A Hind Let Loose Part 13

2. Rebellion is a d.a.m.nable sin, except where the word is taken in a lax sense, as Israel is said to have rebelled against Rehoboam, and Hezekiah against Sennacherib, which was a good rebellion, and clear duty, being taken there for resistance and revolt. In that sense indeed some of our risings in arms might be called rebellion; for it is lawful to rebel against tyrants. But because the word is usually taken in an evil sense, therefore it would have been offensive to acknowledge that before the inquisitors, except it had been explained. But rebellion against lawful magistrates, is a d.a.m.nable sin, exemplarily punished in Korah and his company, who rebelled against Moses; and in Sheba and Absalom, who rebelled against David. For to punish the just is not good, nor to strike princes for equity, Prov. xvii. 26. and they that resist shall receive to themselves d.a.m.nation, Rom. xiii. 2. So that this objection brought from this place, as if the apostle were commanding their subjection without resistance to Nero, and such tyrants; as it is very impertinent, it is fully answered above, Head II. Here it will be sufficient to reply, 1. He is hereby vindicating Christianity from that reproach, of casting off or refusing subjection to magistrates for conscience sake in general. And it is very considerable, what Buchanan says in his book de juri regni, that Paul did not write to the kings themselves, because they were not Christians, and therefore the more might be born with from them, though they should not understand the duty of magistrates; but imagine, that there had been some Christian king who had turned tyrant and apostate, 'to the scandal of religion: what would he have written then? Sure if he had been like himself, he would have denied that he should be owned for a king, and would have interdicted all Christians communion with him, and that they should account him no king, but such as they were to have no fellowship with, according to the law of the gospel.' 2. He speaks of lawful rulers here, not tyrants, but of all such as are defined and qualified here, being powers ordained of G.o.d, terrors to evil works, ministers of G.o.d for good. Yea, but say prelates, and their malignant adherents, these are only motives of subjection to all powers, not qualifications of the powers. I answer, they are indeed motives, but such as can be extended to none but to these powers that are so qualified. 3. He speaks of lawful powers indefinitely in the plural number, not specifying any kind or degree of them, as if only kings and emperors were here meant. It cannot be proven, that the power of the sword is only in them. Neither was there a plurality of kings or emperors at Rome to be subject to: if he meant the Roman emperor, he would have designed him in the singular number. All the reasons of the text agree to inferior judges also, for they are ordained of G.o.d, they are called rulers in scripture, and G.o.d's ministers, revengers by office, who judge not for man, but for the Lord: and inferior magistrates also are not to be resisted, when doing their duty, 1 Pet. ii. 13. yet all will grant, when they go beyond their bounds, and turn little tyrants, they may be withstood. 4. He does not speak of Nero, concerning whom it cannot be proven, that at this time he had the soverereign power as the learned Mr. Prin shews: or if he had, that he was a tyrant at this time; and if he meant him at all, it was only as he was obliged to be by right, nor as he was in deed. All men know, and none condemns the fact of the senate, that resisted Nero at length, without transgressing this precept. Yea I should rather think, the senate is the power that the apostle applies this text to, if he applied it to any in particular. 5. The subjection here required, is the same with the honour in the fifth command, whereof this is an exposition, and is opposite to the contraordinateness here condemned.

Now, subjection takes in all the duties we owe to magistrates, and resistance all the contraries forbidden; but unlimited obedience is not here required: so neither unlimited subjection.

3. We may allow pa.s.sive subjection in some cases, even to tyrants, when the Lord lays on that yoke, and in effect says, he will have us to lie under it a while, as he commanded the Jews to be subject to Nebuchadnezzar: of which pa.s.sage, adduced to prove subjection to tyrants universally, Buchanan, as above, infers, that if all tyrants be to be subjected to, because G.o.d by his prophet commanded his people to be subject to one tyrant; then it must be likewise concluded, that all tyrants ought, to be killed, because Ahab's house was commanded to be destroyed by Jehu. But pa.s.sive subjection, when people are not in capacity to resist, is necessary. I do not say pa.s.sive obedience, which is a mere chimera, invented in the brains of such sycophants, as would make the world slaves to tyrants. Whosoever suffereth, if he can shun it, is an enemy to his own being: for every natural thing must strive to preserve itself against what annoyeth it; and also he sins against the order of G.o.d, who in vain hath ordained so many lawful means for preservation of our being, if we must suffer it to be destroyed, having power to help it.

4. We abhor all war of subjects, professedly declared against a lawful king, as such; all war against lawful authority, founded upon, or designed for maintaining principles inconsistent with government, or against policy and piety; yea, all war without authority. Yet, when all authority of magistrates, supreme and subordinate, is perverted and abused, contrary to the ends thereof, to the oppressing of the people, and overturning of their laws and liberties, people must not suspend their resistance upon the concurrence of men of authority, and forbear the duty in case of necessity, because they have not the peers or n.o.bles to lead them: for if the ground be lawful, the call clear, the necessity cogent, the capacity probable, they that have the law of nature, the law of G.o.d, and the fundamental laws of the land on their side, cannot want authority though they may want parliaments to espouse their quarrel.

This is cleared above, Head 2. yet here I shall add, 1. The people have this privilege of nature, to defend themselves and their rights and liberties, as well as peers; and had it, before they erected and const.i.tuted peers or n.o.bles. There is no distinction of quality in interests of nature, though there be in civil order: but self defence is not an act of civil order. In such interests, people must not depend upon the priority of their superiors, nor suspend the duties they owe to themselves and their neighbours, upon the manuduction of other mens greatness. The law of nature allowing self-defence, or the defence of our brethren, against unjust violence, addeth no such restriction, that it must only be done by the conduit or concurrence of the n.o.bles or parliaments. 2. The people have as great interest to defend their religion as the peers, and more, because they have more souls to care for than they, who are fewer. And to be violented in their consciences, which are as free to them as to the peers, is as insupportable to them: yea, both are equally concerned to maintain truth, and rescue their brethren suffering for it, which are the chief grounds of war; and if the ground of the defensive war be the same with them and without them, what reason can be given, making their resistance in one case lawful, and not in the other? Both are alike obliged to concur, and both are equally, obnoxious to G.o.d's threatened judgments, for suffering religion to be ruined, and not relieving and rescuing innocents. It will be but a poor excuse for people to plead, they had no peers to head them. What if both king and n.o.bles turn enemies to religion, (as they are at this day) shall people do nothing for the defence of it then? Many times the Lord hath begun a work of reformation by foolish things, and hath made the least of the flock to draw them out, Jer. xlix. 2. and l. 45. and did not think fit to begin with n.o.bles, but began it, when powers and peers were in opposition to it; and when he blessed it so at length, as to engage the public representatives to own it, what was done by private persons before, they never condemned. 3. The people are injured without the n.o.bles, therefore they may resist without them, if they be able: for there can be no argument adduced, to make it unlawful to do it with them. 4. It is true the n.o.bles are obliged beyond others, and have authority more than others to concur; but separately they cannot act as representatives judicially: they have a magistratical power, but limited to their particular precincts where they have interest, and cannot extend it beyond these bounds; and so if they should concur, they are still in the capacity of subjects; for out of a parliamentary capacity they are not representatives. 5. All the power they can have is c.u.mulative, not privative; for the worse condition of a ruler ought not to be by procuring. Why then shall the representatives, betraying their trust, wrong the cause of the people, whose trustees they are? Nay, if it were not lawful for people to defend their religion, lives, and liberties without the concurrence of parliaments, then their case should be worse with them than without them; for they have done it before they had them, and so they had better be without them still. 6. People may defend themselves against the tyranny of a parliament, or primores, or n.o.bles: therefore, they may do it without them; for if it be lawful to resist them, it is lawful to wave them, when they are in a conspiracy with the king against them.

