A Hind Let Loose Part 16

Hist. lib. 6. cap. 2. Barclaius, a great royalist, faith, all antiquity agrees, that tyrants, as public enemies, may, most justly, be attacked and slain, not only by the community but also by every individual person thereof. Grotius de jure belli, lib. i. cap. 4. saith, If any person grasp at dominion by unjust war, or hath no t.i.tle thereto by consent of the community, and no paction is made with him, nor allegiance granted, but retains possession by violence only, the right of war remains; and therefore it is lawful to attack him as an enemy, who may be killed by any man, and that lawfully. Yea, king James VI. in his remonstrance for the right of kings, says, the public laws make it lawful and free for any private persons to enterprise against an usurper. Divines say the same. Chamier, Tom. 2. lib. 15. cap 12. Sect. 19. All subjects have right to attack tyrants. Alsted. Theolog. Gaf. cap. 17. reg. 9. p. 321.

Any private man may and ought to cut off a tyrant, who is an invader, without a t.i.tle; because in a hostile manner he invades his native country. And, cap. 1. 18. reg. 14. p. 332. 'It is lawful for every private man to kill a tyrant, who unjustly invades the government. But Dr. Ames concerning conscience, Book 3. Chap 31. concerning manslaughter, a.s.serts all that is here pleaded for in express terms, Quest. 4. Whether or no is it lawful for a man to kill another by his own private authority? Ans. Sometimes it is lawful to kill, no public precognition preceeding; but then only, when the cause evidently requires that it should be done, and public authority cannot be got: For in that case, a private man is publicly const.i.tute the minister of justice, as well by the permission of G.o.d, as the consent of all men.

These propositions carry such evidence in them, that the authors thought it superfluous to confirm them, and sufficient to affirm them. And from any reason that can be adduced to prove any of these a.s.sertions, it will be as evident that this truth I plead for, is thereby confirmed, as that itself is thereby strengthened: for it will follow natively, if tyrants, and tyrants without a t.i.tle, be to be thus dealt with,; then the monsters, of whom the question is, those notorious incendiaries and murdering public enemies, are also to be so served: for either these authors a.s.sert the lawfulness of so treating tyrants without a t.i.tle, because they are tyrants, or because they want a t.i.tle. If the first be said, then all tyrants are to be so served; and reason would say, and royalists will subscribe, if tyrants that call themselves kings may be so animadverted upon, because of their perniciousness to the commonwealth by their usurped authority, then the subordinate firebrands that are the immediate instruments of that destruction, the inferior emissaries that act it, and actually accomplish it, in murdering innocent people, may be so treated; for their persons are not more sacred than the other, nor more unpunishable. If the second be said, it is lawful to kill them, because they want a t.i.tle; then it is either because they want a pretended t.i.tle, or because they want a real and lawful one. The latter is as good as none, and it is proven, Head 2.

Arg. 7. that no tyrants can have any. The former cannot be said, for all tyrants will pretend some, at least before they be killed.

3. But though some of these great authors neither give their reasons for what they a.s.sert, nor do they extend it to all tyrants that tyrannize by virtue of their pretended authority, yet it will not be difficult to prove, that all, great and small, that murder, destroy, and tyrannize over poor people, are to be punished, though they pretend authority for what they do. And hence, if all tyrants, murderers and destroyers of mankind ought to be punished; then when it cannot be done by public authority, it may be done by private; but all tyrants, murderers and destroyers of mankind ought to be punished: Therefore--. The minor is manifest from the general commands of shedding the blood of every man that sheds it, Gen. ix. 6. of putting to death whosoever killeth any person, Numb. x.x.xv. 30, 31. of respecting no man's person in judgment, Deut. i. 17. And universally all penal laws are general without exception of any; for under that reduplication of criminal transgressing those laws, under that general sanction, they are to be judged; which admits of no partial respect: for if the greatest of men be murderers, they are not to be considered as great, but as murderers; just as the meanest are to be considered as mean or poor, but as murderers. But I need not insist on this, being sufficiently proved, Head 2. Arg. 9. and throughout that Head, proving that tyrants can have no authority: and, if they have no authority, then authority (which they have not) cannot exempt them from punishment. The connexion of the major proposition may be thus urged: when this judgment cannot be executed by public authority, either it must be done by private authority, in case of extreme necessity, or not at all: for there is no medium, but either to do it by public authority, or private: if not at all, then the land must remain still defiled with blood, and cannot be cleansed, Numb. x.x.xv. 33.

Then the fierce anger of the Lord cannot be averted, Numb. x.x.xv. 4. for without this executing of judgment, he will not turn it away, Jer. v. 1.

Then must murderers be encouraged, by their impunity, to make havoc of all according to their l.u.s.t, besides that poor handful who cannot escape their prey, as their case is circ.u.mstantiate. Besides, this is point black contrary to these general commands, which say peremptorily, the murderer shall be put to death; but this supposed case, when public authority will not or cannot put them to death, says, they shall not be put to death. In this case then I demand, whether their impunity is necessary, because they must not be put to death? or because they cannot be put to death? To say the latter, were an untruth; for private persons can do it, when they get access, which is possible: if the former, then it is clearly contradictory to the commands, which say, they must be put to death, excepting no case, but when they cannot be put to death. If it be said, they must not be put to death, because the law obliges only public authority to execute judgment: to this I reply, 1. I trust to make the contrary appear from scripture by and by. 2. If the law obliges none but those in public authority to execute judgment, then when there is no judgment execute, it must be the sin of none but those in public authority; and if it be only their sin, how comes others to be threatened and punished for this, that judgment is not executed? If they must only stand by, and be spectators of their omissions unconcerned, what shall they do to evite this wrath? shall they exhort them, or witness against them? But that more than all this is required, is proved before several times, where this argument of people's being punished for the sin of their rulers hath been touched. 3. Then when there is no authority, it must be no sin at all that judgment is not executed, because it is the sin of none; it cannot be sin, except it be the sin of some. 4. What if those in public authority be the murderers? Who shall put them to death? By what authority shall judgment be execute upon them? Whether public or private? public it cannot be; for there is no formal public authority above the supreme, who are supposed the party to be punished; if it be the radical authority of the people, which is the thing we plead for, then it is but private, as that of one party against the other: the people are the party grieved, and so cannot be judges: at best then, this will be extrajudicial executing of judgment. And if the people may do it upon the greatest of tyrants, then a part of them who are in greatest hazard may save themselves from those of lesser note, by putting them to death: for if all the people have right to punish universal tyrants, because they are destroyers of all; then a part hath right to punish particular tyrants, because they are destroyers of them, when they cannot have access to public authority, nor the concurrence of the whole body.

