1914 Part 39

My answer to (1) is this: Had we been in possession of the Belgian coast-line between Nieuport and the Dutch frontier in the early part of 1915, and had we maintained it to the end of the war, the Germans would have been deprived in a great measure of the power they have exercised throughout with such success, to prosecute their submarine campaign. Any price we might have had to pay in the way of losses would have been well worth the object attained.

In a lesser degree this may be said of the enemy's aircraft enterprises. I claim that the naval history of this war clearly bears out my contention.

As to (2), the extent of the line to be held would depend upon the degree of success attained by the operations. If we had been able to make good our advance from the left flank (between Nieuport and Dixmude) by means of powerful naval support from the sea, the least we should have effected would have been to clear the Germans out of the triangle Nieuport--Dixmude--Zeebrugge.

If the operation had then to be suspended, we should have had to hold the line Dixmude--Zeebrugge instead of Dixmude--Nieuport. In actual distance the former s.p.a.ce is about double the latter. But our position at Zeebrugge would have afforded a large measure of naval support, and the country to the south-west of that place lends itself to inundations. This would have enabled us to occupy the north-eastern portion of the line in much less strength. Further, it was just in antic.i.p.ation of such a necessity that the extra troops were asked for.

Inasmuch, however, as such a situation would have forced upon the enemy the necessity of holding a dangerous and exposed salient which could be reached on the north side by our guns from the Fleet, it is more than possible that he would have effected such a retirement as would have considerably shortened our line.

(3) This contention is disputed; but even if it were true, it is no sound military argument against embarking on an operation which promised such valuable results.

(4) There is a complete answer to this objection. Some two or three months later, large trainloads of ammunition--heavy, medium, and light--pa.s.sed by the rear of the Army in France _en route_ to Ma.r.s.eilles for shipment to the Dardanelles.

(5) The best possible means of warding off an attack is to take a strong and powerful initiative.

I cannot characterise these reasons for rejecting my plans as other than illogical, and I feel sure they must really have appeared so to their authors.

Perhaps the true explanation which underlay all this is to be found in the following Memorandum of the War Council of January 9th, 1915. It runs as follows:--

THE POSSIBILITY OF EMPLOYING BRITISH FORCES IN A DIFFERENT THEATRE THAN THAT IN WHICH THEY ARE NOW USED.

"The Council considered carefully your remarks on this subject in reply to Lord Kitchener's letter, and came to the conclusion that, certainly for the present, the main theatre of operations for British forces should be alongside the French Army, and that this should continue as long as France was liable to successful invasion and required armed support. It was also realised that, should the offensive operations subsequently drive the Germans out of France and back to Germany, British troops should a.s.sist in such operations. It was thought that, after another failure by Germany to force the lines of defence held by the French Army and yours, the military situation in France and Flanders might conceivably develop into one of stalemate, in which it would be impossible for German forces to break through into France, while at the same time the German defences would be impa.s.sable for offensive movements of the Allies without great loss of life and the expenditure of more ammunition than could be provided.

In these circ.u.mstances, it was considered desirable to find some other theatre where such obstructions to advance would be less p.r.o.nounced, and from where operations against the enemy might lead to more decisive results.

"For these reasons, the War Council decided that certain of the possible projects for pressing the war in other theatres should be carefully studied during the next few weeks, so that, as soon as the new forces are fit for action, plans may be ready to meet any eventuality that may be then deemed expedient, either from a political point of view, or to enable our forces to act with the best advantage in concert with the troops of other nations throwing in their lot with the Allies."

In fact, the idea became fixed in the minds of the War Council that a condition of stalemate was bound to occur on the Western front, and therefore other theatres which might afford greater opportunities of prosecuting a successful offensive must be sought.

I was asked for my views as to this, and I gave them in full. s.p.a.ce does not allow me to quote my memorandum on the subject _in extenso_, but my ideas will be gleaned from the concluding paragraphs, which run as follows:--

"a.s.suming however, that all the foregoing arguments are brushed aside, it remains to be seen where any effective action could be taken. The countries to be considered are the following:--

"(_a_) _Russia._--Impossible, as there is no means of sending an Army there, the Baltic being closed. Archangel shut in winter and unsuitable at other seasons, and Vladivostok much too far away.

"(_b_) _Denmark_ and (_c_) _Holland_.--One or other of these countries would have to declare war on Germany unless her neutrality were violated, and in both cases the overseas communication would be so vulnerable to mine or torpedo attack as to be in the highest degree insecure.

"(_d_) _North German Coast._--Communications would be equally vulnerable.