5. We disallow all war without real undeclinable necessity, and great and grievous wrongs sustained: and do not maintain it is to be declared or undertaken upon supposed grounds, or pretended causes: and so the question is impertinently stated by our adversaries, 'Whether or not it be lawful for subjects, or a party of them, when they think themselves injured, or to be in a capacity, to resist or oppose the supreme power of a nation.' For the question is not, if when they think themselves injured they may resist? But when the injuries are real: neither is it every reality of injuries will justify their resistance, but when their dearest and nearest liberties are invaded, especially when such an invasion is made, as threatens ineluctable subversion of them. Next, we do not say, That a party's esteeming themselves in a capacity, or their being really in a capacity, doth make resistance a duty; except, all alike, they have a call as well as a capacity, which requires real necessity, and a right to the action, and the things contended for to be real and legal rights, really and illegally encroached upon: their capacity gives them only a conveniency to go about the duty, that is, previously lawful upon a moral ground. No man needs to say, Who shall be judge? the magistrate or people? For, 1. All who have eyes in their head may judge whether the sun shine or not; and all who have common sense may judge in this case. For when it comes to a necessity of resistance, it is to be supposed, that the grievances complained of, and sought to be redressed by arms, are not hid, but manifest; it cannot be so with any party only pretending their suffering wrong. 2. There is no need of the formality of a judge, in things evident to nature's eye, as gra.s.sant tyranny undermining and overturning religion and liberty must be.

Nature, in the acts of necessitated ressistance, in such a case, is judge, party, accuser, witness, and all. Neither is it an act of judgment, for people to defend their own: defence is no act of jurisdiction, but a privilege of nature. Hence, these common sayings, all laws permit force to be repelled by force; and the law of nature allows self defence: the defence of life is necessary, and flows from the law of nature. 3. Be judge who will, the tyrant cannot be judge in the case: for, in these tyrannical acts, that force the people to that resistance, he cannot be acknowledged as king, and therefore no judge: for it is supposed, the judge is absent, when he is the party that does the wrong. And he that does the wrong, as such, is inferior to the innocent. 4. Let G.o.d be judge, and all the world, taking cognizance of the evidence of their respective manifestos of the state of their cause.

6. We condemn rising to revenge private injuries; whereby the land may be involved in blood for some petty wrongs done to some persons, great or small; and abhor revengeful usurping of the magistrate's sword, to avenge ourselves for personal injuries. As David's killing of Saul would have been, 1 Sam. xxiv. 10. 12. 13, 1 Sam. xxvi. 9, 10. To object which, in this case, were very impertinent: for it would have been an act of offence in a remote defence: if Saul had been immediately a.s.saulting him, it could not be denied to be lawful: and it would have been an act of private revenge for a personal injury, and a sinful preventing of G.o.d's promise of David's succession, by a scandalous a.s.sa.s.sination. But it is clear, then David was resisting him, and that is enough for us; and he supposes he might descend into battle, and perish, 1 Sam. xxvi.

10. not excluding, but that he might perish in battle against himself resisting him. We are commanded indeed not to resist evil, but whosoever shall smite us on the one cheek, to turn to him the other also, Matth.

v. 39. and to recompence to no man evil for evil, Rom. xii. 17. But this doth not condemn self defence, or resisting tyrants violently, endangering our lives, laws, religion, and liberties, but only resistance by way of private revenge and retaliation, and enjoin patience, when the clear call and dispensation do inevitably call unto suffering; but not to give way to all violence and sacrilege, to the subverting of religion and righteousness. These texts do no more condemn private persons retaliating the magistrate, than magistrates retaliating private persons, unless magistrates be exempted from this precept, and consequently be not among Christ's followers: yea, they do no more forbid private persons, to resist the unjust violence of magistrates, than to resist the unjust violence of private persons. That objection from our Lord's reproving Peter, Matth. xxvi. 52. Put up thy sword, for all they that take the sword, shall perish by the sword, hath no weight here: for this condemns only making use of the sword, either by way of private revenge, or usurping the use of it without authority, (and so condemns all tyrants) which private subjects do not want to defend themselves, their religion and liberty; or using it without necessity, which was not in Peter's case, both because Christ was able to defend himself, and because he was willing to deliver up himself. Pool's Synops. Critic. in Loc.u.m. Christ could easily have defended himself, but he would not; and therefore there was no necessity for Peter's rashness; it condemns also a rash precipitating and preventing the call of G.o.d to acts of resistance; but otherwise it is plain, it was not Peter's fault to defend his master, but a necessary duty. The reason, our Lord gives for that inhibition at that time, was twofold; one expressed Matth.

xixvi. 52. For they that take the sword, &c. Which do not belong to Peter, as if Peter were hereby threatened; but to those that were coming to take Christ, they usurped the sword of tyranical violence, and therefore are threatened with destruction, by the sword of the Romans: so is that commination to be understood of antichrist, and the tyrants that serve him, Rev. xiii. 13. He that killeth with the sword must be killed with the sword, which is a terrible word against persecutors. The reason is, John xviii. 11.----The cup which my Father hath given me, shall I not drink? Which clearly refels that objection of Christ's non-resistance. To which it is answered, That suffering was the end of his voluntary suscepted humiliation, and his errand to the world, appointed by the Father, and undertaken by himself, which is not our practice: though it be true, that even in his sufferings he left us an ensample that we should follow his steps, 1 Pet. ii. 21. In many things, as he was a martyr, his sufferings were the purest rule and example for us to follow, both for the matter, and frame of spirit, submission, patience, constancy, meekness, &c. but not as he was our sponsor, and after the same manner, for then it were unlawful for us to flee, as well as to resist, because he would not flee at that time.