4. Let these murderers and incendiaries be considered, either as a part of the community with them whom they murder and destroy, or not; if they be a part, and do belong to the same community (which is not granted in this case, yet let it be given) then when the safety of the whole, or better part, cannot consist with the sparing or preserving of a single man, especially such an one as prejudges all, and destroys that better part; he is rather to be cut off, than the whole or the better part be endangered: for the cutting off of a contagious member that destroys the rest of the body, is well warranted by nature, because the safety of the whole is to be preferred to the safety of a part, especially a destructive part: but now, who shall cut it off? since it must be cut off, otherwise a greater part of the body will be presently consumed, and the whole endangered. It is sure the physician's duty; but what if he will not, or cannot, or there be no physician? then any that can may and must; yea, one member may, in that case, cut off another. So, when either the magistrate will not, or dare not, or does not, or there is none to do this necessary work of justice, for the preservation of the community; any member of it may rather prevent the destruction of the whole, or a greater part, by destroying the murdering and destructive member, than suffer himself and others to be unavoidably destroyed by his being spared. If they be not within, or belonging to that society, then they may be dealt with, and carried towards as public enemies and strangers, and all advantages may be taken of them in cases of necessity, as men would do, if invaded by Turks or Tartars.

5. Let it be considered, what men might have done in such a case before government was erected, if there had been some public and notour murderers still preying upon some sort of men. Certainly then private persons (as all are in that case) might kill them to prevent future destruction. Hence, if this was lawful before government was established, it cannot be unlawful when people cannot have the benefit of the government, when the government that is, instead of giving redress to the grieved and oppressed, does allow and impower them to destroy them: otherwise people might be better without government than with it; for then they might prevent their murderers by cutting them off. But so it is that this was lawful before government was established: for let it be adverted, that the scripture seems to insinuate such a case before the flood. Cain, after he murdered his brother, feared that every man that found him should slay him. Gen. iv.

14. If he had reason to fear this, as certainly he had, if the Lord had not removed that, by prorogueing the execution of vengeance upon him, for his greater punishment, and the world's more lasting instruction, and by setting a mark upon him, and inhibiting, under a severe threatning, any to touch him; then every man that should have killed him was the magistrate, (which were ridiculous) or every man was every, and any private person universally, which might have killed him, if this inhibition had not past upon it. Ainsworth upon the place saith, 'That among the ancient Romans, every one might kill without a challenge, any man that was cursed for some public crime.' And cites Dionys.

Halicarnas. l. 2. And so Cain spoke this from a dictate of nature and a guilty conscience.

6. At the erection of government, though the people resign the formal power of life and death, and punishing criminals, over to the governor const.i.tute by them; yet, as they retain the radical power and right virtually, so when either the magistrates neglect their duty of vindicating the innocent, and punishing their destroyers, or impower murderers to prey upon them; in that case, they may resume the exercise of it, to destroy their destroyers, when there is no other way of preventing or escaping their destructions; because extreme remedies ought to be applied to extreme diseases. In an extraordinary exigent, when Ahab and Jezebel did undo the church of G.o.d, Elias, with the people's help, killed all Baal's priests, against and without the king's will; in this case, it is evident the people resumed their power, as Lex Rex saith, quest. 9. p. 63. There must be a court of necessity, no less than a court of justice, when it is in this extremity, as if they had no ruler, as that same learned author saith, quest. 24. pag. 213. If then the people may resume that power in cases of necessity, which they resigned to the magistrate; then a part may resume it, when a part only is in that necessity, and all may claim an interest in the resumption, that had an interest in the resignation.

7. Especially upon the dissolution of a government when people are under a necessity to revolt from it, and so are reduced to their primitive liberty, they may then resume all that power they had before the resignation, and exert it in extraordinary exigents of necessity. If then a people that have no magistrates at all may take order with their destroyers then must they have the same power under a lawful revolt. As the ten tribes, if they had not exceeded in severity against Adoram, Rehoboam's collector, had just cause to take order with that usurper's emissary, if he came to oppress them; but if he had come to murder them, then certainly it was duty to put him to death, and could not be censured at all, as it is not in the history, 1 Kings xii. 18. But so it is that the people pursued by these murderers, some of which in their extreme exigencies they put to death; have for these several years maintained a declared revolt from the present government, and have denied all subjection to it upon the grounds vindicated, Head 2. And there they must be considered as reduced to their primeve liberty, and their pursuers as their public enemies, to whom they are no otherwise related than if they were Turks, whom none will deny it lawful to kill, if they invade the land to destroy the inhabitants.

8. Hence, seeing they are no other than public enemies, unjustly invading, pursuing, and seeking them to destroy them: what arguments will prove the lawfulness of resistance, and the necessity of self-defence, in the immediate defence of life, as well as remote, will also prove the lawfulness of taking all advantages upon them: for if it be lawful to kill an enemy in his immediate a.s.sault, to prevent his killing of them, when there is no other way of preserving themselves from his fury; then it must be lawful also in his remote but still incessant pursuit, to prevent his murdering them by killing him, when there is no other way to escape in a case of extreme necessity. But that this was the case of that poor people, witnesses can best prove it; and I dare appeal to two sorts of them that know it best, that is, all the pursuers, and all the pursued.

9. This is founded, and follows upon the 4th article of the Solemn League and covenant: where we are bound with all faithfulness to endeavour the discovery, of all such as have been, or shall be incendiaries, malignants or evil instruments,----that they may be brought to public trial, and receive condign punishment. Now, as this obliges to the orderly and ordinary way of prosecuting them when there is access to public judicatories: so when there is none either this article obliges to no endeavour at all; (which cannot be, for it is moral duty to endeavour the punishment of such) or else it must oblige to this extraordinary action and execution of judgment, if to any at all. Especially considering, how, in the sense of the short comings of this duty, it is renewed in the solemn acknowledgement of sins, and engagement to duties, that we shall be so far from conniving at malignity, injustice, &c., that we shall----take a more effectual course, than heretofore, in our respective places and callings, for punishing and suppressing these evils.----Certainly we were called to one way of prosecuting this obligation then, when it was first engaged into, and to another now, when our capacity and circ.u.mstances are so materially and formally altered: if the effectual course then was by public authority; then now when that is wanting, there must be some obligation to take some effectual course still, that may suit our places and callings, which will certainly comprehend this extraordinary way of suppressing those evils, by preventing their growth in curbing the instruments, and executing judgment upon them, in a case of extreme necessity, which will suit with all places, and all callings.