"(_e_) _Italy._--a.s.sumes that Italy is a friendly belligerent, in which case she would probably not require the a.s.sistance of British troops, as her own action should be sufficient to finish Austria. It is unlikely that Italy would be induced to join in simply by the offer of troops which her military intelligence must know would be better employed elsewhere.

"(_f_) _Istria and Dalmatia._--A very dangerous line of communication, and one which would be impossible in the face of a hostile Italy. The islands on the Dalmatian seaboard are specially favourable for the action of defending submarines and torpedo craft, while mines might render any approach to the coast out of the question. With an actively friendly Italy an advance through her territory would be more practicable, but, as stated in preceding paragraph, unnecessary.

"(_g_) Through Greece to Servia, presumably _via_, Salonika, presumes Greece to be a friendly belligerent. Probably the least objectionable of any possible proposal, but necessitating the strict neutrality of Bulgaria, as otherwise the land communications would be very open to attack. A hostile Italy would also jeopardise the whole force.

"(_h_) _Gallipoli_, _Asia Minor_, _Syria_.--Any attack on Turkey would be devoid of decisive result. In the most favourable circ.u.mstances it could only cause the relaxation of the pressure against Russia in the Caucasus and enable her to transfer two or three Corps to the West--a result quite incommensurate with the effort involved. To attack Turkey would be to play the German game and to bring about the end which Germany had in mind when she induced Turkey to join in the war, namely, to draw off troops from the decisive spot, which is Germany itself.

"To sum up, my opinions are--

"(1) That the impossibility of breaking through the German line in Flanders has not been proved, and that that operation is feasible provided a sufficiency of high-explosive sh.e.l.ls and of guns is provided.

"(2) That, even if it were proved impossible to break the German line, so large a margin of safety is needed that troops could not be withdrawn from this theatre. It is to be remembered that the Allies are in a much better position to await the outcome of events. Time is against Germany; she will not sit for ever behind her entrenchments, and the Allies must be prepared with an adequate force to strike her whenever she may attempt to break out or withdraw.

"(3) That there are no theatres, other than those in which operations are now in progress, in which decisive results could be attained.

"I have not gone into details in considering the question of the employment of forces in other theatres, as such operations were considered by the M.O. Directorate of the War Office when I was C.I.G.S., and I have no doubt that a full record of the conclusions which were reached are filed there."

General Joffre's final opinion is expressed in a memorandum, dated January 19th, 1915, of which the following is a summary:--

"1. I wish to call your particular attention to the following points:--

"2. The French General Staff consider a German offensive possible--even probable--in the near future. The Germans are certainly making new formations; the 38th Corps has been identified in Bavaria.

"3. Our front must therefore be made absolutely secure. If broken, for example, about Roye and Montdidier, the consequences for the Allies would be of the most serious description.

"4. In addition to (3) we must place ourselves in the position of being able to a.s.sume the offensive.

"5. Because of (3) and (4), reserves are absolutely necessary.

"6. For these reasons, I am anxious for a rapid release of the Corps north of the British line.

"7. We must never lose sight of the decisive result, and all secondary operations must give way.

"8. Operations towards Ostend--Zeebrugge, though important, are, for the moment, secondary, and in my opinion should follow rather than precede the princ.i.p.al action, viz., the Collection of Reserves.

"To resume:--

(_a_) To beat the enemy it is necessary to have Reserves.

(_b_) These Reserves can only come from the north, as British reinforcements set them free.

(_c_) The German menace, not a vain thing, makes it necessary to collect these Reserves in the shortest possible time.

(_d_) The main object, viz., the defeat of the enemy, makes it necessary to delay the offensive towards Ostend--Zeebrugge."

I always disagreed with these views, and remain convinced that my plans should have been accepted and tried. I will only add, as a further argument against embarking upon operations in other theatres of war, that our military forces at that time, and for at least fifteen months afterwards, were not sufficient to enable us to carry on great operations in more than one theatre with the necessary power and energy required for success. They could only have resulted in what actually happened in 1915, viz., the series of feeble and on the whole unsuccessful attempts to break through the German line in France, and an absolute failure, compelling ultimate withdrawal of our troops, in the Dardanelles.

I have dealt at perhaps wearisome length with the strategic alternatives and the problems which presented themselves for solution after the close of the First Battle of Ypres. It has been necessary to do so in order that my countrymen may understand the situation as it actually existed at the time, and that they may appreciate what seemed to me conclusive reasons why greater progress was not made in 1915.

Divided counsels lead to half measures and indecisive action. Such counsels have always had, and always will have, the most deterrent and disadvantageous effect on any vigorous prosecution of a war, great or small.

CHAPTER XVI.

THE OPERATIONS OF DECEMBER 14TH-19TH, 1914.