7. As we are not for rising in arms for trifles of our own things, or small injuries done to ourselves, but in a case of necessity for the preservation of our lives, religion, laws, and liberties, when all that are dear to us, as men and as Christians, are in hazard: so we are not for rising up in arms, to force the magistrates to be of our religion, but to defend our religion against his force. We do not think it the way that Christ hath appointed, to propagate religion by arms: let persecutors and limbs of antichrist take that to them; but we think it a privilege which Christ hath allowed us to defend and preserve our religion by arms: especially, when it hath been established by the laws of the land, and become a land right, and the dearest and most precious right and interest we have to contend for. It is true faith Christ, John xviii. 36. 'My kingdom is not of this world; if my kingdom were of this world, then would my servants fight that I should not be delivered to the Jews.' But this objection will not conclude, that Christ's kingdom is not to be defended and preserved by resistance, of all that would impiously and sacrilegiously spoil us of it in this world, because it is not of this world: for then all were obliged to suffer it to be run down, by slaves of h.e.l.l and satan, and antichrist's va.s.sals, papists and malignants: yea, magistrates were not to fight for it, for they are among his servants, if they be Christians. But the good confession he witnesses here before Pilate, is, that he hath a kingdom, which, as it is not in opposition to any cesarean majesty; so it must not be usurped upon by any king of clay, but is specially distinct from all the kingdoms of the world, and subordinate to no earthly power, being of a spiritual nature; whereof this is a demonstration, and sufficient security for earthly kingdoms, that his servants, as such, that is, as Christians, and as ministers, were not appointed by him to propagate it by arms, nor to deliver him their king at that time, because he would not suffer his glorious design of redemption to be any longer r.e.t.a.r.ded: but this doth not say, but though they are not to propagate it as Christians, and as ministers, by carnal weapons, yet they may preserve it with such weapons as men. Hence that old saying may be vindicated, prayers and tears are the arms of the church. I grant they are so, the only best prevailing arms, and without which all others would be ineffectual, and that they (together with preaching and church discipline, &c.) are the only ecclesiastical or spiritual arms of a church as a church; but the members thereof are also men, and as men they may use the same weapons that others do, and ye my flock, the flock of my pasture, are men, saith the Lord, Ezek. x.x.xiii. 31. Yea, from this I shall take an argument; if it be lawful for private subjects, without the concurrence of parliaments, to resist a tyrant by prayers and tears; then it is lawful also to resist him by violence, but the former is true, as our adversaries grant by this objection, and I have proved it to be duty to pray against tyrants, Head 2. Ergo--. The connection is founded upon these reasons, 1. This personal resistance by violence, is as consistent with that command, Rom. xiii. 1. 2. 'Let every soul be subject unto the higher powers--whosoever therefore resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of G.o.d;' as resistance by prayer is with that, 1 Tim. ii. 1, 2. I exhort--that--supplications--be made--for kings, and for all that are in authority. If the prince be good, the one is as unlawful as the other; and a sinful resistance of the ordinance of G.o.d (to pray against him) no less than the other (to fight against him.) Therefore when he becomes a tyrant, and destroyer of the Lord's inheritance, and an apostate, as I may not pray for him except conditionally, but against him as an enemy of Christ; so I may also fight against him as such. 2. As adversaries themselves will grant, that resistance by prayers and tears is more powerful and effectual than the other; so the laws of the land make the one treasonable as well as the other; and that deservedly, when the prince is doing his duty; but when he turneth tyrant, neither can justly be condemned.

These things being permitted, I shall come shortly to the purpose, and endeavour to prove this truth, That it is a necessary duty for a community (whether they have the concurrence of the primores, n.o.bles, and representatives or not) to endeavour, in the defence of their religion, lives, laws, and liberties, to resist and repress the usurpation and tyranny of prevailing dominators, using or abusing their power, for subverting religion, invading the liberties, and overturning the fundamental laws of the country. Wherein I shall be but short, because this truth is sufficiently confirmed by all the arguments of the second head; yet I may only hint at many others, and prosecute them in this order. First, I shall produce some arguments from the law of nature and nations. 2dly, From the common practice of all Christian people.

3dly, From express scriptures.

I. The arguments of the first cla.s.s are very multifarious: I shall reduce them to a few, as compendiously as may be, and only give the strength of them in a syllogistical form, without expatiating, save where the matter requires.

1. The great antagonists of this truth, through the clearness thereof, are forced to a.s.sert and grant such particulars, as will by consequence justify this plea. 1. Barclay contra Monarchum, is cited by the Apol.

Relat. and Jus Populi a.s.serting 'That if a king will alienate and subject his kingdom, without his subjects consent, or be carried with a hostile mind to the destruction of his people, his kingdom is actually lost, and the people may not only lawfully resist, but also depose him.'

Grotius de jure belli, lib. 1. cap. 4. a.s.serts the same, and adds, 'If he but attempt to do so he may be resisted.' The surveyor of Naphtali grants the same, pag. 23, 24. Yea, this hath been granted in open court, by the council of Scotland, That in case of the king's alienating his kingdoms he may be resisted. Hence, 1. If vendition or alienation of kingdoms, or attempts of it, do annul a king's authority, then an alienation of them from Christ, to whom they are devoted by covenant, and selling to antichrist, as is attempted by this king, gives the people a right to resist him; but the former is here conceded: Ergo--(2.) We need say no more to apply the other, that carrying a hostile mind to the destruction of the people does forfeit his kingdom, and gives the people right to resist, than that a papist is always known to carry a hostile mind to the destruction of protestants, and all the designs declared these 27 years have been demonstrative efforts of it.