II. From the scriptures, these arguments are offered,

First, Some approven examples, and imitable in the like circ.u.mstances, will clear and confirm the lawfulness of this extraordinary work of judgment executed by private persons, upon notorious incendiaries, firebrands, and murderers, guilty of death by the law of G.o.d,

1. Moses spied an Egyptian smiting an Hebrew, one of his brethren; and he looked this way, and that way, and when he saw that there was no man, he slew the Egyptian, and hid him in the sand, Exod. ii. 11, 12. Here is an uncondemned example: whereof the actor who was the relater did not condemn himself, though he condemns himself for faults that seem less odious; yea, in effect, he is rather condemned by Stephen the Martyr, Acts vii. And though it be extraordinary, in that it was done by private authority, not by a judge, as it was objected to him the second day: yet it was not unimitable; because that action, though heroical, whereof the ground was ordinary, the rule moral, the circ.u.mstances commonly incident, the management directed by human prudence, cannot be unimitable; but such was this action, though heroical. The ground was ordinary, spying his brother in hazard, whose murder he would have prevented. The rule was moral, being according to that moral precept in rescuing our brother in hazard, Prov. xxiv. 11, 12. The circ.u.mstances were incident in a case of extreme necessity, which he managed very prudently, looking this way, and that way, and hiding him in the sand.

Therefore it may be imitated in the like case. It signifies nothing to say that he was moved by the Spirit of G.o.d thereto: for unto every righteous performance the motion of the Spirit of G.o.d is requisite. This impulse that Moses had and others after-mentioned, was nothing but a greater measure of that a.s.sisting grace, which the extraordinariness of the case, and the difficulties therein occurring did call for; but the interveening of such motions, do not alter the rule, so as to make the action unimitable. Impulses are not the rule of duty, either under an ordinary or extraordinary exigence; but when they are subsequent and subservient both to the rule of duty, and to a man's call in his present circ.u.mstances, they clearly determine to the species of an heroic enterprise; in so much that it is not only the particular deed that we are to heed for our imitation, but we are to emulate the grace and principle of zeal which produced it, and is thereby so conspicuously relucent for our upstirring to acts in like manner, as G.o.d may give opportunity, as is observed by the true non-conformist, Dial. 7. pag.

392, &c.

2. When Israel joined himself unto Baal-Peor, the Lord said unto Moses, 'Take all the heads of the people, and hang them up before the Lord against the sun, that the fierce anger of the Lord may be turned away from Israel.' And Moses said unto the judges, 'Slay every one his men that were joined unto Ball-Peor.' And when Zimri brought the Midianitish Cozbi in the sight of Moses, and in the sight of all the congregation, who were weeping before the door of the tabernacle; and when Phineas saw it, he rose up,----and took the javelin in his hand, and he went after the men of Israel into the tent, and thrust both of them through,----So the plague was stayed,----And the Lord spake unto Moses, saying, 'Phineas hath turned away my wrath from the children of Israel, while he was zealous for my sake among them,----I give unto him my covenant of peace,----because he was zealous for his G.o.d, and made an atonement for the children of Israel.' Numb. xxv. 3.-13. This action is here much commended, and recorded to his commendation, Psal. cvi. 30, 31. Then stood up Phinehas, and executed judgment, and so the plague was stayed; and that was counted to him for righteousness, unto all generations; that is,----Into justice of the deed before men, who otherwise might have put a bad construction upon it, as rash, out of season, committed against a magistrate by a private person, too cruel by cutting them off from repentance; but G.o.d esteemed it as extraordinary just. Pool's Synops. Critic. in Loc.u.m. It is certain, this action was some way extraordinary; because Phinehas was not a magistrate, nor one of the judges whom Moses commanded to slay every one his men, ver. 5.

Otherwise, if this had been only an ordinary execution of the judgment by the authority of Moses, Phinehas' action would not have been taken so much notice of, nor so signally rewarded; but here it is noted as a singular act of zeal, which it could not have been, if it was only an ordinary execution of the magistrate's command: yet, though this action was signally heroical, proceeding from a principle of pure zeal for G.o.d, and prompted by a powerful motion of the Spirit of G.o.d to that extraordinary execution of judgment: it is notwithstanding imitable in the like circ.u.mstances. For, the matter is ordinary, being neither preternatural, nor supernatural, but just and necessary. The end was ordinary, to turn away the wrath of G.o.d, which all were obliged to endeavour. The principle was ordinary, (though at the time he had an extraordinary measure of it) being zealous for the Lord, as all were obliged to be. The rule was ordinary, to wit, the command of slaying every man that was joined to Baal Peor, ver. 5. only this was extraordinary, that the zeal of G.o.d called him to his heroical action, though he was not a magistrate, in this extraordinary exigent, to avert the wrath of G.o.d; which was neither by Moses's command, nor by the judges obedience, turned away only by Phinehas' act of another nature, and his zeal appearing therein, and prompting him thereto, the Lord was appeased, and the plague slayed. In which fervour of zeal, transporting him to the omission of the ordinary solemnities of judgment, the Spirit of the Lord places the righteousness and praise of the action. Yet the same call and motion of zeal might have impowered others to do the like: the text speaks of no other call he had, but that of zeal, ver. 11, 12, 13. yea, another was obliged to do the same, upon the ground of that moral command, Deut. xiii. 6.-9. having the ground of G.o.d's ordinary judgment, which commandeth the idolater to die the death; and therefore to be imitate of all that prefer the true honour and glory of G.o.d to the affection of flesh and wicked princes, as Mr. Knox affirmeth in his conference with Lethingtoun, rehea.r.s.ed before, per. 3. Further, let it be enquired, What makes it unimitable? Certainly it was not so, because he had the motion and direction of G.o.d's Spirit; for men have that to all duties. It was not, because he was raised and stirred up of G.o.d to do it; for G.o.d may raise up spirits to imitable actions. It was not, because he had an extraordinary call, for men have an extraordinary call, to imitable actions, as the apostles had to preach. We grant these actions are extraordinary and unimitable; which, first, do deviate from the rule of common virtue, and transcend all rules of common reason and divine word; but this was not such, but an heroic act of zeal and fort.i.tude: Next these actions, which are contrary to a moral ordinary command are unimitable, as the Israelites robbing the Egyptians, borrowing, and not paying again, Abraham's offering his son Isaac; but this was not such: next those actions, which are done upon some special mandate of G.o.d, and are not within the compa.s.s of ordinary obedience to the ordinary rule, are unimitable; but is not such: as also miraculous actions, and such as are done by the extraordinary inspiration of the Spirit of G.o.d, as Elias's killing the captains with their fifties by fire from heaven; but none can reckon this among these. See Jus Populi at length discussing this point, and pleading for the suitableness of this action, cap. 20. If therefore the Lord did not only raise up this Phinehas to that particular act of justice, but also so warrant and accept him therein, and reward him therefore, upon the account of his zeal, when there was a G.o.dly and zealous magistrate, able, and whom we cannot without breach of charity presume, but also willing to execute justice; how much more may it be pleaded, that the Lord, who is the same yesterday, to day and forever, will not only pour out of that same spirit upon others; but also when he gives it, both allow them, though they be but private persons, and also call them, being otherwise in a physical and probable capacity to do these things in an extremely necessitous, and otherwise irrecoverable state of the church, to which in a more intire condition he doth not call them? And particularly, when there is not only the like or worse provocations, the like necessity of execution of justice and of reformation, for the turning away of wrath, and removing of judgments, that was in Phinehas's case, but also, when the supreme civil magistrate, the n.o.bles of the kingdom, and other inferior rulers, are not only unwilling to do their duty, but so far corrupted and perverted, that they are become the authors and patronizers of these abominations, Naph. prior Edit. p. 23.

