A History of the Japanese People Part 63

Whereas, Ieyasu puts the matter thus:--

Nak.u.made mato Hototogisu.

(I'll wait till the cuckoo does sing.)

Nevertheless, whatever n.o.bunaga may have lost by these defects, the fact remains that in the three decades of his military career he brought under his sway thirty-three provinces, or one-half of the whole country, and at the time of his death he contemplated the further conquest of Shikoku, Chugoku, and Kyushu. To that end he had appointed Hideyoshi to be Chikuzen no Kami; Kawajiri Shigeyoshi to be Hizen no Kami, while his own son, n.o.butaka, with Niwa Nagahide for chief of staff, had been sent to subdue Shikoku. Even admitting that his ambition was self-aggrandizement in the first place, it is undeniable that he made the peace of the realm, the welfare of the people, and the stability of the throne his second purposes, and that he pursued them with ardour. Thus, one of his earliest acts when he obtained the control in Kyoto was to appoint officials for impartially administering justice, to reduce the citizens' taxes; to succour widows and orphans, and to extend to all the blessings of security and tranquillity. In 1572, we find him sending messengers to the provinces with instructions to put in hand the making of roads having a width of from twenty-one to twelve feet; to set up milestones and plant trees along these roads; to build bridges; to remove barriers, and generally to facilitate communications.

Towards the Throne he adopted a demeanour emphatically loyal. In this respect, he followed the example of his father, n.o.buhide, and departed radically from that of his predecessors, whether Fujiwara, Taira, or Ashikaga. As concrete examples may be cited the facts that he restored the shrines of Ise, and reinst.i.tuted the custom of renovating them every twenty years; that, in the year following his entry into the capital, he undertook extensive repairs of the palace; that he granted considerable estates for the support of the Imperial household, and that he organized a commission to repurchase all the properties which had been alienated from the Court. Finally, it is on record that when, in recognition of all this, the sovereign proposed to confer on him the rank of minister of the Left, he declined the honour, and suggested that t.i.tles of lower grade should be given to those of his subordinates who had shown conspicuous merit.

DEATH OF MITSUHIDE

It was plainly in Hideyoshi's interests that he should figure publicly as the avenger of n.o.bunaga's murder, and to this end his speedy arrival in Kyoto was essential. He therefore set out at once, after the fall of Takamatsu, with only a small number of immediate followers. Mitsuhide attempted to destroy him on the way, and the details of this attempt have been magnified by tradition to incredible dimensions. All that can be said with certainty is that Hideyoshi was, for a moment, in extreme danger but that he escaped scathless. Immediately on arriving in Kyoto, he issued an appeal to all n.o.bunaga's va.s.sal-barons, inviting them to join in exterminating Mitsuhide, whose heinous crime "provoked both heaven and earth."

But it was no part of Hideyoshi's policy to await the arrival of these barons. He had already at his command an army of some thirty thousand men, and with this he moved out, challenging Mitsuhide to fight on the plains of Yamazaki. Mitsuhide did not hesitate to put his fortunes to the supreme test. He accepted Hideyoshi's challenge, and, on the 12th of June, a great battle was fought, the issue of which was decided by two things; first, the defection of Tsutsui Junkei, who refrained from striking until the superior strength of Hideyoshi had been manifested, and secondly, the able strategy of Hideyoshi, who antic.i.p.ated Mitsuhide's attempt to occupy the position of Tenno-zan, which commanded the field. From the carnage that ensued Mitsuhide himself escaped, but while pa.s.sing through a wood he received from a bamboo spear in the hands of a peasant a thrust which disabled him, and he presently committed suicide. Thus, on the thirteenth day after n.o.bunaga's death, the head of his a.s.sa.s.sin was exposed in Kyoto in front of the temple of Honno-ji where the murder had taken place, and Mitsuhide's name went down in history as the "Three days' shogun" (Mikkakubo).