2. Dr. Ferne acknowledgeth, 'That personal defence is lawful against the sudden, illegal, and inevitable a.s.saults of the king's messengers, or of himself, in so far as to ward off his blows, or hold his hands. As also, he alloweth private persons liberty to deny subsidies and tribute to the prince, when he employeth it to the destruction of the commonwealth.' Hence, (1.) If one may defend himself against the sudden, illegal, and inevitable a.s.saults of the king or his messengers; then may many men, in defence of their lives and liberties, defend themselves against the surprising ma.s.sacres, the sudden a.s.saults, and much more the devised and deliberate a.s.saults of a tyrant's b.l.o.o.d.y emissaries, which are illegal and inevitable, as all their furious and b.l.o.o.d.y onsets have been; but the former is here allowed: therefore,--3. Bodin de Repub.

lib. 2. cap. 5. granteth, 'If a king turn tyrant, he may lawfully, at his subjects request, be invaded, resisted, condemned, or slain by a foreign prince.' Hence, if foreign princes may lawfully help a people oppressed by their own sovereign; then people may resist themselves, if they be able and hold in their pains; but the former is here granted: therefore----The consequence cannot be denied, for foreigners have no more power or authority over another sovereign, than the people have themselves. 4. Arnisaeus de Author. Princip. c. 2. n. 10. granteth, 'That if the prince proceed extrajudicially, without order of law, by violence, every private man hath power to resist.' So the surveyor of Naphtali, as above, 'Grants so much of a woman's violent resisting attempts against the honour of her chast.i.ty, and tending to ensnare her in sin, whereof, her non-resistance makes her guilty.' Hence, (1.) If every extrajudicial violence of a prince may be resisted; then also all contrajudicial violence against law or reason must be opposed, for that is more grievous, and all their violences, wherein they do not act as judges, must be resisted, and that is all together, for in none of them they can act as judges; but the former is here granted: therefore--2.

If a woman may defend her chast.i.ty against the king, lest her non-resistance make her guilty, (oh, if all women had been of this mind, the country would not have been pestered so with the king's b.a.s.t.a.r.ds); then may a nation, or any part of it, resist a tyrant's attempt upon the honour of their religion, enticing them to fornication with the mother of harlots, lest their non-resistance make them guilty; but the former is here yielded: therefore,--5. That same Arnisaeus, cap. 4. saith, 'Of the former (to wit, he who is called a tyrant in t.i.tle) it is determined by all without any difficulty, that he may be lawfully repulsed, or if by force he be gotten into the throne, he may warrantably be thence removed, because he hath not any jot of power which is not illegitimate, and unto which resistance is forbidden for the fear of G.o.d and for conscience sake, and therefore he is no further to be looked at than as an enemy.' This is so pat and pertinent to the present possessor of the government, that no words can more particularly apply it. 6. Grotius de jure belli, lib. 1. cap. 4. granteth, the law of not resisting does not bind when the danger is most weighty and certain, 'And we do not plead for it in any other case.' And further he says, 'The law of non-resistance seemeth to have flowed from them, who first combined together into society, and from whom such as did command did derive their power: now, if it had been asked of such, whether they would choose to die, rather than in any case to resist the superior by arms? I know not if they would have yielded thereto, unless with this addition, if they could not be resisted but with the greatest perturbation of the commonwealth, and destruction of many innocents. And afterwards he hath these words, nevertheless I scarce dare condemn every one or the lesser part, which may only be done at utmost extremity, notwithstanding respect is to be had to the common good.' From which we need make no inference, the concession is so large, that it answers our case. 7. The surveyor of Naphtali, in the place above cited, 'Grants legal self-defence against the sovereign, by way of plea in court, for safety of a man's person or estate,--as also is the case of most habited, notour and complete tyranny against law, to the destruction of the body of a people, and of all known legal liberties, and the being of religion according to law.--And in case of his not being in his natural and right wits.'--Hence, (1.) If it be lawful to resist the king by a plea in law, for an estate, (yea the law will allow), by actual force, if he come to take possession of it illegally: then it must be lawful for their lives and estates, liberties and religion, to resist him by force, when the legal resistance is not admitted; but the former is yielded here: therefore.--The reason of the connexion is, the munic.i.p.al law permits the one, and the law of nature and nations (which no munic.i.p.al law can infringe) will warrant the other: he hath no more right to be both judge and party in this case, more than in the other: and he can no more act as a sovereign in this case, than in the other. (2.) If it be lawful to resist habited, notour, and complete tyranny against law, to the destruction of the body of a people, and of all known legal liberties, and the being of religion, according to law: then we desire no more to conclude the duty of resisting this tyranny exercised this 27 years habitually, which the desolation of many hundred families, the banishment of many hundreds to slavery, the rivers of blood, &c. have made notour to all Scotland at least, and the perversion of all the fundamental laws, and all civil and religious liberties, yea the subversion of every remaining model of our religion, as reformed and covenanted to be preserved, in doctrine, worship, discipline and government, and designs to introduce popery and establish arbitrary government, have made complete; but the former is here granted: therefore--3. If in case of his being out of his wits, he should run upon an innocent man to kill him, or attempt to cut his own throat, it were then lawful to resist him, yea, a sin not to do it; then when in a rage, or deliberately, he is seeking to destroy many hundreds of the people of G.o.d, he may be resisted; but the former is clear: therefore--.

4. King James the VI. in his remonstance for the right of kings, against the oration of Cardinal Perron, hath these words, The public laws make it lawful, and free for any private person, to enterprize against an usurper of the kingdom. Then shall it not be duty, to enterprize against a man, who by the laws of the land is not capable of a right to reign, who hath got into the throne by the means of murder, and can pretend no right but that of succession, which I proved to be, none, Head 2.

However, we see by these concessions of adversaries, that the absolute subjection they talk of will not hold, nor the prerogative be so uncontroulable in every case, as they would pretend, and that in many cases, the safety of the people hath the supremacy above it; and that also in these cases the people must be judges, whether they may resist or not.

2. From the law of nature I may argue, 1. If G.o.d, the fountain of all power, and author of all right, hath given unto man both the power and the right, of, and reason to manage self-defence, and hath noways interdicted it in his word to be put forth against tyrants; then it is duty to use it against them upon occasion; but the former is true: therefore,--2. If this power and right were restrained in man against the unjust violence of any, it would either be by policy, or grace, or some express prohibition in the word of G.o.d; but none of these can be said: therefore.--Policy cannot destroy nature, but is rather c.u.mulative to it; a man entering into a politic incorporation, does not lose the privilege of nature: if one particular nature may defend itself against destroying violence out of society, then must many of these natures combined in society have the same right, and so much the more that their relative duties super-add an obligation of mutual a.s.sistance. Grace does not restrain the right of sinless nature, though it restrains corruption: but self-defence is no corruption: Grace makes a man more a man than he was. And nothing can be more dishonourable to the gospel, than that by the law of nature it is lawful to resist tyrants, but we are bound by religion from withstanding their cruelty: the laws of G.o.d do not interfere one with another. 3. That law which alloweth comparative re-offending, so as to kill rather than be killed, teacheth resistance: but so the law of nature alloweth, except we be guilty of murder in the culpable omission of self defence. The reason is, because the love of self is nearer and greater, as to temporal life, than the love of our neighbour: that being the measure of this: therefore it obliges rather to kill than be killed, the exigence of necessity so requiring. 4. If nature put no difference between the violence of a tyrant than of another man: then it teaches to resist both alike: but it putteth no difference, but rather aggravates that of a tyrant; being the violence of a man, the injustice of a member of the commonwealth, and the cruelty of a tyrant. And it were absurd to say, we might defend ourselves from the lesser violence, and not from the greater. 5. If particular nature must yield to the good of universal nature; then must one man, though in greatest power, be resisted, rather than the universal commonwealth suffer hurt: but the former is true; for that dictates the necessity of the distracted father to be bound by his own sons, lest all the family be hurt: Ergo the greatest of men or kings, when destructive to the commonwealth, must be resisted; for he is but one man, and so but particular nature. 6. That which is irrational, and reflects upon Providence, as putting men in a worse condition than brutes, is absurd and contrary to the law of nature: but to say, that the brutes have power to defend themselves by resisting what annoys them, and deny this power to men, is irrational and reflects upon Providence, as putting men in a worse condition than brutes: therefore it is absurd, and contrary to the law of nature.

