining Russian ships in the harbour.

Nothing then remained for the Russians except to sink the ships, and this they did, so that Russia lost a squadron which, all told, represented an outlay of over thirty millions sterling--$150,000,000.

In a telegram despatched to his own Government on January 1st, General Stossel said: "Great Sovereign, forgive! We have done all that was humanly possible. Judge us; but be merciful. Eleven months have exhausted our strength. A quarter only of the defenders, and one-half of them invalids, occupy twenty-seven versts of fortifications without supports and without intervals for even the briefest repose. The men are reduced to shadows!" On the previous day Stossel had written to General Nogi, declaring that further resistance would merely entail useless loss of life considering the conditions within the fortress. The total number of prisoners who surrendered at the fall of the fortress was 878 officers and 23,491 men, and the captured material included 546 guns; 35,252 rifles; 60 torpedoes; 30,000 kilograms of powder; 82,670 rounds of gun-ammunition; two and a quarter million rounds of small-arm ammunition; a number of wagons; 1,920 horses; four battle-ships; two cruisers; fourteen gunboats and torpedo-craft; ten steamers; thirty-three steam launches, and various other vessels. These figures are worthy of study, as one of General Stossel's alleged reasons for surrendering was scarcity of ammunition.

MISHCHENKO'S RAID

The capture of Port Arthur meant something more than the fall of a fortress which had been counted impregnable and which had dominated the strategical situation for fully seven months. It meant, also, that General Nogi's army would now be free to join their comrades beyond the Liao River, and that Kuropatkin would find his opponents'

strength increased by four divisions. It became, therefore, important to ascertain how soon this transfer was likely to be effected, and, if possible, to interrupt it by tearing up the railway. Accordingly, on January 8th, General Mishchenko's division of Cossacks, Caucasians, and Dragoons, mustering six thousand sabres, with six batteries of light artillery, crossed the Hun River and marched south on a five-mile front. Throughout the war the Cossacks, of whom a very large force was with the Russian army, had hitherto failed to demonstrate their usefulness, and this raid in force was regarded with much curiosity. It accomplished very little. Its leading squadrons penetrated as far south as Old Niuchw.a.n.g, and five hundred metres of the railway north of Haicheng were destroyed, a bridge also being blown up. But this damage was speedily restored, and as for the reconnoitring results of the raid, they seem to have been very trifling.

THE BATTLE OF MUKDEN

After the battle of Heikautai, which cost the Russians twenty thousand casualties and exposed the troops to terrible hardships, Kuropatkin's army did not number more than 260,000 effectives. On the other hand, he could rely upon a constant stream of re-enforcements from Europe, as the efficiency of the railway service had been enormously increased by the genius and energy of Prince Khilkoff, Russian minister of Ways and Communications. In fact, when all the forces under orders for Manchuria had reached their destination, Kuropatkin would have under his command twelve army corps, six rifle-brigades, and nine divisions of mounted troops, a total of something like half a million men. Evidently the j.a.panese would not have acted wisely in patiently awaiting the coming of these troops.

Moreover, since the break-up of winter would soon render temporarily impossible all operations in the field, to have deferred any forward movement beyond the month of March would have merely facilitated the ma.s.sing of Russian re-enforcements in the lines on the Shaho, where the enemy had taken up his position after his defeat at Heikautai.

These considerations induced Marshal Oyama to deliver an attack with his whole force during the second half of February, and there resulted a conflict which, under the name of the "battle of Mukden,"

will go down in the pages of history as the greatest fight on record.