CONFERENCE AT KIYOSU

By this time the princ.i.p.al of n.o.bunaga's va.s.sal-barons were on their way at the head of contingents to attack Mitsuhide. On learning of the a.s.sa.s.sin's death, these barons all directed their march to Kiyosu, and in the castle from which n.o.bunaga had moved to his early conquests thirty years previously, a momentous council was held for the purpose of determining his successor. The choice would have fallen naturally on Samboshi, eldest son of n.o.bunaga's first-born, n.o.butada, who, as already described, met his death in the Mitsuhide affair. But Hideyoshi was well understood to favour Samboshi's succession, and this sufficed to array in opposition several of the barons habitually hostile to Hideyoshi. Thus, in spite of the fact that both were illegitimate and had already been adopted into other families, n.o.bunaga's two sons, n.o.bukatsu and n.o.butaka, were put forward as proper candidates, the former supported by Ikeda n.o.buteru and Gamo Katahide; the latter, by Shibata Katsuiye and Takigawa Kazumasu.

At one moment it seemed as though this question would be solved by an appeal to violence, but ultimately, at the suggestion of Tsutsui Junkei, it was agreed that Samboshi should be nominated n.o.bunaga's successor; that n.o.bukatsu and n.o.butaka should be appointed his guardians, and that the administrative duties should be entrusted to a council consisting of Shibata Katsuiye, Niwa Nagahide, Ikeda n.o.buteru, and Hideyoshi, each taking it in turn to discharge these functions and each residing for that purpose in Kyoto three months during the year. An income of one hundred thousand koku in the province of Omi was a.s.signed to Samboshi pending the attainment of his majority, when he should be placed in possession of much larger estates, which were to be entrusted in the meanwhile to the keeping of one of the four barons mentioned above. n.o.bukatsu received the province of Owari, and n.o.butaka that of Mino, the remainder of n.o.bunaga's dominions being apportioned to his generals, with the exception of Hideyoshi, to whom were a.s.signed the provinces recently overrun by him in the midlands--Tajima, Harima, Inaba, and Tamba.

Such an arrangement had no elements of stability. The four councillors could not possibly be expected to work in harmony, and it was certain that Katsuiye, Sak.u.ma Morimasa, and Takigawa Kazumasu would lose no opportunity of quarrelling with Hideyoshi. Indeed, that result was averted solely by Hideyoshi's tact and long suffering, for when, a few days later, the barons again met at Kiyosu for the purpose of discussing territorial questions, every possible effort was made to find a pretext for killing him. But Hideyoshi's astuteness and patience led him successfully through this maze of intrigues and complications. He even went so far as to hand over his castle of Nagahama to Katsuiye, and to endure insults which in ordinary circ.u.mstances must have been resented with the sword.

Tradition describes a grand memorial ceremony organized in Kyoto by Hideyoshi in honour of n.o.bunaga, and, on that occasion, incidents are said to have occurred which bear the impress of romance. It is, at all events, certain that the immediate issue of this dangerous time was a large increase of Hideyoshi's authority, and his nomination by the Court to the second grade of the fourth rank as well as to the position of major-general. Moreover, the three barons who had been appointed with Hideyoshi to administer affairs in Kyoto in turn, saw that Hideyoshi's power was too great to permit the peaceful working of such a programme. They therefore abandoned their functions, and Hideyoshi remained in sole charge of the Imperial Court and of the administration in the capital.

DEATH OF SHIBATA KATSUIYE

It has been already stated that n.o.bunaga's sons, n.o.butaka and n.o.bukatsu, were bitter enemies and that n.o.butaka had the support of Takigawa Kazumasu as well as of Shibata Katsuiye. Thus, Hideyoshi was virtually compelled to espouse the cause of n.o.bukatsu. In January, 1583, he took the field at the head of seventy-five thousand men, and marched into Ise to attack Kazumasu, whom he besieged in his castle at Kuwana. The castle fell, but Kazumasu managed to effect his escape, and in the mean while Katsuiye entered Omi in command of a great body of troops, said to number sixty-five thousand. At the last moment, however, he had failed to secure the co-operation of Maeda Toshiiye, an important ally, and his campaign therefore a.s.sumed a defensive character. Hideyoshi himself, on reconnoitring the position, concluded that he had neither numerical preponderance nor strategical superiority sufficient to warrant immediate a.s.sumption of the offensive along the whole front. He therefore distributed his army on a line of thirteen redoubts, keeping a reserve of fifteen thousand men under his own direct command, his object being to hold the enemy's forces in check while he attacked Gifu, which place he a.s.saulted with such vigour that the garrison made urgent appeals to Katsuiye for succour.