3. From the inst.i.tution of government I may argue thus: that power and government which is not of G.o.d may be resisted: the tyrants power and government, in overturning laws, subverting religion, bringing in idolatry, oppressing subjects, is not of G.o.d: Ergo it may be resisted: the major is clear, because that is only the reason why he is not to be resisted, because the ordinance of G.o.d is not to be resisted, Rom. xiii.

2. But they that resist a man destroying all the interests of mankind, overturning laws, subverting religion, &c. do not resist the ordinance of G.o.d. And if it were not so, this would tend irremedilessly to overthrow all policies, and open a gap to all disorder, injustice, and cruelty, and would give as great encouragement to tyrants to do what they list, as thieves would be encouraged, if they knew n.o.body would resist them or bring them to punishment.

4. From the original const.i.tution of government by men, it may be argued thus: if people at the first erection of government acted rationally, and did not put themselves in a worse case than before, wherein it was lawful to defend themselves against all injuries, but devolved their rights upon the fiduciary tutory of such, as should remain still in the rank of men, that can do wrong, who had no power but by their gift, consent, and choice, with whom they a.s.sociated not to their detriment but for their advantage, and determined the form of their government, and time of its continuance, and in what cases they might recur to their primeve liberty, and settled a succession to have course not _jure hereditario_ but _jure et vi legis_, for good ends; then they did not give away their birth-right of self-defence, and power of resistance, which they had before to withstand the violence, injuries, and oppressions of the men they set over them, when they pervert the form and convert it to tyranny, but did retain a power and privilege to resist and revolt from them, and repel their violence when they should do violence to the const.i.tution, and pervert the ends thereof: but the former is true. Ergo--the minor is cleared, Head. 2. And the connexion is confirmed from this; if the estates of a kingdom give the power to a king, it is their own power in the fountain, and if they give it for their own good, they have power to judge when it is used against themselves, and for their evil; and so power to limit and resist the power that they gave.

5. From the way and manner of erecting governors by compact, the necessity whereof is proven Head 2. Many arguments might be deduced; I shall reduce them to this form: If people must propose conditions unto princes, to be by them acquiesced in and submitted unto at their admission to the government, which thereupon becomes the fundamental laws of the government, and securities for the people's rights and liberties, giving a law claim to the people to pursue the prince, in case of failing in the main and princ.i.p.al thing covenanted, as their own covenanted mandatarius who hath no jus or authority of his own, but what he hath from them, and no more power but what is contained in the conditions, upon which he undertaketh the government; Then when either an usurper will come under no such conditions, or a tyrant doth break all these conditions, which he once accepted, and so become stricto jure no prince, and the people be stricto jure liberated from subjection to him, they may and must defend themselves and their fundamental rights and privileges, religion and laws, and resist the tyranny overturning them: but the former is true, Ergo--The connexion is clear: and the minor is proved Head 2. And at length demonstrated and applied to the government of Charles the Second by Jus Populi. cap. 6. See Arg. 4, 5.

Head 2.

6. From the nature of magistracy it may be argued thus, That power which is properly neither parental, nor marital, nor masterly and despotic, over the subjects, persons, and goods, but only fiduciary, and by way of trust, is more to be resisted than that which is properly so; but that power which is properly so, that is parental power, and marital, and masterly, may be resisted in many cases; Therefore, that power which is not so properly, but only fiduciary is more to be resisted. That a king's power over his subjects, is neither parental, nor marital, &c. is proven Head 2. And the major needs no probation. The minor is clear by instances, 1. If children may, in case of necessity, resist the fury of their father, seeking to destroy them; then must private subjects resist the rage and tyranny of princes, seeking to destroy them, and what is dearest to them; for there is no stricter obligation moral between king and people, than between parents and children, nor so strict; and between tyrants and people there is none at all; but the former cannot be denied: Therefore,--2. If wives may lawfully defend themselves against the unjust violence of enraged husbands; then must private subjects have power to resist the furious a.s.saults of enraged tyrants, for there is not so great a tye betwixt them and people, as between man and wife; yea there is none at all; but the former is true: Ergo,--3. If servants may defend themselves against their masters; then must private subjects defend themselves against a tyrant or his emissaries; but the former is true: Ergo,--4. If the king's power be only fiduciary, and by way of p.a.w.n, which he hath got to keep; then when that power is manifestly abused, to the hurt of them that intrusted him with it, he ought to be resisted by all whom he undertook to protect; but the former is true: Therefore the latter.

7. From the limited power of princes it may be thus argued: If princes be limited by laws and contracts, and may be resisted by pleas in law, and have no absolute power to do and command what they will, but must be limited both by the laws of G.o.d and man, and cannot make what laws they will in prejudice of the people's rights, nor execute the laws made according to their pleasure, nor confer on others a lawless licence to oppress whom they please; then when they turn tyrants, and arrogate a lawless absoluteness, and cross the rules, and transgress the bounds prescribed by G.o.d's laws, and man's laws, and make their own l.u.s.ts a law, and execute the same arbitrarily, they must be resisted by force, when a legal resistance cannot be had, in defence of religion and liberty; but all princes are limited, &c. Therefore,--The minor is proved, Head 2. And the connexion may be thus confirmed in short: That power which is not the ordinance of G.o.d may be resisted; but an absolute illimited power, crossing the rules, and transgressing the bounds prescribed by G.o.d's law and man's, is not the ordinance of G.o.d; Therefore it may be resisted.