3. When the children of Israel served Eglon the king of Moab, and they cried unto the Lord, he raised them up a deliverer, Ehud the son of Gera, who made a dagger, and brought a present unto Eglon, and put forth his left hand, and took the dagger from his right thigh, and thrust it into his belly, Judg. iii. 21. That this action was approven will not be doubted, since the Lord raised him up as a deliverer who by this heroical action commenced it; ond since it was a message from G.o.d, and that it was extraordinary, were ridiculous to deny: for sure this was not the judicial action of a magistrate, neither was Ehud a magistrate at this time, but only the messenger of the people sent with a present.

Yet it is imitable in the like case, as from hence many grave authors concluded the lawfulness of killing a tyrant without a t.i.tle.

4. When the Lord discomfitted the host of Jabin, and Sifera his captain fled into the house of Heber the Kenite, Jael Heber's wife took a nail of the tent, and went softly unto him, and smote the nail into his temples, Judg, iv. 21. of which the prophetess Deborah says, chap. v.

24. "Blessed above women shall Jael the wife of Heber the Kenite be above women in the tent." Yet not only was Jael no magistrate, but in subjection to and at peace with Jabin, though she killed his captain.

But there was no injustice here, when he was declared a public enemy, the war was just, he was an oppressor of the people of G.o.d, it became Jael, as a member of the commonwealth, to betray and cut off the common enemy. Therefore Jael had sinned, if she had not killed him. Martyr and others cited in Pool. Synops. Critic. upon the place, albeit that author himself, in his English annotations, does cut the knot, instead of loosing it, in denying Deborah's song to be divinely inspired in its first composure, but only recorded as a history by divine inspiration, as other historical pa.s.sages not approven, only because this heroic fact of Jael is there recommended, which is too bold an attempt upon this part of the holy canon of the scripture: whence we see what inconveniences they are driven to, that deny this principle of natural justice, the lawfulness of cutting off public enemies, to procure the deliverance of the Lord's people. Hence, If it be lawful for private persons, under subjection to, and at peace with the public enemies of the Lord's people to take all advantages to break their yoke, and deliver the oppressed from their bondage, by killing their oppressors; it must be much more lawful for such as acknowledge no such subjection or agreement, to attempt the same in extreme necessity; but the former is true: therefore the latter.

5. When Samson married the Timnite, and obliged himself by compact, to give them thirty sheets and thirty change of garments, upon their solving his riddle, the Spirit of the Lord came upon him, and he went down to Askelon, and slew thirty men of them, and took their spoil, Judg. xiv. 19. And afterwards, when he lost his wife by the cruelty and treachery of those Philistines, he said unto them, 'Though you have done this, yet will I be avenged of you, and after that I will cease. And he smote them hip and thigh with a great slaughter,' chap. xv. 7, 8. And when the Jews, who acknowledged the Philistines for rulers, came to Etam to expostulate with him, all the satisfaction he gave them was to avouch, that as they had done unto him, so he had done unto them, and to kill a thousand more of them, ver. 11. &c. These were extraordinary heroic facts, not only because they flowed from an extraordinary power wherewith he was endued, and from an extraordinary motion and call; but because of his avenging his own private injuries for the public good, in a way both of fort.i.tude and prudence, without a declared war, provoking the enemies against himself, and diverting from the people, and converting against himself, all their fury, in which also he acted as a type of Christ; and also because he acted not as a magistrate at this time, for by whom was he called or counted a magistrate? not by the Philistines, nor by the men of Judah, for they tell him that the Philistines were their lords, and they bound him and delivered him up to them: yet in his private capacity, in that extraordinary exigence, he avenged himself and his country against his public enemies, by a clandestine war, which is imitable in the like case, when a prevailing faction of murdering enemies domineer over and destroy the people of G.o.d, and there is no other way to be delivered from them; for his ground was moral, because they were public enemies, to whom he might do as they did to him. Hence, if saints sometimes, in cases of necessity, may do unto their public enemies, as they have done unto them, in prosecuting a war not declared against them; then much more may they do so in cases of necessity, to deliver themselves from their murdering violence, when a war is declared; but here is an example of the former: ergo

6. When these same Philistines again invaded and over-ran the land in the time of Saul, Jonathan his son, and his armour bearer, fell upon the garrison of these uncirc.u.mcised, and killed them, 1 Sam. xiv. 6. 13.

This was an heroic action, without public authority; for he told not his father, ver. 1. And singular indeed, in respect of the effect, and were a tempting of the Lord, for so few to a.s.sault such a mult.i.tude, as it were to imitate Samson in his exploits; but in this respect, these actions are unimitable in consideration of prudence, not of conscience, or as to the lawfulness of the thing: their ground was moral, to cut off public enemies. Hence, If it be lawful to fall upon a garrison of public enemies, oppressing the country, then it must be lawful to fall upon one or two, that are the ring leaders of public enemies, and main promoters of their destruction, that are as pernicious, and have no more right or power, than the Philistines; but such is the case of those about whom the question is.

7. When David dwelt in the country of the Philistines, he and his men went up and invaded the Geshurites, and the Gezrites, and the Amalekites; and David smote the land, and left neither man nor woman alive, 1 Sam. xxvii. 8, 9. This was without public authority, having none from Saul, none from Achish, in whose country he dwelt, and none of his own, being no magistrate. We deny not the divine motion, but plead, that it is imitable from its moral ground, which was that command to cut off the Amalekites, Exod. xvii. and the Amorites, whose relicts these nations were; the same ground that Saul the magistrate had to destroy them. Whence it is lawful sometimes for others than magistrates to do that which is inc.u.mbent to magistrates, when they neglect their duty. All I plead for from it is, If it be lawful for private persons, upon the call of G.o.d, to cut off their public enemies, when they are obliged by the command of G.o.d to destroy them, though they be living quietly and peaceably in the country; then may it be lawful, in cases of necessity, for private persons to cut off their public enemies, whom they are obliged, by the covenant of G.o.d, to bring to condign punishment, and to extirpate them, (as the covenant obliges in reference to malignant incendiaries) when they are ravening like lions for their prey.