In this situation it was imperative that some attempt should be made to break the line of redoubts, but it was equally imperative that this attempt should not furnish to the enemy a point of concentration. Accordingly, having ascertained that the weakest point in the line was at Shizugatake, where only fifteen hundred men were posted, Katsuiye instructed his princ.i.p.al general, Sak.u.ma Morimasa, to lead the reserve force of fifteen thousand men against that position, but instructed him at the same time to be content with any success, however partial, and not to be betrayed into pushing an advantage, since by so doing he would certainly furnish a fatal opportunity to the enemy. Morimasa neglected this caution. Having successfully surprised the detachment at Shizugatake, and having inflicted heavy carnage on the defenders of the redoubt, who lost virtually all their officers, he not only sat down to besiege the redoubt, whose decimated garrison held out bravely, but he also allowed his movements to be hampered by a small body of only two score men under Niwa Nagahide, who took up a position in the immediate neighbourhood, and displaying their leader's flag, deceived Morimasa into imagining that they had a powerful backing. These things happened during the night of April 19, 1583. Katsuiye, on receipt of the intelligence, sent repeated orders to Morimasa requiring him to withdraw forthwith; but Morimasa, elated by his partial victory, neglected these orders.

On the following day, the facts were communicated to Hideyoshi, at Ogaki, distant about thirty miles from Shizugatake, who immediately appreciated the opportunity thus furnished. He set out at the head of his reserves, and in less than twenty-four hours his men crossed swords with Morimasa's force. The result was the practical extermination of the latter, including three thousand men under Katsuiye's adopted son, Gonroku. The latter had been sent to insist strenuously on Morimasa's retreat, but learning that Morimasa had determined to die fighting, Gonroku announced a similar intention on his own part. This incident was characteristic of samurai canons.

Hideyoshi's victory cost the enemy five thousand men, and demoralized Katsuiye's army so completely that he subsequently found himself able to muster a total force of three thousand only. Nothing remained but flight, and in order to withdraw from the field, Katsuiye was obliged to allow his chief retainer, Menju Shosuke, to impersonate him, a feat which, of course, cost Shosuke's life.

Katsuiye's end is one of the most dramatic incidents in j.a.panese history. He decided to retire to his castle of Kitano-sho, and, on the way thither, he visited his old friend, Maeda Toshiiye, at the latter's castle of Fuchu, in Echizen. Thanking Toshiiye for all the a.s.sistance he had rendered, and urging him to cultivate friendship with Hideyoshi, he obtained a remount from Toshiiye's stable, and, followed by about a hundred samurai, pushed on to Kitano-sho. Arrived there, he sent away all who might be suspected of sympathizing with Hideyoshi, and would also have sent away his wife and her three daughters. This lady was a sister of n.o.bunaga. She had been given, as already stated, to Asai Nagamasa, and to him she bore three children.

But after Nagamasa's destruction she was married to Katsuiye, and was living at the latter's castle of Kitano-sho when the above incidents occurred. She declined to entertain the idea of leaving the castle, declaring that, as a samurai's daughter, she should have shared her first husband's fate, and that nothing would induce her to repeat that error. Her three daughters were accordingly sent away, and she herself joined in the night-long feast which Katsuiye and his princ.i.p.al retainers held while Hideyoshi's forces were marching to the attack. When the sun rose, the whole party, including the ladies, committed suicide, having first set fire to the castle.

YODOGOMI

One of the three daughters of Asai Nagamasa afterwards became the concubine of Hideyoshi and bore to him a son, Hideyori, who, by her advice, subsequently acted in defiance of Ieyasu, thus involving the fall of the house of Hideyoshi and unconsciously avenging the fate of n.o.bunaga.

n.o.bUTAKA

n.o.bunaga's son, n.o.butaka, who had been allied with Katsuiye, escaped, at first, to Owari on the latter's downfall, but ultimately followed Katsuiye's example by committing suicide. As for Samboshi, n.o.bunaga's grandson and nominal heir, he attained his majority at this time, but proving to be a man of marked incompetence, the eminent position for which he had been destined was withheld. He took the name of Oda Hiden.o.bu, and with an income of three hundred thousand koku settled down contentedly as Hideyoshi's va.s.sal.