8. Further from the rule of government, it may be argued several ways, 1. That power which is contrary to law, evil and tyrannical, can ty none to subjection, but if it oblige to any thing, it ties to resistance; but the power of a king against law, religion, and the interests of the subjects, is a power contrary to law, evil and tyrannical: Therefore,--The major is plain, for wickedness can ty no man, but to resist it; that power which is contrary to law, evil and tyrannical is wickedness. 2. That power, and those acts, which neither king can exercise; nor command, nor others execute, nor any obey, must certainly be resisted: but such is the power and acts that oppress the subjects, and overturn religion and liberty; Therefore--The minor is evident from scriptures condemning oppression and violence, both in them that command, and in them that execute the same, and also them that obey such wicked commands. The major is clear from reason; both because such power and such acts as cannot be commanded, cannot be executed, cannot be obeyed lawfully, are sinful and wicked: and because it cannot be a magistratical power, for that may always be exercised and executed lawfully. And what a man cannot command, the resisting of that he cannot punish; but acts of oppression against law, religion, and liberty, a man cannot command; Ergo, the resisting of these he cannot punish. 3. That government of administration, which is not subordinate to the law and will of G.o.d, who hath appointed it, must be resisted; but that government or administration, which undermines or overturns religion and liberty, is not subordinate to the law and will of G.o.d; Therefore--The major is clear; for nothing but what is the ordinance of G.o.d, subordinate to his law and will, is irresistible, Rom. xiii. 2. The a.s.sumption is undeniable.

9. From the ends of government, which must be acknowledged by all to be the glory of G.o.d, and the good of mankind; yea, all that have been either wise or honest, have always held that the safety of the people is the supreme law. The argument may run thus, in short, 1. That doctrine which makes the Holy One to cross his own ends in giving governors, must be absurd and unchristian as well as irrational; but such is the doctrine that makes all kings and tyrants irresistible upon any pretence whatsoever: Ergo--The minor I prove: That doctrine which makes G.o.d intending his own glory and the people's good, to give governors both as fathers to preserve, and as murderers to destroy them, must make the Holy One to cross his own ends; for these are contradictory; but the doctrine that makes all kings and tyrants irresistible, &c. is such: for, by office, they are fathers to preserve, and, by office also, they must be murderers, vested with such a power from G.o.d, by the first act, if they be irresistible when they do so; seeing every power that is irresistible is the ordinance of G.o.d. Hence also when a blessing turns a curse, it is no more the ordinance of G.o.d, but to be resisted; but when a king turns a tyrant, overturning religion and liberty, then a blessing turns a curse: Therefore--2. Means are to be resisted, when they are not useful for, but destructive to the ends they were appointed for; but governors overturning religion and liberty, are means not useful for, but destructive to the ends for which they were appointed; seeing then they are neither for the glory of G.o.d, nor the good of mankind: Therefore--3. If all powers and prerogatives of men are only means appointed for, and should vail unto the supreme law of the people's safety, and all laws be subordinate to, and corroborative of this law, and when cross to it are in so far null, and no laws, and all law formalities in compet.i.tion with it are to be laid aside, and all parliamentary privileges must yield to this, and king and parliament both conspiring have no power against it; and no sovereign power, by virtue of any resignation from the people can comprize any authority to act against it; then it is duty to obey this supreme law, in resisting all powers and prerogatives, all laws, and law formalities, and all conspiracies whatsoever against this supreme law, the safety of the people; but the former is true, as was proven Head 2. Therefore--4. That power which is obliged, and appointed to command and rule justly and religiously, for the good of the people, and is only set over them on these conditions, and for that end, cannot ty them to subjection without resistance, when the power is abused to the destruction of laws, religion and people; but all power is so obliged and appointed: therefore, whensoever it is so abused, it cannot ty people to subjection, but rather oblige them to rejection of it.

10. From the obedience required to government, it may be argued thus. 1.

If we may flee from tyrants, then we may resist them; but we may flee from tyrants: therefore we may resist them. The connexion I prove, (1.) If all grounds of justice will warrant the one as well as the other, then if the one be duty, so is the other; but the former is true; for the same justice and equity that warrants declining a tyrant's unjust violence by flight, will warrant resistance when flight will not do it; the same principle of self-defence, that makes flight duty, when resistance is not possible, will also make resistance duty, when flight is not possible; the same principle of charity to wives and children, that makes flight lawful, when by resistance they cannot avoid tyranny, will make resistance duty, when by flight they cannot evite it; the same principle of conscience to keep religion free, that prompts to flight, when resistance will not save it, will also prompt to resist it, when flight is not practicable. (2.) If to flee from a just power, when in justice we are obnoxious to its sword, be to resist the ordinance of G.o.d, and so sin: then to flee from an unjust power, must be also a resisting of the abusing of it, and so duty, for the one is resistance as well as the other; but the difference of the power resisted makes the one lawful; the other not. Again, if royal power may be resisted by interposing seas and miles, why not also by interposing walls and arms?

Both is resistance, for against a lawful magistrate that would be resistance. (3.) If a tyrant hath irresistible power to kill and destroy the people, he hath also irresistible power to cite and summon them before him; and if it be unlawful to resist his murders, it must be as unlawful to resist his summons. (4.) For a church or community of Christians, persecuted for religion, to flee with wives and children, strong and weak, old and young, to escape tyrannical violence, and leave the land, were more unlawful than to resist; for what is not possible as a natural means of preservation is not a lawful mean; but this were not a possible mean: neither is it warranted in nature's law, or G.o.d's word, for a community or society of Christians, that have G.o.d's right and man's law to the land, and the covenanted privileges thereof, to leave the country and cause of Christ, and all in the hands of a tyrant and papist, to set up idolatry upon the ruins of reformation there. A private man may flee, but flight is not warranted of them as of a private single man. 2. If it be duty to disobey, it is duty to resist tyrants, in defence of religion and liberty; but it is duty to disobey them: Therefore--The connection only will be struck at, which is thus strengthened: If subjection be no more pressed in scripture than obedience, then if non-obedience be duty, non-subjection must be so also, and consequently resistance; but subjection is no more pressed in scripture than obedience; for all commands of subjection to the higher powers, as G.o.d's ministers, under pain of d.a.m.nation, do only respect lawful magistrates, and in lawful things, and do include obedience: and non-obedience to the power so qualified is a resisting of the ordinance of G.o.d, as well as non-subjection. If then obedience to magistrates be duty, and non-obedience sin, and obedience to tyrants sin, and non-obedience duty; then by parity of reason, subjection to magistrates is duty, and non-subjection is sin, and also subjection to tyrants is sin, and non-subjection duty.