It has been claimed by the Russians that Kuropatkin was thinking of a.s.suming the offensive when the j.a.panese forced his hand; but however that may be, the fact is that he fought on the defensive as he had done throughout the whole war with two exceptions. Nevertheless, we may confidently a.s.sert that at no previous period had the Russians been so confident and so strong. According to the j.a.panese estimate, the accuracy of which may be trusted, Kuropatkin had 376 battalions, 171 batteries, and 178 squadrons; representing 300,000 rifles, 26,000 sabres and 1368 guns, while the defences behind which these troops were sheltered were of the most elaborate character, superior to anything that the j.a.panese had encountered during the previous battles of the field-campaign. On the other hand, the j.a.panese also were in unprecedented strength. Up to the battle of Heikautai, Kuropatkin had been confronted by only three armies, namely, the First, Second, and Fourth, under Generals Kuroki, Oku, and Nozu, respectively. In the middle of February, these numbered three, four, and two divisions, respectively. But there had now been added a considerable number of reserve brigades, bringing up the average strength of most of the divisions to from 22,000 to 25,000 men.

Further, in addition to these armies, two others were in the field, namely, the Third, under General Nogi, and the Fifth, under General Kawamura. General Nogi's force had marched up from Port Arthur, but General Kawamura's was a new army formed of special reservists and now put in the field for the first time.

The Russians occupied a front forty-four miles in extent and from five to six miles in depth. They did not know, apparently, that General Kawamura's army had joined Oyama's forces, nor did they know where Nogi's army was operating. The j.a.panese programme was to hold the Russian centre; to attack their left flank with Kawamura's army, and to sweep round their right flank with Nogi's forces. The latter were therefore kept in the rear until Kawamura's attack had developed fully on the east and until the two centres were hotly engaged. Then "under cover of the smoke and heat generated by the conflict of the other armies on an immense front, and specially screened by the violent activity of the Second Army, Nogi marched in echelon of columns from the west on a wide, circling movement; swept up the Liao valley, and bending thence eastward, descended on Mukden from the west and northwest, giving the finishing blow of this gigantic encounter; severing the enemy's main line of retreat, and forcing him to choose between surrender and flight. To launch, direct, and support four hundred thousand men engaged at such a season over a front one hundred miles in length was one of the most remarkable tasks ever undertaken on the field of battle by a modern staff."

Of course, all these events did not move exactly as planned, but the main feature of the great fight was that Kuropatkin, deceived by Kawamura's movement, detached a large force to oppose him, and then recalled these troops too late for the purpose of checking General Nogi's flanking operation. The fighting was continuous for almost two weeks, and on the morning of March 16th, the Russians had been driven out of Mukden and forced northward beyond Tiehling. In fact, they did not pause until March 20th, when Linievitch, who had succeeded Kuropatkin in the chief command, was able to order a halt at Supingchieh, seventy miles to the north of Mukden. "The Russian losses in this most disastrous battle included, according to Marshal Oyama's reports, 27,700 killed and 110,000 wounded," while an immense quant.i.ty of war material fell into the hands of the victors. The j.a.panese losses, up to the morning of March 12th, were estimated at 41,222.

THE BATTLE OF TSUSHIMA

From the outset, both sides had appreciated the enormous preponderance that would be conferred by command of the sea. It was in obedience to this conviction that the Russian authorities were in the act of taking steps to increase largely their Pacific squadron when the outbreak of war compelled them to suspend the despatch of re-enforcements. They did not, however, relinquish their preparations. Evidently, any vessels sent to the scene of combat after fighting had begun must be competent to defend themselves against attack, which condition entailed strength to form an independent squadron. The preparations to acquire this competence involved a long delay, and it was not until the 16th of October, 1904, that Admiral Rozhdestvensky left Libau with some forty ships.

The world watched this adventure with astonished eyes. Thitherto Great Britain, equipped as she is with coaling-stations all round the globe, had been the only power thought capable of sending a large fleet on an ocean voyage. Rozhdestvensky's squadron consumed over three thousand tons of coal daily when steaming at a reduced speed, and how this supply was to be kept up in the absence of ports of call, no one was able to conjecture. The difficulty was ultimately overcome by the very benevolent character which the neutrality of certain powers a.s.sumed, and in May, 1905, the Baltic squadron, as the vessels under Rozhdestvensky were called, made its appearance in Far Eastern waters.