8. In the days of Ahab and Jezebel's tyranny, whereby the idolatrous prophets of Baal were not punished according to the law, Elijah said unto the people, 'Take the prophets of Baal, let none of them escape; and they took them to the brook Kishon, and slew them there,' 1 Kings xviii. 40. How Mr. Knox improved this pa.s.sage we heard before, in the historical representation, Per, 3. and Jus pop. vindicates it, that in some cases private persons may execute judgment on malefactors, after the example of Elias here. Which fact, Peter Martyr, in loc.u.m, defendeth thus: 'I say it was done by the law of G.o.d; for, Deut. xviii. 20. G.o.d decerned that the false prophet should die; and chap. xvii. the same is said of private men and women, who would worship idols; but, chap. xiii.

not only is death threatened against a seducing prophet, but a command is added, That no man should spare his brethren.--3dly, It is commanded, that the whole city, when it becometh idolatrous, should be cut off by fire and sword:' And, Lev. xxiv. 14. 16. it is statute, that the blasphemer should not live: 'to which we may add the law or equity of taliation: for these prophets of Baal caused Jezebel and Ahab kill the servants of the Lord.' See Jus pop. cap. 20. pag. 425. Upon this also Mr. Mitchel defends his fact, as above,--'Also Elijah, by virtue of that precept, Deut. xiii. gave commandment to the people to destroy Baal's priests, contrary to the command of the seducing magistrate, who was not only remiss and negligent in executing justice, but became a protector and defender of the seducers; then and in that case, I suppose the Christians duty not to be very dark.'

9. This idolatrous and tyrannical house was afterwards condignly punished by Jehu, 2 Kings ix. x. chap. who destroyed all the idolaters, who were before encouraged and protected by that court, chap. x. 25.

This extraordinary fact was not justified by his magistratical authority; for that was as extraordinary as the fact itself, and conferred as a mean to accomplish the fact. He had no authority by the people's suffrages, nor was he acknowledged as such by the court or body of the people, only the Lord gave it extraordinarily. But it is not the imitation of his a.s.sumption of authority that is here pleaded for, but the imitation of his fact in extraordinary cases, when not only tyrants and idolaters pa.s.s unpunished, but their insolency in murdering the innocent is intolerable. Mr. Knox vindicates this at length, as before, and shews, that it had the ground of G.o.d's ordinary judgment, which commands the idolater to die the death; and that though we must not indeed follow extraordinary examples, if the example repugn to the law, but where it agrees with and is the execution of the law, an example uncondemned stands for a command; for G.o.d is constant, and will not condemn in ages subsequent what he hath approved in his servants before.

See the Testimony of Period 3. above, and Jus pop. cap. 20. pag. 418.

10. When Athaliah, the mother of Ahaziah, had tyrannized six years, at length Jehoiada, with others, made a conspiracy against her, to depose her, and make Joash king; which when it was discovered, she cried treason, treason, as indeed it would have been so, if she had been the lawful magistrate; for it was an attempt of subjects against her that had the possession of the sovereign power. But Jehoiada commanded the captains to heave her forth without the ranges, and him that followeth her kill with the sword; and they laid hands on her, and she was slain, 2 Kings xii. 14,--16. That this is imitable in the punishment of tyrants, is cleared above. If therefore it be lawful for subjects to kill usurping tyrants, and such as follow them to help them, under whom nevertheless people might have a life; then it must be lawful for private persons to put forth their hand against their cut-throat emissaries, in a case of necessity, when there is no living for them.

11. When Amaziah turned idolater and tyrant, after the time that he turned away from the Lord, they made a conspiracy against him in Jerusalem, and he fled to Lachish; but they sent to Lachish after him and slew him there, Chron. xxv. 37. This fact is before vindicated by Mr. Knox, Period 3. afterward Head 2. and Head 5.

12. When Esther made suit to reverse Haman's letters, the king granted the Jews in every city, not only to gather themselves together, and to stand for their lives, but also to destroy, to slay, and to cause to perish, all the power of the people and province that would a.s.sault them, both little ones and women,--and to avenge themselves on their enemies. And accordingly in the day that their enemies hoped to have power over them, the Jews gathered themselves to lay hand on such as sought their hurt, and smote all their enemies with the stroke of the sword, Esth. viii. 11, 13, chap. ix, 1-5, &c. They had indeed that law of nature fortified by the king's accessary authority, as Valentinian, by his edict, granted the like liberty, to resist any unjust invader to depopulate the lands of his subjects, that he might be forthwith liable to a deserved punishment, and suffer that death which he threatned.--And the like of Arcadius is extant, in the Justinian Cod. t.i.t. How it may be lawful for every man to vindicate himself and the public, without the concurrence of a judge. But that doth not exclude the lawfulness of such resistances in case of necessity, without public authority; so here, it was not the king's commandment that made the Jews avenging themselves lawful, if it had not been lawful before and without it; it gave them only liberty to improve that privilege, which they had from G.o.d and nature. Surely their power of resisting did not depend on the king's commandment, as is proven, Head 5. Ergo, neither their power of avenging themselves, to prevent their murder by their enemies, which they could and were obliged to do, if there had been no such authority: Ergo, it was not only suspended upon the king's authority. And as for Haman's sons and adherents, being Agagites, they were obliged, by a prior command, to avenge themselves on them, on all occasions, by that command to destroy Amalek: therefore it must be lawful, even without public authority, in some cases of necessity, to prevent the murder of public enemies, by laying hands on them that seek the hurt of all the people of G.o.d.

Secondly, There are some precepts from which the same may be concluded.

1. There is a command, and the first penal statute against murderers, we read, Gen. ix. 6. 'Whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed.' Here the command is given in general to punish capitally all murderers; but there may be some that no magistrate can punish, who are not here exempted, to wit, they that are in supreme authority, and turn murderers, as was said above. Again, the command is given in general to man involving all the community (where the murderer is) in guilt, if his blood be not shed; as we find in the scripture, all the people were threatned and punished because judgment was not executed; and when it was executed even by these who were no magistrates, the wrath of G.o.d was turned away, whereof there are many examples above. Further, if the command to shed the blood of murderers be given before the inst.i.tution of magistracy, then, in case of necessity, to stop the course of murderers, it may be obeyed, when there is no magistrate to execute it: but here it is given before the first inst.i.tution of magistracy, when now there was no government in the world, but family government, as Grotius on the place saith, 'When this law was given, public judgment was not yet const.i.tute, therefore the natural right and law of taliation is here held forth, which when mankind was increased and divided into several nations, was justly permitted only to judges, some cases excepted, in which that primeve right did remain.' And if in any, then in this case in question. Hence, Lex Rex answereth the p. prelate, essaying to prove, that a magistracy is established in the text denies that Ba Adam, by man, must signify a magistrate, for then there was but family government, and cites Calvin, of the same mind, that the magistrate is not spoken of here. Though this command afterwards was given to the magistrate, Numb. x.x.xv. 30. yet in a case of necessity, we must recur to the original command.