OSAKA CASTLE

Hideyoshi left behind him a striking monument of his greatness of thought and power of execution. At Osaka where in 1532 the priests of the Hongwan-ji temple had built a castle which n.o.bunaga captured in 1580 only after a long and severe siege, Hideyoshi built what is called The Castle of Osaka. It is a colossal fortress, which is still used as military headquarters for garrison and a.r.s.enal, and the dimensions of which are still a wonder, though only a portion of the building survives. Materials for the work were requisitioned from thirty provinces, their princ.i.p.al components being immense granite rocks, many of which measured fourteen feet in length and breadth, and some were forty feet long and ten feet wide. These huge stones had to be carried by water from a distance of several miles. The outlying protection of this great castle consisted of triple moats and escarpments. The moats were twenty feet deep, with six to ten feet of water. The total enclosed s.p.a.ce was about one hundred acres, but only one-eighth of this was the hominaru, or keep, inside the third moat.

It will be seen that the plan of the castle was to have it divided into s.p.a.ces separately defensible, so that an enemy had to establish his footing by a series of repeated efforts.

And the second respect in which it was a novelty in j.a.panese defensive warfare was that the castle donjon was heavily built and armoured after a fashion. The three-storey donjon was framed in huge timbers, quite unlike the flimsy structure of most j.a.panese buildings, and the timbers were protected against fire by a heavy coat of plaster. Roof and gates were covered with a sort of armor-plate, for there was a copper covering to the roof and the gates were faced with iron sheets and studs. In earlier "castles"

there had been a thin covering of plaster which a musket ball could easily penetrate; and stone had been used only in building foundations.

THE KOMAKI WAR

After the suicide of his brother, n.o.butaka, and when he saw that his nephew, Samboshi (Hiden.o.bu), was relegated to the place of a va.s.sal of Hideyoshi, n.o.bukatsu seems to have concluded that the time had come to strike a final blow in a.s.sertion of the administrative supremacy of the Oda family. He began, therefore, to plot with that object. Hideyoshi, who was well served by spies, soon learned of these plots, and thinking to persuade n.o.bukatsu of their hopelessness, he established close relations with the latter's three most trusted retainers. No sooner did this come to the cognizance of n.o.bukatsu than he caused these three retainers to be a.s.sa.s.sinated, and applied to Ieyasu for a.s.sistance, Ieyasu consented. This action on the part of the Tokugawa baron has been much commented on and variously interpreted by historians, but it has always to be remembered that Ieyasu had been Oda n.o.bunaga's ally; that the two had fought more than once side by side, and that had the Tokugawa leader rejected n.o.bukatsu's appeal, he would not only have suffered in public estimation, but would also have virtually accepted a position inferior to that evidently claimed by Hideyoshi.

The course of subsequent events seems to prove that Ieyasu, in taking the field on this occasion, aimed simply at a.s.serting his own potentiality and had no thought of plunging the empire into a new civil war. In March, 1584, he set out from Hamamatsu and joined n.o.bukatsu at Kiyosu, in Owari. The scheme of campaign was extensive.

Ieyasu placed himself in communication with Sasa Narimasa, in Echizen; with Chosokabe Motochika, in Shikoku, and with the military monks in the province of Kii. The programme was that Narimasa should raise his standard in Echizen and Kaga, and that Motochika, with the monks of Kii, should move to the attack of Osaka, so that Hideyoshi would be compelled to carry on three wars at the same time. Hideyoshi met this combination with his usual astuteness. He commissioned Uesugi Kagekatsu to attack the Sasa troops in rear while Maeda Toshiiye menaced them from the front; he told off Hachisuka to oppose the soldier-monks of Kii; he posted Sengoku Hidehisa in Awaji to hold in check the forces of Chosokabe Motochika, and he stationed Ukita Hideiye at Okayama to provide against the contingency of hostility on the part of the Mori family. Fighting commenced in the province of Ise, and success at the outset crowned the arms of Hideyoshi's generals. They captured two castles, and Ieyasu thereupon pushed his van to an isolated hill called Komaki-yama, nearly equidistant from the castles of Inu-yama and Kiyosu, in Owari, which he entrenched strongly, and there awaited the onset of the Osaka army. The war thus came to be known as that of Komaki.

Hideyoshi himself would have set out for the field on the 19th of March, but he was obliged to postpone his departure for some days, until Kuroda and Hachisuka had broken the offensive strength of the monks of Kii. It thus fell out that he did not reach the province of Owari until the 27th of March. His army is said to have numbered one hundred and twenty thousand men. It is commonly alleged that this was the only war between Ieyasu and Hideyoshi, and that the latter suffered defeat at the hands of the former. But the fact is that two of Hideyoshi's generals, Ikeda n.o.buteru and Mori Nagayoshi, acted in direct contravention of his orders, and thus precipitated a catastrophe for which Hideyoshi cannot justly be held responsible.