It had been supposed that the Russians would seek to envelop their movements in obscurity, but they seem to have appreciated, from the outset, the absurdity of endeavouring to conceal the traces of a fleet of forty vessels steaming along the routes of the world's commerce. They therefore proceeded boldly on their way, slowly but indomitably overcoming all obstacles. It will be observed that the date of their departure from Libau was just two months after the last attempt of the Port Arthur squadron to escape to Vladivostok.

Doubtless, this sortie, which ended so disastrously for the Russians, was prompted in part by antic.i.p.ation of the Baltic fleet's approaching departure, and had the Port Arthur squadron, or any considerable portion of it, reached Vladivostok before Rozhdestvensky's coming, Admiral Togo might have been caught between two fires. The result of the sortie, however, dispelled that hope.

Long before Rozhdestvensky reached the Far East, he fell into touch with j.a.panese scouts, and every movement of his ships was flashed to the enemy. That Vladivostok was his objective and that he would try to reach that place if possible without fighting, were unquestionable facts. But by what avenue would he enter the Sea of j.a.pan? The query occupied attention in all the capitals of the world during several days, and conjectures were as numerous as they were conflicting. But Admiral Togo had no moment of hesitation. He knew that only two routes were possible, and that one of them, the Tsugaru Strait, could be strewn with mines at very brief notice. The Russians dare not take that risk. Therefore Togo waited quietly at his base in the Korean Strait and on the 27th of May his scouts reported by wireless telegraphy at 5 A.M., "Enemy's fleet sighted in 203 section. He seems to be steering for the east channel."

In the historic action which ensued, Rozhdestvensky had under his command eight battle-ships, nine cruisers, three coast-defence ships, nine destroyers, an auxiliary cruiser, six special-service steamers, and two hospital ships. Togo's fleet consisted of five battle-ships (one of them practically valueless), one coast-defence vessel, eight armoured cruisers, ten protected cruisers, twenty destroyers, and sixty-seven torpedo-boats. Numerically, the advantage was on the j.a.panese side, although in first-cla.s.s fighting material the disparity was not remarkable. As for the result, it can only be called annihilation for the Russian squadron. Out of the thirty-eight ships composing it, twenty were sunk; six captured; two went to the bottom or were shattered while escaping; six were disarmed and interned in neutral ports to which they had fled; one was released after capture, and of one the fate is unknown. Only two escaped out of the whole squadron. This wonderful result justifies the comment of a competent authority:

"We can recognize that Togo is great--great in the patience he exercised in the face of much provocation to enter upon the fight under conditions less favourable to the success of his cause; great in his determination to give decisive battle despite advice offered to him to resort to methods of evasion, subterfuge, and finesse; great in his use of not one but every means in his power to crush his enemy, and great, greatest perhaps of all, in his moderation after victory unparalleled in the annals of modern naval war.

"The att.i.tude of the j.a.panese people in the presence of this epoch-making triumph is a sight for men and G.o.ds. They have the grand manner of the ancients, and their invariable att.i.tude throughout the war, whether in the hour of victory or in that of disappointment, has been worthy of a great people. No noisy and vulgar clamour, no self-laudation, no triumph over a fallen enemy, but deep thankfulness, calm satisfaction, and reference of the cause of victory to the ill.u.s.trious virtue of their Emperor."*

*The War in the Far East, by the Military Correspondent of "The Times."

The j.a.panese losses in the two-days' fighting were three torpedo-boats, and they had 116 killed and 538 wounded.