2. This same command of punishing murdering enemies, is even, after the inst.i.tution of magistrates, in several cases not astricted to them, but permitted to the people, yea enjoined to them. As, (1.) Not only magistrates, but the people, are commanded to avenge themselves on their public enemies, as the Israelites, after their being ensnared in the matter of Peor, are commanded to vex the Midianites, and smite them, because they beguiled them, and brought a plague upon them, Numb. xxv.

17, 18. and Numb. x.x.xi. 2. to avenge themselves on them, and for this end to arm themselves, and go against them, and avenge the Lord of Midian: which they executed with the slaughter of all the males. So likewise are they commanded to destroy Amalek. It is true these commands are given primarily and princ.i.p.ally to magistrates, as there to Moses, and afterwards to Saul: yet afterwards we find others than magistrates, upon this moral ground, having the call of G.o.d, did execute judgment upon them, as Gideon and David, before they were magistrates, did avenge themselves and the Lord upon them, as is before cleared. It is also true, that there was some holy severity then to be extended against particular nations as such, peculiar to that dispensation, which is not pleaded as imitable; but the ground was moral, and the right of a people's saving themselves by the destruction of their enemies; when there is no other way for it, is natural. And this is all we plead for here. If people may vex their enemies, and avenge themselves against them, even without public authority, when ensnared by their craftiness; much more may they put a stop to their insolency, by cutting off their principle and most pernicious instruments, in case of necessity, when invaded by their cruelty; but here a people is commanded to vex their enemies, and avenge themselves on them, and accordingly Gideon and David did so, without public authority, and that upon a ground which is moral and natural: Ergo--(2.) The execution of the punishment of murderers is committed to the people: 'The revenger of blood, himself shall slay the murderer, when he meeteth him, he shall slay him,' Numb. x.x.xv. 19, 21.

So that if he met him before he got into any city of refuge, he might lawfully slay him, and if he did flee to any, he was to be rendered up to the avengers hands, Deut. xix. 12. that the guilt of innocent blood may be put away from Israel, ver. 23. This revenger of blood was not the magistrate: for he was the party pursuing, Numb. x.x.xv. 24. Between whom and the murderer the congregation was to judge: he was only the next in blood or kindred. In the original he is called Goel, the redeemer, or he to whom the right of redemption belongs, and very properly so called, both because he seeks redemption and compensation for the blood of his brother, and because he redeems the land from blood guiltiness, in which otherwise it would be involved. I do not plead that this is always to be imitated, as neither it was always practised in Israel; but if a private man, in a hot pursuit of his brother's murderer, might be his avenger, before he could be brought to judgment, then much more may this power be a.s.sumed, in a case of necessity, when there is no judgment to be expected by law, and when not only our brethren have been murdered by them that profess a trade of it, but others also and ourselves are daily in hazard of it, which may be prevented in cutting them off. I do not see what is here merely judicial, so as to be rejected as Judaical: for sure murderers must be slain now as well as then, and there is the same hazard of their escaping now as then: murder involves the land in guilt, now as well as then, and in this case of necessity especially, that law that gives a man right to preserve himself, gives him also right to be his own avenger, if he cannot otherwise defend himself. (3.) Not only the execution, the decision of matters of life and death, is committed to them; as in the case of blasphemy and cursing, 'All that heard were to lay their hands upon his head, and all the congregation was to stone him,' Lev. xxiv. 14, 16. 'The man-slayer was to stand before the congregation in judgment. Then the congregation shall judge between the slayer and avenger of blood,' Numb. x.x.xv. 12, 24. The people claimed the power of life and death, in seeking to execute judgment upon those that had spoken treason against Saul, Bring the men (say they) that we may put them to death, 1. Sam. xi. 12. Especially in the case of punishing tyrants, as they did with Amaziah. Certainly this is not so judicial or judaical, as that in no case it may be imitated; for that can never be abrogated altogether, which in many cases is absolutely necessary; but that the people, without public authority, should take the power of life and death, and of putting a stop to the insolency of destroyers, by putting them to death, is in many cases absolutely necessary; for without this they cannot preserve themselves against gra.s.sant tyrants, nor the fury of public enemies or firebrands within themselves, in case they have no public authority, or none but such as are on their destroyers side. (4.) Not only the power of purging the land, by divine precept, is inc.u.mbent on the people, that it may not ly under blood guiltiness; but also the power of reforming the courts of kings, by taking course with their wicked abetters and evil instruments, is committed to him, with a promise that if this be done, it shall tend to the establishment of their throne; which is not only a supposition in case it be done, but a supposed precept to do it, with an insinuation of the necessity and expediency of it, that it is as suitable as the taking away of the dross from silver, in order to the production of a vessel, Prov. xxv. 4, 5. 'Take away the wicked from before the king, and his throne shall be established in righteousness;' which is not only there given to kings, for then it would be in the second person spoken to them, but to the people to do it before them, as the people did with Baal's prophets from before Ahab. And our progenitors many times have done with wicked counsellors, as may be seen in the foregoing representation, and more fully in the history of the Dougla.s.ses, and in Knox's and Calderwood's histories. Hence, if it be duty to reform the court, and to take away a king's wicked sycophants, counsellors, agents, and instigators to tyranny; then it must be lawful, in some cases of necessity, to restrain their insolency, and repress their tyranny, in executing judgment upon such of them as are most insupportable, who are made drunk with the blood of innocents; but the former is true: therefore----(5.) For the omission of the executing of this judgment on oppressors and murderers, involving the whole land in blood guiltiness, which cannot be expiated but by the blood of them that are so criminal; not only magistrates, but the whole people have been plagued. As for Saul's murdering the Gibeonites, the whole land was plagued, until the man that consumed them, and devised against them to destroy them, seven of his sons were delivered unto them, to be hanged up before the Lord, 2 Sam. xxi. 5, 6. So also for the sins of Mana.s.seh. The reason was, because if the magistrate would not excute judgment, the people should have done it: for not only to the king, but also to his servants, and to the people that entered in by the gates, the command is, excute ye judgment, and deliver the spoiled out of the hand of the oppressor, Jer.

xxii. 2, 3. though it be true, this is to be done by every one in their station, justice and order being preserved, and according to the measure of their office, and it chiefly belongs to judges and magistrates: yet this is no wrong to justice, nor breach of order, nor sinful transgression of people's vocation, not only to hinder the shedding of innocent blood, to prevent G.o.d's executing of what he there threatens, but also to execute judgment on the shedders, to prevent their progress in murdering villany, when inferior as well as superior magistrates are oppressing and tyrannizing: therefore this seeking, and doing, and executing judgment, is so often required of the people, in such a case, when princes are rebellious and companions of thieves, and in the city where judgment used to be, now murderers bear sway, Isa. i. 17. 21. the Lord is displeased where there is none, Isa. lix. 15, 16. Jer. v. 1. See this vindicated in Lex Rex, quest. 34. p. 367. and in Jus popul. cap.