These two captains argued that as Ieyasu had ma.s.sed a large force at Komaki and at the Obata entrenchments in the same district, he had probably left his base in Mikawa comparatively undefended. They proposed, therefore, to lead a force against Mikawa. Hideyoshi showed great reluctance to sanction this movement, but he allowed himself to be at last persuaded, with the explicit reservation that no success obtained in Mikawa province should be followed up, and that whatever the achievement of n.o.bukatsu's troops, they should at once rejoin the main army in Owari.

Unquestionably Hideyoshi had in vivid recollection the disaster which had overtaken Katsuiye at Shizugatake. Ieyasu, fully cognizant of the situation through the medium of a spy, knew the limitations set by Hideyoshi. On April the 7th, n.o.buteru attacked the fortress of Iwasaki, in Mikawa, killed its commandant, and captured the castle.

But elated by this victory, he neglected Hideyoshi's caution, and the generals of Ieyasu, closing in on him, inflicted a crushing defeat at a place called Nagakude. It is thus evident that Hideyoshi's share in the disaster was of a most indirect character. He immediately hastened to Nagakude, but only to find that Ieyasu had retired to Obata, and subsequently, when Hideyoshi returned to his headquarters, Ieyasu placed a still longer interval between the two armies by marching back to Komaki.

The war thenceforth may be said to have consisted of a series of menaces and evasions. Each general sought to entice his opponent out of an entrenched position, and each general showed an equal determination not to be so enticed. At last, Hideyoshi pushed a force into Mino and captured several castles in that province. But even this failed to change Ieyasu's att.i.tude. The Tokugawa leader entered the fortress of Kiyosu, and n.o.bukatsu repaired to that of Nagashima, in Ise. After eight months of this comparatively fruitless manoeuvring, a treaty was concluded, on December the 11th, between Hideyoshi and n.o.bukatsu, and subsequently between Hideyoshi and Ieyasu, the latter giving his son Ogimaru to be adopted by Hideyoshi.

The boy was eleven years of age at the time. His name was changed to Hashiba Hideyasu, and he received the appointment of governor of Mikawa province.

The circ.u.mstances in which this treaty was concluded have provoked much historical discussion. Did the overtures come originally from Hideyoshi, or did they emanate from Ieyasu and n.o.bukatsu? Some annalists have endeavoured to prove that Hideyoshi a.s.sumed the att.i.tude of a suppliant, while others have attributed that demeanour to the Tokugawa chieftain. The situation, however, presents one feature which is very significant. It was not until the month of November, 1584, that Chosokabe Motochika effectually brought the island of Shikoku under his sway, and thus became free to lead a strong army, including the monks of Kii province, against Osaka. This formidable danger could not but influence Hideyoshi in the direction of clasping hands with his eastern foes, and it is therefore more than probable that a statesman who had never previously allowed considerations of personal dignity to interfere with the prosecution of a vital policy, did not hesitate to bow his head to n.o.bukatsu, in order to recover the free use of the great army a.s.sembled in Owari, Mino, and Ise. Most fortunate was it for j.a.pan that events took this turn, for, had Ieyasu and Hideyoshi remained mutually hostile, the country would probably have been plunged into a repet.i.tion of the terrible struggle from which nothing enabled it to emerge except the combined labours of n.o.bunaga, Hideyoshi, and Ieyasu. It was not, however, until the early summer of 1586 that Hideyoshi and Ieyasu established genuinely friendly relations. During a year and a half subsequent to the conclusion of the treaty which ended the Komaki War, Ieyasu held severely aloof and refrained from visiting Kyoto.

Finally, Hideyoshi despatched Asano Nagamasa to propose that Ieyasu should take into his household Hideyoshi's younger sister, and that Hideyoshi should send his mother as a hostage to Okazaki, to remain there during a visit by Ieyasu to Kyoto. Four months were needed by Ieyasu to consider this proposal, and in September, 1586, he repaired to Osaka and thence accompanied Hideyoshi to Kyoto.