11. From the resistance allowed in all governments, it may be argued thus; if it be duty to defend our religion, lives and liberties, against an invading army of cut-throat papists, Turks or Tartars, without or against the magistrates warrant; then it must be duty to defend the same against invading home-bred tyrants, except we would subscribe ourselves home-born slaves: but the former is true; therefore--The minor cannot be doubted, because the magistrates power cannot be privative and destructive to defence of our religion, lives and liberties; nor can it take away nature's birth-right to defend these, or make it fare the worse, than if we had no magistrates at all. Now, if we had no magistrates at all, we might defend these against invaders; and whether we have magistrates or not, we are under moral obligations of the law of G.o.d to endeavour the defence of these: but this needs not be insisted on. The connexion of the proposition is clear; if princes be more tyrannical in invading religion and liberties themselves, than in suffering others to do it, or hindering them to be opposed: and if their invasion be more tyrannical, hurtful and dangerous, than the invasion of strangers, then if it be duty to resist strangers invading their interests, it is more duty to resist home-bred tyrants invading the same; but the former is true: therefore the latter. Resisting in the one case is no more resisting the ordinance of G.o.d than in the other.

12. From the motives of resistance we may draw this argument, which might be branched out into several, but I shall reduce it to this complex one: if when we are in a capacity, we cannot acquit ourselves in the duties that we owe to our covenanted religion, and our covenanted brethren, and posterity, and ourselves, nor absolve exoner ourselves from the sin and judgment of tyrants, who overturn religion, oppress our brethren, impose slavery on ourselves, and entail it upon posterity, by a pa.s.sive subjection, submission to and not opposing these mischiefs; then resistance is necessary: but the former is true: therefore--. The connexion is clear, for there cannot be a medium; if we cannot discharge these duties by subjection, submission, and not opposing, then we must do them by non-subjection, non-submission, and opposing, since they must be done some way. The a.s.sumption is thus confirmed. 2. The duties we owe to religion, when it is corrupted, declined from, and overturned, are not only to reform our own hearts and ways, and keep ourselves pure from the corruptions established, and to rebuke and witness against the compliers with the same, and so by work, doing and suffering, keep and contend for the word of our testimony; but further, when, by the const.i.tution of the kingdom, religion is become a fundamental law, and consequently the magistrate, overturning it, is violating and everting the main grounds and ends of the government, and turning gra.s.sant and ingrained tyrant, especially when it is not only so authorised and confirmed by law, but corroborated by solemn vows and covenants made and sworn unto G.o.d by all ranks of people, to maintain and defend this religion with their lives and fortunes,--and resist all contrary errors and corruptions according to their vocation: and the utmost of that power that G.o.d puts in their hands all the days of their lives; as also mutually to defend and a.s.sist one another, (as in the national covenant.) And sincerely, really, and constantly endeavour--the preservation of the reformed religion in doctrine, worship, discipline and government, the extirpation of popery, prelacy, &c.--and to a.s.sist and defend all those that enter into the same bond in the maintaining thereof,--(as in the solemn league;) then to defend and maintain that religion, and themselves professing it; when it is sought to be razed; this must be an interest as necessary to be defended, as that of our bodies which is far inferior, and as necessary a duty, as to defend our nation and civil liberties from perpetual slavery, and as preferable thereunto, as Christ's interest is to man's, and as the end of all self-preservation is to the means of it, the preservation of religion being the end of all self-preservation; but this duty cannot be discharged without resistance, in a mere pa.s.sive subjection and submission: otherwise the same might be discharged in our universal submission to Turks coming to destroy our religion. Certainly this pa.s.sive way cannot answer the duty of pleading for truth, Isa. lix. 4.

seeking the truth, Jer v. 1. being valiant for it, Jer. ix. 3. making up the hedge, standing in the gap, &c. Ezek. xxii. 30. which yet are necessary inc.u.mbent duties according to our capacity; therefore we cannot answer the duties we owe to religion in a mere pa.s.sive way. 2.

The duty we owe to our covenanted brethren, is to a.s.sist and defend them, and relieve them when oppressed, as we are bound by our covenants, and antecedently by the royal law of Christ, the foundation of all righteousness among men toward each other, Matth. vii. 12. 'All things whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye even so to them.'--We would have them helping us when we are oppressed, so should we do to them when it is in the power of our hands to do it, and not forbear to deliver them for fear the Lord require their blood at our hand, Prov. xxiv. 11, 12. But this cannot be done by mere subjection without resistance. 3. There is no way to free ourselves of the sin and judgment of tyrants, by mere pa.s.sive subjection: we find in the scriptures, people have been so involved and punished for the sins of tyrants; as the people of Judah for Mana.s.seh, 2 Kings xxi. 11. &c. Jer.

xv. 4. whose sins if they had not been committed, the judgment for them had been prevented, and if the people had hindered them they had not smarted; but being jointly included with their rulers in the same bond of fidelity to G.o.d, and made accountable as joint princ.i.p.als with their kings for that debt, by their mutual as well as several engagements to walk in his ways, they were liable to be punished for their rebellion and apostacy, because they did not hinder it. Hence somewhat must be done to free ourselves of their sin, and to escape their judgments: but this can be nothing else but opposition to them by resistance; or else if we make any other opposition, it will make us more a prey to their jury.

II. Secondly, This truth is confirmed from the common practice of the people of G.o.d, even under persecution. Whence I shall draw an argument from examples, which, to condemn, were impious, and, to deny, were most impudent. And, for form's sake, it may run thus: What the people of G.o.d, under both testaments, have frequently done, in time of persecution, for defending, vindicating, or recovering their religion and liberties, may and ought to be done again in the like circ.u.mstances, when these are in the like hazard; but, under both testaments, the people of G.o.d frequently in times of persecution have defended, vindicated, or recovered their religion and liberties by defensive arms, resisting the sovereign powers that sought to destroy them: therefore this may and ought to be done again, when these religious, civil and natural privileges, are in the like hazard to be destroyed by the violent encroachments of the sovereign powers. The proposition cannot be denied, except by them that do profess themselves enemies to the people of G.o.d, and condemn their most frequently reiterated practices most solemnly and signally owned of G.o.d, to the confusion of their enemies, to the convicton of the world that the cause for which they contended was of G.o.d, and to the encouragement of all the patrons of such a cause, to hope, that when it is at the lowest it shall have a revival and glorious issue. It is true, sometimes they did not resist, when either they were not in a capacity, or did not see a call to such an action, but were not extraordinarily spirited of the Lord for pa.s.sive testimonies under a suffering dispensation: but it is as true, that many times they did resist, when the Lord capacitated, called, and spirited them for active testimonies. And therefore, if their suffering under these circ.u.mstances may be imitated, by a people so stated; then also their actions under these other circ.u.mstances may be imitated, by a people in the like case.