PEACE RESTORED

After the battles of Mukden and Tsushima, which were great enough to terminate the greatest war, the Russians and the j.a.panese alike found themselves in a position which must either prelude another stupendous effort on both sides or be utilized to negotiate peace. Here the President of the United States of America intervened, and, on the 9th of June, 1905, the American minister in Tokyo and the amba.s.sador in St. Petersburg, instructed from Washington, handed an identical note to the j.a.panese and the Russian Governments respectively, urging the two countries to approach each other direct. On the following day, j.a.pan intimated her frank acquiescence, and Russia lost no time in taking a similar step. Two months nevertheless elapsed before the plenipotentiaries of the two powers met, on August 10th, at Portsmouth, New Hampshire. Russia sent M. (afterwards Count) de Witte and Baron Rosen; j.a.pan, Baron (afterwards Marquis) Komura, who had held the portfolio of Foreign Affairs throughout the war, and Mr.

(afterwards Baron) Takahira. The j.a.panese statesmen well understood that much of the credit accruing to them for their successful conduct of the war must be forfeited in the sequel of the negotiations. For the people of j.a.pan had accustomed themselves to expect that Russia would recoup a great part, if not the whole, of the expenses incurred by their country in the contest, whereas the ministry in Tokyo knew that to look for payment of indemnity by a great State whose territory has not been invaded effectively or its existence menaced must be futile.

Nevertheless, diplomacy required that this conviction should be concealed, and thus Russia carried to the conference a belief that the financial phase of the discussion would be crucial. Baron Komura's mandate was, however, that the only radically essential terms were those formulated by j.a.pan prior to the war. She must insist on securing the ends for which she had fought, since she believed them to be indispensable to the peace of the Far East, but beyond that she would not go. The j.a.panese plenipotentiaries, therefore, judged it wise to submit their terms in the order of the real importance, leaving their Russian colleagues to imagine, as they probably would, that the converse method had been adopted, and that everything prefatory to questions of finance and territory was of minor consequence.

The negotiations, commencing on the 10th of August, were not concluded until the 5th of September, when a treaty of peace was signed. There had been a moment when the onlooking world believed that unless Russia agreed to ransom the island of Saghalien by paying to j.a.pan a sum of 120 millions sterling,--$580,000,000, the conference would be broken off. Nor did such an exchange seem unreasonable, for were Russia expelled from the northern part of Saghalien, which commands the estuary of the Amur, her position in Siberia would have been compromised. But j.a.pan's statesmen were not disposed to make any display of territorial aggression. The southern half of Saghalien had originally belonged to j.a.pan and had pa.s.sed into Russia's possession by an arrangement which the j.a.panese nation strongly resented. To recover that portion of the island seemed, therefore, a legitimate ambition. j.a.pan did not contemplate any larger demand, nor did she seriously insist on an indemnity. Thus, the negotiations were never in real danger of failure.

The Treaty of Portsmouth recognized j.a.pan's "paramount political, military, and economic interests" in Korea; provided for the simultaneous evacuation of Manchuria by the contracting parties; transferred to j.a.pan the lease of the Liaotung peninsula, held by Russia from China, together with that of the Russian railways south of Kwanchengtsz and all collateral mining or other privileges; ceded to j.a.pan the southern half of Saghalien, the fiftieth parallel of lat.i.tude to be the boundary between the two parties; secured fishing-rights for j.a.panese subjects along the coasts of the seas of j.a.pan, Okhotsk, and Bering; laid down that the expense incurred by the j.a.panese for the maintenance of the Russian prisoners during the war should be reimbursed by Russia, less the outlays made by the latter on account of j.a.panese prisoners, by which arrangement j.a.pan obtained a payment of some four million sterling $20,000,000, and provided that the contracting parties, while withdrawing their military force from Manchuria, might maintain guards to protect their respective railways, the number of such guards not to exceed fifteen per kilometre of line. There were other important restrictions: first, the contracting parties were to abstain from taking, on the Russo-Korean frontier, any military measures which might menace the security of Russian or Korean territory; secondly, the two powers pledged themselves not to exploit the Manchurian railways for strategic purposes, and thirdly, they promised not to build on Saghalien or its adjacent islands any fortifications or other similar works, or to take any military measures which might impede the free navigation of the Strait of La Perouse and the Gulf of Tatary.