HIDEYOSHI BECOMES REGENT

In May, 1583, after the downfall of Katsuiye, the Emperor appointed Hideyoshi to be a councillor of State, and conferred on him the fourth order of rank. In November of the following year, he received another step of rank and was nominated gon-dainagon. The Emperor Okimachi at that time contemplated abdication, but the palace which he would have occupied as ex-Emperor had fallen into such a state of disrepair as to be virtually uninhabitable. Hideyoshi signalized his loyalty on this occasion by spending a large sum on the renovation of the palace, and in recognition of his services the Emperor raised him to the high post of nai-daijin. It was confidently expected that he would then become sa-daijin, but, owing to complications which need not be related here, the outcome of the matter was that he received the still higher post of kwampaku (regent). There can be no doubt that he himself had contemplated becoming shogun. In fact, it is on record that he made proposals in that sense to Yoshiaki, the last of the Ashikaga shoguns. But it had come by that time to be recognized that only a scion of the Minamoto family could be eligible for the post of shogun, and thus Yoshiaki declined Hideyoshi's overtures, though to accept them would have materially altered the fallen fortunes of the Ashikaga sept. Hideyoshi ultimately became prime minister of State (dajo daijiri) and took the family name of Toyotomi. It is stated, but the evidence is not conclusive, that in order to reach these high posts, he had to be adopted into the house of a Fujiwara n.o.ble. He had been a Taira when he served under n.o.bunaga, and to become a Fujiwara for courtly purposes was not likely to cause him much compunction.

THE MONKS, SHIKOKU, AND ETCHU

Immediately on the termination of the Komaki War, Hideyoshi took steps to deal effectually with the three enemies by whom his movements had been so much hampered, namely, the Buddhist priests of Kii, the Chosokabe clan in Shikoku, and the Sasa in Etchu. It has already been stated that the priests of Kii had their headquarters at Negoro, where there stood the great monastery of Dai-Dembo-In, belonging to the Shingon sect and enjoying almost the repute of Koya-san. Scarcely less important was the monastery of Sawaga in the same province. These two centres of religion had long been in possession of large bodies of trained soldiers whose ranks were from time to time swelled by the accession of wandering samurai (ronin).

The army despatched from Osaka in the spring of 1585 to deal with these warlike monks speedily captured the two monasteries, and, for purposes of intimidation, crucified a number of the leaders. For a time, Koya-san itself was in danger, several of the fugitive monks having taken refuge there. But finally Koya-san was spared in consideration of surrendering estates yielding twenty-one thousand koku of rice, which properties had been violently seized by the monasteries in former years.

Three months later, Hideyoshi turned his arms against the Chosokabe sept in Shikoku. This being an enterprise of large dimensions, he entrusted its conduct to five of his most competent generals, namely, Ukita Hideiye, Hachisuka Iemasa, Kuroda Nagamasa, Kikkawa Motoharu, and Kohayakawa Takakage. Hideyoshi himself would have a.s.sumed the direct command, and had actually set out for that purpose from Osaka, when couriers met him with intelligence that less than one month's fighting had brought the whole of the Island of the Four Provinces into subjection. He therefore turned eastward, and entering Etchu, directed the operations, in progress there under the command of Maeda Toshiiye against Sasa Narimasa. This campaign lasted seven days, and ended in the surrender of Narimasa, to whom Hideyoshi showed remarkable clemency, inasmuch as he suffered him to remain in possession of considerable estates in Etchu.

THE UESUGI

At this time Hideyoshi cemented relations of friendship with the Uesugi family of Echigo, whose potentialities had always been a subject of apprehension to n.o.bunaga. The powerful sept was then ruled by Kagekatsu, nephew of the celebrated Kenshin. This daimyo had given evidence of good-will towards Hideyoshi during the Komaki War, but it was naturally a matter of great importance to establish really cordial relations with so powerful a baron. History relates that, on this occasion, Hideyoshi adopted a course which might well have involved him in serious peril. He entered Echigo with a mere handful of followers, and placed himself practically at the mercy of Kagekatsu, judging justly that such trustful fearlessness would win the heart of the gallant Kagekatsu. Hideyoshi's insight was justified by the sequel. Several of the princ.i.p.al retainers of Kagekatsu advised that advantage should be taken of Hideyoshi's rashness, and that his victorious career should be finally terminated in Echigo.

But this vindictive counsel was rejected by the Uesugi baron, and relations of a warmly friendly character were established between the two great captains.