And by an impartial scrutiny it will be found, that the examples of their endeavoured resistance will be little inferior, if not superior in number or importance, to the examples of their submissive sufferings in all ages; which will appear in the probation of the a.s.sumption, by adduction of many instances, which I shall only cursorily glean out of that plentiful harvest that histories afford.

1. I need only to glance at that known and famous history of the Maccabees, of undoubted verity, though not of cannonical authority. In which according to scripture predictions, we have a notable account of heroic enterprises, atchievements, and exploits performed by them that knew their G.o.d, and tendered his glory, and their religion and country's liberties, above the common catechrestic notions of uncontroulable irresistible royalty, and absolute implicit loyalty, that have abused the world in all ages. We have there an account of the n.o.ble and successful resistance of a party of a few G.o.dly and zealous patriots, without the concurrence of civil authority, or countenance of the ephori or n.o.bles of the kingdom, against a king universally acknowledged and subjected unto, that came in peaceably, and obtained the kingdom by flatteries, with whom the greatest part and those of the greatest note took part, and did wickedly against the covenant and nation's interest, and were corrupted by flatteries: yet a few priests, with the concurrence of some common countrymen, did go to arms against him and them; and the Lord did wonderfully a.s.sist them for a considerable time; as was foretold by Daniel xi. This fell out under the persecution of Antiochus Epiphanes, and was happily begun by Matthias a G.o.dly priest, and his five sons, who, being commanded under severe certifications to worship according to the then law, and the king's wicked l.u.s.t, did valiantly resist that abomination, and went to defensive arms: which, while living, he patronized, and, when a dying, did encourage his sons to it by a notable oration, shewing what case his country was in, and what a duty and dignity it was to redeem and deliver it. This was vigorously prosecuted by Judas Maccabeus, expressly for the quarrel of religion and liberty, against that mighty tyrant and all his emissaries.

2. To come to the history of the gospel dispensation: It is true in that time of the primitive persecutions under heathen emperors, this privilege of self-defence was not so much improved or contended for by Christians, who studied more to play the martyrs, than to play the men, because in these circ.u.mstances the Lord was pleased to spirit for and call them unto, and accept of their hands pa.s.sive testimonies; while they were incorporate under a civil relation with the heathens, in subjection to governors who did not by open tyranny, overturn their civil liberties, only did endeavour to eradicate religion, which, at that time, had never become their right by law; while they were scattered and out of capacity, and never could come to a separate formed community by joint concurrence and correspondence, to undertake a declared resistance; while religion was only a propagating through the nations, and the Lord providentially did preclude the least appearance that might be of propagating it by any formed force, being the gospel of peace, designed to save, and not to destroy: yet even then, instances are not wanting of Christians resisting their enemies, and of rescuing their ministers, &c. As they are found on record. 1. How some inhabiting Mareota, with force rescued Dionysius, of Alexandria, out of the hands of such as were carrying him away, about the year 255. 2. How about the year 310, the Arminians waged war against Maximus, who was come against them with an army because of their religion. 3. How about the year 342, the citizens of Athanasius their minister, against Gregorius the intruded curate and Syria.n.u.s the emperor's captain, who came with great force to put him in. 4. How about the year 356, the people of Constantinople did in like manner stand to the defence of Paulus, against Constantius the emperor, and killed his captain Hermogenes; and afterwards, in great mult.i.tudes, they opposed the intrusion of the heretic Macedonius. 5. How, when a wicked edict was sent forth to pull down the churches of such as were for the clause of one substance, the christians that maintained that testimony resisted the bands of soldiers, that were procured at the emperor's command by Macedonius, to force the Mantinians to embrace the Arian heresy; but the Christians at Mantinium, kindled with an earnest zeal towards Christian religion, went against the soldiers with chearful minds and valiant courage, and made a great slaughter of them. 6. How, about the year 387, the people of Cesarea did defend Basil their minister. 7. How, for fear of the people, the lieutenant of the emperor Valens durst not execute those 80 priests who had come to supplicate the emperor, and were commanded to be killed by him. 8. How the inhabitant's of mount Nitria espoused Cyril's quarrel, and a.s.saulted the lieutenant, and forced his guards to flee. 9.

How, about the year 404, when the emperor had banished Chrysostom, the people flocked together, so that the emperor was necessitated to call him back again from his exile. 10. How the people resisted also the transportation of Ambrose, by the command of Valentinian the emperor; and chused rather to lose their lives, than to suffer their pastor to be taken away by the soldiers. 11. How the Christians, oppressed by Baratanes king of Persia, did flee to the Romans to seek their help. And Theodosius, the emperor, is much praised for the war which he commenced against Chosroes king of Persia, upon this inducement, that the king sought to ruin and extirpate those Christians in his dominions, that would not renounce the gospel.

3. But when religion was once embraced in embodied corporations, and established by law, and became a people's common interest and liberty, in a capacity to defend it with their lives and other liberties, and when it was propagated through the nations; then the Lord did call for other more active testimonies, in the preservation and defence of it: of which we have many instances in histories. About the year 894, the Bohemian Christians resisted Drahomica their queen, who thought to have destroyed them, and reintroduced paganism. About the year 1420, they maintained a long defensive war against the government, and the pope's legates, under the management of their brave captain Zizca; which was further prosecuted after him by the remaining Thaborites. And again in this century, in the year 1618, they maintained a defensive war against the emperor Ferdinand II. electing and erecting a new king in opposition to him, Frederick Palatine of the Rhine, in which cause many received a crown of martyrdom: and this was also espoused by king James VI, who sent to aid his son in law against the emperor.

4. It we look to the histories of the Waldenses, these constant opposers of antichrist, we will find many instances of their resistance. About the year 1194, very early, while Waldo (from whom they had their name) was alive, they began to defend themselves by arms, after the b.l.o.o.d.y edict of Alphonsus king of Arragon; an edict so like to many of ours emitted this day, as it would seem our enemies have taken the copy of it: so it were very seemly for the people grieved with such edicts to imitate the copy of the Waldenses their practice, in opposition to them.

In the year 1488, they resist by arms Albert de Capitaneis, sent by pope Innocent VIII. in Pragola and Fra.s.saniere, and throughout Piedmont; where, for the most part, the offspring of the old Waldenses had their residence, where, very evidently, through many