10. p. 237.

3. That command concludes the same against idolaters, apostates, and enticers thereunto, Deut. xiii. 6. &c. 'If thy brother----or thy friend, which is as thine own soul, entice thee secretly, saying, let us go and serve other G.o.ds----thou shalt not spare nor conceal him, but thou shalt surely kill him----because he sought to thrust thee away from the Lord thy G.o.d----And all Israel shall hear, and fear, and do no more any such wickedness.' And ver. 13. &c. 'If thou shall hear say in one of thy cities----saying, Certain men the children of Belial, are gone out----and have withdrawn the inhabitants of their city, saying, let us go to serve other G.o.ds----Then shalt thou enquire----and behold if it be truth, and the thing certain----thou shalt surely smite the inhabitants of that city with the edge of the sword, destroying it utterly.'----This cause of the open enticers to idolatry was not brought to the judges, as common idolaters, and such who were enticed to serve other G.o.ds, and worship them, were to be brought to the gates, and to be stoned first by the hands of witnesses, and afterwards by all the people, Deut. xvii. 3, 5, 7. But this is another law; of which the Jewish antiquaries, and particularly Grotius out of Philo and the Rabb. upon the place, saith, 'Whereas in other crimes the guilty used to be kept after the sentence a night and a day, that if he could say any more for himself he might, these were excepted from this benefit; and not only so, but it was permitted to any to execute judgment upon them (viz. Enticers to idolatry) without waiting for a judge. The like was used against sacrilegious robbers of the temple, and priests who sacrificed when they were polluted, and those who cursed G.o.d by the name of an idol, and those who lay with an idolatress: chiefly those who denied the divine authority of the law: and this behoved to be before the people, at least ten, which in Hebrew they called Hheda.----Neither is this to be admitted in so grievous a crime, when even the man-slayer without the place of refuge might have been killed by the kinsman of the defunct.'

And upon Numb. xv. 30. the punishment of presumptuous blasphemers, he says, 'But here these are to be understood thus, that the guilty shall not be brought to the judges, but be killed by them that deprehended them in the crime, as Phinehas did to Zimri;' and proves it out of Maimonides, Pool. Synop. Critic. on the place. And it must be so; for in this case no mention is made either of judges, or witnesses, or further judgment about it, than that he that was tempted by the enticer should fall upon him, and let the people know it, that they might lay hands on him also; otherwise evil men might pretend such a thing when it was not true.

But in case of a city's apostacy, and hearkning to enticers, the thing was only to be solicitously enquired into, and then though it was chiefly inc.u.mbent upon the magistrate to punish it, yet it was not all astricted to him, but that the people might do it without him. As upon this moral ground, was Israel's war stated against Benjamin, Judg. xx.

13. When there was no king nor judge, and also when there were kings that turned idolaters and tyrants, they served them so, as here is commanded: witness Amaziah, as is shewed above. Hence not only Moses, upon the people's defection into idolatry in the wilderness, commanded all on the Lord's side, every man to put his sword by his side,--and slay every man his brother, and every man his companion, and every man his neighbour, whereby three thousand fell at that time by the sword of the Levites, Exod. x.x.xii. 27, 28. But also Joash, Gideon's father, upon the same moral ground, though he was no magistrate, could say to the Abiezrites, will ye plead for Baal--he that will plead for him, let him be put to death while it is yet morning.--Judg. vi. 31. Moreover, (as Mr. Mitchel adduces the example very pertinently), we see that the people of Israel destroyed idolatry, not only in Judah wherein the king concurred, but in Ephraim, and in Mana.s.seh, where the king himself was an idolater; and albeit, they were but private persons, without public authority: for what all the people was bound to do by the law of G.o.d, every one was bound to do it to the uttermost of his power and capacity.

Mr. Mitchel offers this place to vindicate his fact of shooting at the prelate, Deut. xiii. 9. 'Wherein, (says he) it is manifest, That the idolater or enticer to worship a false G.o.d, is to be put to death by the hand of those whom he seeks to turn away from the Lord: which precept I humbly take to be moral, and not merely judicial, and that it is not at all ceremonial or levitical. And as every moral precept is universal, as to the extent of place, so also as to the extent of time, and persons.'

The chief thing objected here is, that this is judicial precept, peculiarly suited to the old dispensation; which to plead for as a rule under the New Testament, would favour of Jewish rigidity inconsistent with a gospel Spirit. Ans. How Mr. Knox refels this, and clears that the command here is given to all the people, needs not be here repeated; but it were sufficient to read it in the foregoing representation, Period 3.

Pag. 24. As it is also cited by Jus Pop. pag. 212. &c. But these general truths may be added, concerning the judicial laws, 1. None can say, that none of the judicial laws, concerning political const.i.tutions, is to be observed in the New Testament: for then many special rules of natural and necessary equity would be rejected, which are contained in the judicial laws of G.o.d: yea, all the laws of equity in the world would be so cast: for none can be instanced, which may not be reduced to some of the judicial laws: and if any of them are to be observed, certainly these penal statutes, so necessary for the preservation of policies, must be binding. 2. If we take not our measures from the judicial laws of G.o.d, we shall have no laws for punishment of any malefactors by death, of divine right, in the New Testament. And so all capital punishments must be only human const.i.tutions; and consequently they must be all murders: for to take away the life of man, except for such causes as the Lord of our life (to whose arbitriment it is only subject) hath not approven, is murder, as Dr. Ames saith, De homicidio Conscienc. Lib.