The above provisions concerned the two contracting parties only. But China's interests also were considered. Thus, it was agreed to "restore entirely and completely to her exclusive administration" all portions of Manchuria then in the occupation, or under the control, of j.a.panese or Russian troops, except the leased territory; that her consent must be obtained for the transfer to j.a.pan of the leases and concessions held by the Russians in Manchuria; that the Russian Government should disavow the possession of "any territorial advantages or preferential or exclusive concessions in impairment of Chinese sovereignty or inconsistent with the principle of equal opportunity in Manchuria," and that j.a.pan and Russia "engaged reciprocally not to obstruct any general measures common to all countries which China might take for the development of the commerce and industry of Manchuria."

This distinction between the special interests of the contracting parties and the interests of China herself, as well as of foreign nations generally, is essential to clear understanding of a situation which subsequently attracted much attention. From the time of the Opium War (1857) to the Boxer rising (1900), each of the great Western powers struggled for its own hand in China, and each sought to gain for itself exclusive concessions and privileges with comparatively little regard for the interests of others and with no regard whatsoever for China's sovereign rights. The fruits of this period were permanently ceded territories (Hongkong and Macao); leases temporarily establishing foreign sovereignty in various districts (Kiao-chou, Weihaiwei, and Kw.a.n.g-chow); railway and mining concessions, and the establishment of settlements at open ports where foreign jurisdiction was supreme. But when, in 1900, the Boxer rising forced all the powers into a common camp, they awoke to full appreciation of a principle which had been growing current for the past two or three years, namely, that concerted action on the lines of maintaining China's integrity and securing to all alike equality of opportunity and a similarly open door, was the only feasible method of preventing the part.i.tion of the Chinese empire and averting a clash of rival interests which might have disastrous results. This, of course, did not mean that there was to be any abandonment of special privileges already acquired or any surrender of existing concessions. The arrangement was not to be retrospective in any sense. Vested interests were to be strictly guarded until the lapse of the periods for which they had been granted, or until the maturity of China's competence to be really autonomous.

A curious situation was thus created. International professions of respect for China's sovereignty, for the integrity of her empire, and for the enforcement of the open door and equal opportunity co-existed with legacies from an entirely different past. Russia endorsed this new policy, but not unnaturally declined to abate any of the advantages previously enjoyed by her in Manchuria. Those advantages were very substantial. They included a twenty-five-year lease--with provision for renewal--of the Liaotung peninsula, within which area of 1220 square miles Chinese troops might not penetrate, whereas Russia would not only exercise full administrative authority, but also take military and naval action of any kind; they included the creation of a neutral territory on the immediate north of the former and still more extensive, which remained under Chinese administration, and where neither Chinese nor Russian troops might enter, nor might China, without Russia's consent, cede land, open trading marts, or grant concessions to any third nationality; and they included the right to build some sixteen hundred miles of railway (which China would have the opportunity of purchasing at cost price in the year 1938, and would be ent.i.tled to receive gratis in 1982), as well as the right to hold extensive zones on either side of the railway, to administer these zones in the fullest sense, and to work all mines lying along the lines.

Under the Portsmouth treaty these advantages were transferred to j.a.pan by Russia, the railway, however, being divided so that only the portion (521.5 miles) to the south of Kwanchengtsz fell to j.a.pan's share, while the portion (1077 miles) to the north of that place remained in Russia's hands. China's consent to the above transfers and a.s.signments was obtained in a treaty signed at Peking on the 22nd of December, 1905. Thus, j.a.pan came to hold in Manchuria a position somewhat contradictory. On the one hand, she figured as the champion of the Chinese empire's integrity and as an exponent of the new principle of equal opportunity and the open door. On the other, she appeared as the legatee of many privileges more or less inconsistent with that principle. But, at the same time, nearly all the great powers of Europe were similarly circ.u.mstanced. In their cases, also, the same incongruity was observed between the newly professed policy and the aftermath of the old practice. It was scarcely to be expected that j.a.pan alone should make a large sacrifice on the altar of a theory to which no other State thought of yielding any retrospective obedience whatever. She did, indeed, furnish a clear proof of deference to the open-door doctrine, for instead of reserving the railway zones to her own exclusive use, as she was fully ent.i.tled to do, she sought and obtained from China a pledge to open to foreign trade sixteen places within these zones.