INVASION OF KYUSHU

There now remained only three really formidable enemies of Hideyoshi.

These were Hojo Ujimasa, in the Kwanto; Date Masamime, in Dewa and Mutsu, and Shimazu Yoshihisa, in Kyushu. Of these, the Shimazu sept was probably the most powerful, and Hideyoshi determined that Kyushu should be the scene of his next warlike enterprise. The Island of the Nine Provinces was then under the rule of three great clans; the Shimazu, in the south; the Otomo, in Bungo, and the Ryuzoji, in Hizen. The most puissant of these had at one time been Ryuzoji Takan.o.bu, but his cruel methods had alienated the sympathy of many of his va.s.sals, among them being Arima Yoshizumi, who threw off his allegiance to Takan.o.bu and joined hands with Shimazu Yoshihisa.

Takan.o.bu sent an army against Yoshizumi, but the Satsuma baron despatched Shimazu Masahisa to Yoshizumi's aid, and a sanguinary engagement at Shimabara in 1585 resulted in the rout of Takan.o.bu's forces and his own death.

Takan.o.bu's son and successor, who was named Masaiye, being still a boy, advantage was taken of the fact by Otomo Yoshishige, who invaded Hizen, so that Masaiye had to apply to the Shimazu family for succour. The Satsuma chieftain suggested that the matter might be settled by mutual withdrawal of forces, but Yoshishige declined this overture, and the result was a battle in which the Otomo troops were completely defeated. Otomo Yoshishige then (1586) had recourse to Hideyoshi for a.s.sistance, thus furnishing the opportunity of which Osaka was in search. Orders were immediately issued to Mori, Kikkawa, Kohayakawa, and Chosokabe Motochika to a.s.semble their forces for an oversea expedition, and in the mean while, Sengoku Hidehisa was despatched to Kyushu bearing a letter in which Hideyoshi, writing over his t.i.tle of kwampaku, censured the Shimazu baron for having failed to pay his respects to the Imperial Court in Kyoto, and called upon him to do so without delay. This mandate was treated with contempt. Shimazu Yoshihisa threw the doc.u.ment on the ground, declaring that his family had ruled in Satsuma for fourteen generations; that only one man in j.a.pan, namely Prince Konoe, had competence to issue such an injunction, and that the head of the house of Shimazu would never kneel to a monkey-faced upstart.

Hideyoshi had foreseen something of this kind, and had warned Sengoku Hidehisa in the sense that whatever might be the action of the Satsuma baron, no warlike measures were to be precipitately commenced. Hidehisa neglected this warning. Yielding to the anger of the moment, he directed the Otomo troops to attack the Satsuma forces, and the result was disastrous. When the fighting ended, the Satsuma baron had pushed into Bungo and taken sixteen forts there, so that fully one-half of Kyushu was now under the sway of the Shimazu.

Hideyoshi, on receiving news of these disasters, confiscated the estates of Sengoku Hidehisa, and issued orders to thirty-seven provinces to provide commissariat for three hundred thousand men and twenty thousand horses for a period of one year. Soon an army of one hundred and fifty thousand men a.s.sembled at Osaka, and the van, numbering sixty thousand, embarked there on the 7th of January, 1587, and landed at Yunoshima in Bungo on the 19th of the same month--dates which convey some idea of the very defective system of maritime transport then existing. In Bungo, the invading army was swelled by thirty thousand men under the leadership of Kohayakawa and Kikkawa, and the whole force, under the command-in-chief of Hidenaga, Hideyoshi's brother, moved to invest the castle of Takashiro.

It is unnecessary to follow the fighting in all its details. The salient facts are that Hideyoshi left Osaka with the main army of one hundred and thirty thousand men on the 22d of January, 1587, and, travelling by land, reached the Strait of Akamagasaki--now called Shimonoseki--on the 17th of February. He marched through Chikuzen, making friends of the local chieftains by forbearance and diplomacy, and fighting the first great battle of the campaign at Oguchi on the Sendai-gawa. The Satsuma baron's younger brother, Iehisa, after a gallant resistance, surrendered to Hideyoshi, and was employed by the latter to communicate direct with his chief, Yoshihisa. It was generally supposed that Iehisa would never return from this mission, but would remain in the camp of Shimazu. He did return, however, his word of honour being of more importance in his estimation than the opportunity of recovering his liberty.