5. Cap. 31. Quest. 2. For in the New Testament, though in the general, the power of punishing is given to the magistrate, yet it is no where determined, neither what, nor how crimes are to be punished. If therefore penal laws must be taken from the Old Testament; the subject of executing them, as well as the object, must be thence deduced; that is, what is there astricted to the magistrate must be so still, and what is permitted to the people must remain in like manner their privilege; since it is certain, the New-Testament liberty is not more restricted as to penal laws than the old. 3. Those judicial laws, which had either somewhat typical, or pedagogical, or peculiar to the then judaical state, are indeed not binding to us under that formality; though even these doctrinally are very useful, in so far as in their general nature, or equity of proportion, they exhibit to us some doc.u.ments of duty; but those penal judgments, which in the matter of them are appended to the moral law, and are, in effect, but accurate determinations and accommodations of the law of nature, which may suit our circ.u.mstances as well as the Jews, do oblige us as well as them. And such are these penal statutes I adduce; for, that blasphemy, murder, and idolatry, are heinous crimes, and that they are to be punished, the law of nature dictates: and how, and by whom, in several cases, they are to be punished, the law judicial determines. Concerning the moral equity even of the strictest of them, Amesius de Conscien. Lib. 5. Mosaical appendix of precepts, doth very learnedly a.s.sert their binding force: 4. Those judicial laws, which are but positive in their form, yet if their special, internal, and proper reason and ground be moral, which pertains to all nations, which is necessary and useful to mankind, which is rooted in, and may be fortified by human reason, and as to the substance of them approven by the more intelligent heathens; those are moral, and oblige all Christians as well as Jews: and such are these laws of punishing idolaters, &c. founded upon moral grounds, pertaining to all nations, necessary and useful to mankind, rooted in, and fortified by human reason; to wit, that the wrath of G.o.d may be averted, and that all may hear and fear, and do no more so wickedly; especially if this reason be superadded, when the case is such, that innocent and honest people cannot be preserved, if such wicked persons be not taken order with. 5. Those judicial laws, which being given by the Lord's immediate authority, though not so solemnly as the moral decalogue, are neither as to their end, dead, nor as to their use, deadly, nor as to their nature, indifferent, nor in any peculiar respect restringible only to the Jews, but the transgressions whereof both by omission and commission are still sins, and were never abolished neither formally nor consequentially in the New Testament, must be moral; but such, as these penal laws I am speaking of, they cannot be reputed among the ceremonial laws, dead as to their end, and deadly as to their use, or indifferent in their nature: for sure, to punish the innocent upon the account of these crimes, were still sin, now as well as under the Old Testament; and not punish the guilty, were likewise sin now as well as then. If then the matter be moral and not abolished, the execution of it by private persons, in some cases when there is no access to public authority, must be lawful also. Or if it be indifferent, that which is in its own nature indifferent, cannot be in a case of extreme necessity unlawful, when otherwise the destruction of ourselves and brethren is in all human consideration inevitable. That which G.o.d hath once commanded, and never expresly forbidden, cannot be unlawful, in extraordinary cases, but such are these precepts we speak of: therefore they cannot be in every case unlawful. Concerning this case of the obligation of judicial laws, Ames. de Conscienc. Lib. 5. Cap. 1. Quest. 9. 6. Those laws which are predicted to be observed and executed in the New Testament, cannot be judicial or judaical, restricted to the old: but such is this. In the day, that a fountain shall be opened for the house of David for sin, and for uncleanness; which clearly points at gospel times; it is said, "The Lord will cause the prophets and the unclean spirits to pa.s.s out of the land: and it shall come to pa.s.s, that when any shall yet prophesy, then his father and his mother that begat him shall say unto him, thou shalt not live----and shall thrust him through when he prophesieth," Zech. xiii. 3. Which cannot be meant of a spiritual penetration of the heart: for it is said, he shall not live; and the wounds of such as might escape, by resistance or flight, are visible in his hands, ver. 6. It is therefore to be understood of corporal killing inticers to idolatry, according to the law, Deut. xii.

9. either by delivering them up to the judges, as Piscator on the place says, or as Grotius saith, they shall run through, as Phinehas did Zimri, Numb. xxv. Understand this of a false prophet, desiring to intice the people to the worship of false G.o.ds; for the law impowered every Jew to proceed against such----which law expressly adds, that they should not spare their son, if guilty of such a crime. From all which I conclude, if people are to bring to condign punishment idolatrous apostates, seeking to intice them; then may oppressed people, daily in hazard of the death of their souls by compliance; or of their bodies, by their constancy in duty, put forth their hand to execute judgment, in case of necessity, upon idolatrous apostates and incendiaries, and the princ.i.p.al murdering emissaries of tyrants, that seek to destroy people, or enforce them to the same apostacy; but the former is true: therefore, &c.

4. The same may be inferred from that command of rescuing and delivering our brother, when in hazard of his life; for omitting which duty, no pretence, even of ignorance, will excuse us, Prov. xxiv. 11, 12. If thou forbear to deliver them that are drawn unto death, and those that are ready to be slain; if thou sayest, behold we knew it not: doth not he that pondereth the heart consider it? and he that keepeth thy soul doth not he know it, and shall not he render to every man according to his works? That is, 'Rescue out out of the hand of the invader, robber, unjust magistrate, &c. and that either by defending him with your hand, or tongue, or any other lawful way: men use to make a great many excuses, either that they know not his danger nor his innocence, nor that they were possessed of so great authority that they might relieve him, that they have enough to do to mind their own affairs, and not concern themselves with others, &c. He proposes and redargues here, for examples sake, one excuse, comprehending all the rest.' As commentators say, Pool. Syn. Crit. in loc. This precept is indefinitely given to all: princ.i.p.ally indeed belonging to righteous magistrates; but in case of their omission, and if, instead of defending them, they be the persons that draw or send out their destroying emissaries to draw them to death, then the precept is no more to be restricted to them, than that verse.

1. not to be envious against evil men, or vers. 10. If thou faint in the day of adversity, thy strength is small, can be said to be spoken only to magistrates. Hence, if it be a duty to rescue our brethren from any prevailing power that would take their lives unjustly, and no pretence even of ignorance will excuse the forbearance of it, then it must be lawful, in some extraordinary cases, to prevent the murdering violence of public incendiaries, by killing them, rather than to suffer ourselves or our brethren to be killed, when there is no other way, in probability, either of saving ourselves, or rescuing them; but here the former is commanded as a duty: therefore the latter also must be justified, when the duty cannot otherwise be discharged.

Now, having thus at some length endeavoured to discuss this some way odd and esteemed odious head, to which task I have been as unwillingly drawn, as the actors here pleaded for were driven to the occasion thereof, whom only the necessity of danger did force to such atchievements, to preserve their own and brethren's lives, in prosecuting the cause; and nothing but the necessity of duty did force me to this undertaking, to