For the rest, however, the inconsistency between the past and the present, though existing throughout the whole of China, was nowhere so conspicuous as in the three eastern provinces (Manchuria); not because there was any real difference of degree, but because Manchuria had been the scene of the greatest war of modern times; because that war had been fought by j.a.pan in the cause of the new policy, and because the principles of the equally open door and of China's integrity had been the main bases of the Portsmouth treaty, of the Anglo-j.a.panese alliance, and of the subsequently concluded ententes with France and Russia. In short, the world's eyes were fixed on Manchuria and diverted from China proper, so that every act of j.a.pan was subjected to an exceptionally rigorous scrutiny, and the nations behaved as though they expected her to live up to a standard of almost ideal alt.i.tude. China's mood, too, greatly complicated the situation. She had the choice between two moderate and natural courses; either to wait quietly until the various concessions granted by her to foreign powers in the evil past should lapse by maturity, or to qualify herself by earnest reforms and industrious developments for their earlier recovery. Nominally she adopted the latter course, but in reality she fell into a mood of much impatience. Under the name of a "rights-recovery campaign" her people began to protest vehemently against the continuance of any conditions which impaired her sovereignty, and as this temper coloured her att.i.tude towards the various questions which inevitably grew out of the situation in Manchuria, her relations with j.a.pan became somewhat strained in the early part of 1909.

j.a.pAN IN KOREA AFTER THE WAR WITH RUSSIA

Having waged two wars on account of Korea, j.a.pan emerged from the second conflict with the conviction that the policy of maintaining the independence of that country must be modified, and that since the ident.i.ty of Korean and j.a.panese interests in the Far East and the paramount character of j.a.panese interests in Korea would not permit j.a.pan to leave Korea to the care of any third power, she must a.s.sume the charge herself. Europe and America also recognized that view of the situation, and consented to withdraw their legations from Seoul, thus leaving the control of Korean foreign affairs entirely in the hands of j.a.pan, who further undertook to a.s.sume military direction in the event of aggression from without or disturbance from within. But in the matter of internal administration, she continued to limit herself to advisory supervision. Thus, though a j.a.panese resident-general in Seoul, with subordinate residents throughout the provinces, a.s.sumed the functions. .h.i.therto discharged by foreign ministers and consuls, the Korean Government was merely asked to employ j.a.panese experts in the position of counsellors, the right to accept or reject their counsels being left to their employers.

Once again, however, the futility of looking for any real reforms under this optional system was demonstrated. j.a.pan sent her most renowned statesman, Prince Ito, to discharge the duties of resident-general; but even he, in spite of patience and tact, found that some less optional methods must be resorted to. Hence, on the 24th of July, 1907, a new agreement was signed, by which the resident-general acquired initiative as well as consultative competence to enact and enforce laws and ordinances; to appoint and remove Korean officials, and to place capable j.a.panese subjects in the ranks of the administration. That this const.i.tuted a heavy blow to Korea's independence could not be gainsaid. That it was inevitable seemed to be equally obvious. For there existed in Korea nearly all the worst abuses of medieval systems. The administration of justice depended solely on favour or interest. The police contributed by corruption and incompetence to the insecurity of life and property.

The troops were a body of useless mercenaries. Offices being allotted by sale, thousands of incapables thronged the ranks of the executive.

The Emperor's Court was crowded by diviners and plotters of all kinds, male and female. The finances of the Throne and those of the State were hopelessly confused. There was nothing like an organized judiciary. A witness was in many cases considered particeps criminis; torture was commonly employed to obtain evidence, and defendants in civil cases were placed under arrest. Imprisonment meant death or permanent disablement for a man of means. Flogging so severe as to cripple, if not to kill, was a common punishment; every major offence from robbery upwards was capital, and female criminals were frequently executed by administering shockingly painful poisons. The currency was in a state of the utmost confusion. Extreme corruption and extortion were practised in connexion with taxation. Finally, while nothing showed that the average Korean lacked the elementary virtue of patriotism, there had been repeated proofs that the safety and independence of the empire counted for little with political intriguers. j.a.pan must step out of Korea altogether or effect drastic reforms there.

She necessarily chose the latter alternative, and the things which she accomplished between the beginning of 1906 and the close of 1908 may be briefly described as the elaboration of a proper system of taxation; the organization of a staff to administer annual budgets; the re-a.s.sessment of taxable property; the floating of public loans for productive enterprises; the reform of the currency; the establishment of banks of various kinds, including agricultural and commercial; the creation of a.s.sociations for putting bank-notes into circulation; the introduction of a warehousing system to supply capital to farmers; the lighting and buoying of the coasts; the provision of posts, telegraphs, roads, and railways; the erection of public buildings; the starting of various industrial enterprises (such as printing, brick making, forestry and coal mining); the laying out of model farms; the beginning of cotton cultivation; the building and equipping of an industrial training school; the inauguration of sanitary works; the opening of hospitals and medical schools; the organization of an excellent educational system; the construction of waterworks in several towns; the complete remodelling of the Central Government; the differentiation of the Court and the executive, as well as of the administrative and the judiciary; the formation of an efficient body of police; the organization of law-courts with a majority of j.a.panese jurists on the bench; the enactment of a new penal code, and drastic reforms in the taxation system.

In the summer of 1907, the resident-general advised the Throne to disband the standing army as an unserviceable and expensive force.

The measure was, doubtless desirable, but the docility of the troops had been overrated. Some of them resisted vehemently, and many became the nucleus of an insurrection which lasted in a desultory manner for nearly two years; cost the lives of 21,000 insurgents and 1300 j.a.panese, and entailed upon j.a.pan an outlay of nearly a million sterling. Altogether, what with building 642 miles of railway, making loans to Korea, providing funds for useful purposes and quelling the insurrection, j.a.pan was fifteen millions sterling $72,000,000 out of pocket on Korea's account by the end of 1909. She had also lost the veteran statesman, Prince Ito, who was a.s.sa.s.sinated at Harbin by a Korean fanatic on the 26th of October, 1909.*

*Encylopaedia Britannica, (11th Edition); article "j.a.pan," by Brinkley.

ANNEXATION OF KOREA

j.a.pan finally resolved that nothing short of annexation would suit the situation, and that step was taken on August 22, 1910. At what precise moment this conviction forced itself upon j.a.pan's judgment it is impossible to say, She knows how to keep her counsel. But it was certainly with great reluctance that she, hitherto the exponent and champion of Korean independence, accepted the role of annexation. The explanation given by her own Government is as follows:

-"In its solicitude to put an end to disturbing conditions, the j.a.panese Government made an arrangement, in 1905, for establishing a protectorate over Korea and they have ever since been a.s.siduously engaged in works of reform, looking forward to the consummation of the desired end. But they have failed to find in the regime of a protectorate sufficient hope for a realization of the object which they had in view, and a condition of unrest and disquietude still prevails throughout the whole peninsula. In these circ.u.mstances, the necessity of introducing fundamental changes in the system of government in Korea has become entirely manifest, and an earnest and careful examination of the Korean problem has convinced the j.a.panese Government that the regime of a protectorate cannot be made to adapt itself to the actual condition of affairs in Korea, and that the responsibilities devolving upon j.a.pan for the due administration of the country cannot be justly fulfilled without the complete annexation of Korea to the Empire."